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Abstract 
In this thesis I aim to provide a balanced, unbiased analysis of the materno-fetal conflict as 
expressed by the caesarean section scenario. A second aim is to examine the legal balance of 
the woman's rights against the fetus' and to determine whether the law could be altered to 
increase its protection of the fetus without unacceptably infringing the woman's rights. 
In R v Collins, the Court of Appeal has strongly affirmed the right of the competent pregnant 
woman to refuse consent to medical treatment regardless of any detrimental effect either to 
herself or her fetus. Likewise, Re MB holds that the interests of the fetus have no bearing on the 
woman's right to self-determination. However, despite its powerful affirmation of the primacy 
of autonomy I show that the Court of Appeal has left significant leeway for the concerned 
physician - or judge - to circumvent the woman's decision by finding her temporarily 
incompetent. The subjective nature of the current competence assessment tests and the use of 
temporary factors - such as pain, drugs and labour itself - allows backdoor paternalism. 
The failure of the courts to assess the public policy implications of the situation, and the 
obvious judicial sympathy for the fetus, suggest that the legal balance may be weighted too 
heavily in favour of the woman. However, analysis of statute law, common law and government 
publications suggests that society would not support the protection of the fetus at the expense 
of the woman. This is confirmed by European human rights law. Likewise, I argue that the 
moral value of the fetus is insufficient to allow it to trump the woman's rights. Finally, I argue 
that neither criminal nor tort liability are justified in trying to protect the fetus against the 
woman's refusal of consent to treatment. 
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Introduction 
In October 1992 the 'caesarean section debate'1 crossed the Atlantic when, in Re S,2 the High 
Court considered whether doctors could lawfully perform a caesarean against the will of a 
competent woman. This aspect of the maternal-fetal conflict first emerged in the U.S. more 
than ten years previously. Jefferson,3 in which the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the 
compulsory caesarean order made by the lower court, was the first officially reported case.4 
The conflict raged in America for almost ten years until Re AC.5 This case concerned an 
unfortunate woman in the latter stage of terminal cancer who was 26 weeks pregnant when 
doctors estimated her life expectancy as only 24 to 48 hours.6 The District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals, in reversing the original compulsory caesarean order, held that the trial judge was 
wrong to balance AC's rights against those of the state and that a competent refusal of 
consent must be respected in 'virtually all cases'.7 Sadly, we were destined to play out the 
same judicial farce that had already been reconciled in America. 
In Re S, a 30 year old woman, in her third pregnancy, was admitted post-term with ruptured 
membranes and a transverse fetal lie. S refused consent to a caesarean for religious reasons. 
The situation was described as a matter of 'life and death'8 with both mother and fetus at risk. 
In under an hour Sir Stephen Brown P held that - on the basis of Re T9 and Re AC10 - a non-
consensual caesarean was lawful (figure 1). 
Thorpe, LJ. 'The Caesarean Section Debate' [1997] 27 Fam. Law 663. 
2 Re S [1993] 1 FLR 26. 
3 Jefferson v Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, 274 SE 2d 457 (Ga 1981). 
4 Rhoden, NK. 'The Judge in the Delivery Room' [1986] California Law Review 1951. 
5 Re AC, 573 A 2d 1235 (1990). 
6 Noble-Allgire, AM. 'Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections' (1989) 10 The Journal of Legal Medicine 
211. 
7 Opcit. n.5 at 1249. 
8 Op cit. n.2 at 27. 


























Figure 1: Interpretation of the possible basis for the decision in Re S. The dashed lines 
represent contentious arguments criticised as not having a good legal basis. 
The decision provoked strong criticism with the consensus that Re S was wrongly decided". 
Thomson states: ' . . .the decision in Re S appears to ignore what seemed to be a settled 
requirement for consent to medical treatment when the individual is conscious and mentally 
competent. . . . i t also appears to run counter to the view that the fetus in English law does not 
have a legal personality until it is born alive'. 1 2 As Montgomery noted: 'Although the 
decision was made by the President of the Family Division .. .its hurried nature means that it 
must be treated warily. The basis of the court's jurisdiction to make the order was barely 
discussed, nor was any clear explanation given of the reasons for the decision'.13 Stern, 
1 0 Op cit. n.5. 
" Plomer, A. 'Judicially Enforced Caesareans and the Sanctity of Life' (1997) 26 Anglo-American Law 
Review 235 at 236. 
1 2 Thomson, M. 'After Re S' [1994] 2 Med. Law Rev. 127 at 130. 
1 3 Montgomery, J. Health Care Law (1997) at 404. 
13 
interprets the decision as based on the public interest in the fetus and believes: 'the decision 
in re S represents a worrying policy preference for the rights of an unborn child over those of 
a pregnant woman'. 1 4 And Hewson comments that: "The President took a consequentialist 
view of pregnant women in Re S, opening up alarming vistas of obstetric coercion. ...But 
allowing obstetricians to cut open women's bodies against their wi l l , as the means of saving 
their foetuses, is open to powerful moral and legal objections'.15 Lord Justice Thorpe, 
however, while arguing for the need for legislation in this area, believed: 'the President's 
decision was not without foundation in law' 1 6 and 'the President, certainly at that date, was 
fully entitled to draw support from the USA jurisprudence which, although clearly divided on 
the issue, demonstrated instances in which the jurisdiction had been found and the discretion 
similarly exercised'.17 
The only English authority referred to in Re S was Lord Donaldson MR's dictum in Re T. 
This case concerned the lawfulness of administering a blood transfusion to a young woman 
who lay unconscious on intensive care following a caesarean18. Although not herself one, T 
had, after talking with her Jehovah's witness mother, refused consent to a blood transfusion 
during the caesarean. The court at first instance declared that, since T's refusal of blood only 
covered the caesarean - not the postoperative emergency that had arisen - it would be lawful, 
as in her best interests, for doctors to transfuse blood. T's appeal was dismissed as her 
decision to refuse consent was vitiated by the change in circumstances and the undue 
influence exerted by her mother. The dictum relied on in Re S was: 'An adult patient who, 
like Miss T, suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute right to choose whether to 
consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather than another of the 
1 4 Stem, K.' Court-Ordered Caesarian Sections: In Whose Interests?' [1993] 56 MLR 238 at 243. 
1 5 Hewson, B. 'Ethical Triumph or Surgical Rape?' (1993) 137 SJ 1182. 
1 6 Opcit. n.l. 
1 7 Ibid. 
1 8 Op cit. n.9. 
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treatments being offered. The only possible qualification is a case in which the choice may 
lead to the death of a viable foetus'.1 9 
Sir Stephen Brown P held that Re AC20 indicated 'that i f this case were being heard in the 
American courts the answer would be likely to be in favour of granting a declaration'.21 This 
was an unfortunate choice because the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the 
lower court's decision to order a compulsory caesarean.22 As Thomson notes: 'Re AC does 
not validate, or support, compelled medical treatment against the wishes of a competent 
patient in order to save or benefit the life of a fetus... It is seen as very clearly stating that a 
competent patient cannot be compelled to undergo major invasive surgery, even i f failure to 
do so will result in the death of the fetus'.2 3 However, some justification for Sir Stephen 
Brown P's use of Re AC as an authority can be found in that court's discussion of Re 
Madyun24. In Re Madyun the court ordered a caesarean where there was strong evidence that 
both the mother and baby would benefit physically. Re AC neither approved nor disapproved 
of this decision which, as noted by Teff: 'did leave open the possibility that intervention was 
lawful on facts very similar to Re S'.25 
Following Re S, the ethics committee of the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists advised against seeking court orders in similar circumstances.26 They 
produced a report concluding: 'I t is inappropriate, and unlikely to be helpful or necessary, to 
invoke judicial intervention to overrule an informed and competent woman's refusal of a 
1 9 Op cit. n.9 at 786, per Lord Donaldson MR. 
2 0 Op cit. n.5. 
2 1 Op cit. n.2 at 27. 
2 2 Op cit. n.5 at 1249. 
2 3 Op cit. n.12 at 128. 
2 4 114 Daily Washington Law Report 2233 (D.C. super Ct , 1986) 
2 5 Teff, H. Reasonable Care (1994) at 152. 
2 6 Dimond, B. 'Forcing the Issue' (1996: 14th November) Health Services Journal 9. 
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proposed medical treatment, even though her refusal might place her life and that of the 
foetus at risk'.27 However, other cases followed. 
There have been seven reported instances where an English court has considered the 
lawfulness of a non-consensual caesarean. In the first and last cases (Re 5" and Collins) the 
court dealt with women competent to determine their own treatment decisions. In Rochdale™ 
a woman, competent in the eyes of her obstetrician, was deemed incompetent by the judge 
because she was emotionally upset by the pain and stress of labour. In two cases the courts 
held the women to be incompetent because a needle phobia rendered them incapable of 
weighing information in the balance.29 In the other two cases the women were more clearly 
incompetent with one suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and the other denying that she 
was even pregnant.30 In all cases, the first instance decision was to override the woman's 
refusal and declare a non-consensual caesarean lawful. Two of the cases went to the Court of 
Appeal: in Re MB,31 the women suffered from a needle phobia and the order was upheld; in 
Collins the first instance decision was overruled and the Court of Appeal upheld the primacy 
of the woman's autonomy.32 However, the Court of Appeal hearing was after the event, the 
baby had already been delivered, and no lives were at stake. 
As Thorpe LJ noted: Tt is, perhaps, easier for an appellate court to discern principle than it is 
for a trial court to apply it in the face of judicial instinct, training, and emotion. Applications 
in Caesarean cases are confined to judges of the Family Division. Those judges are dedicated 
to upholding child welfare. It is simply unrealistic to suppose that the preservation of each 
RCOG. A Consideration of the Law and Ethics in Relation to Court-Authorised Obstetric 
Interventions (1994) at 5.12. 
2 8 Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v C [1997] 1 FCR 274. 
2 9 Re MB [1997] 2 FCR 541; Re L [1997] 1 FCR 609. 
3 0 Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH [1996] 1 FLR 762; Norfolk and Norwich 
Healthcare (NHS) Trust [1996] 2 FLR 613. 
3 1 Re MB [1997] 2 FCR 541. 
3 2 St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S; R v Collins and others, ex parte S [1998] 3 All ER 673. 
16 
life wil l not be a matter of equal concern to the Family Division judge surveying the medical 
dilemma. Whatever emphasis legal principle may place upon adult autonomy with the 
consequent right to choose between treatments, at some level the judicial outcome will be 
influenced by the expert evidence as to which treatment affords the best chance of the happy 
announcement that both mother and baby are doing well. Unless the recognition of this 
consideration is legitimated there is an obvious risk of strained reasoning, increased litigation 
both at first instance and on appeal, and stress in interdisciplinary co-operation'.33 
It is this emotional pressure and judicial instinct that makes the caesarean cases so hard. The 
woman's decision, to refuse a caesarean, may be difficult to understand for someone with 
different beliefs and their choice may seem 'morally repugnant'.34 The death of a fetus during 
childbirth is tragic and when that death is preventable, excepting an incomprehensible 
decision of the pregnant woman, the pressure is on the judge to reach a decision that will 
result in two live people. Rhoden believes: 'The dilemma is so difficult that it borders on the 
intractable'.35 In Re T, Lord Donaldson MR described the situation as a 'novel problem of 
considerable legal and ethical complexity'.3 6 Its complexity arises from the conflict between 
autonomy and the sanctity of life both of which society values and protects by the law. 
However, neither receive absolute protection and the court must decide which principle has 
primacy. Where the person refusing treatment is not pregnant this is settled with public 
policy and legal precedent supporting the individual. As Lord Donaldson MR stated: 'I t is 
well established that in the ultimate the right of the individual is paramount'.37 The presence 
of a fetus, however, has a powerful effect on the situation. 
3 3 Op cit. n.l at 663-664. 
3 4 Op cit. n.32 at 692. 
3 5 Op cit. n.4 at 1954. 
3 6 Op cit. n.9 at 786. 
3 7 Ibid, at 796. 
17 
Pregnancy is a unique physical state in which a developing fetus progressively approaches 
personhood enclosed within the woman. Anything affecting the woman is also likely to affect 
the fetus and any need the fetus has must be met through the woman's body. When it was not 
possible to assess, monitor or treat the fetus there was no moral or legal conflict and what 
was good for the mother was good for the fetus. The only patient to consider was the woman. 
With the advent of new medical technologies, allowing it to be monitored and treated, the 
fetus has become a second patient.38 As Nelson and Milliken note: 'As a result of the rapid 
development of obstetric knowledge and technology, the physician's relationship to the fetus 
has changed dramatically'.39 The woman has always had to balance her own interests with 
those of her fetus but now the doctor and - through the doctor - the state have also become 
embroiled in the conflict. 
The conflict is all the more impassioned because it does not affect the moral community 
evenly. Women are cast as the villains with the unborn child as the innocent victim and the 
medical profession - an essentially masculine establishment - the moral saviour. Non-
consensual caesareans are major infringements of women's rights and are considered by 
feminists to be another example of masculine control. Gallagher states: 'The fetus's 
emergence as patient, plaintiff and even quasi-religious icon serves as a vehicle for efforts to 
reinforce the claims of traditional maternal norms and gender roles on white, Anglo 
women'. 4 0 Later she states: 'The most draconian expression of this none-too-subtle gender 
warfare is the court-ordered cesarean section'.41 Some authors question whether the fetal 
rights movement treats women simply as 'fetal containers'42 and Hewson considers non-
3 8 Nelson, LJ. Milliken, MD. 'Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women' (1988) 259(7) JAMA 
1060. 
3 9 Ibid. 
4 0 Gallagher, J. 'Collective Bad Faith: 'Protecting' The Fetus'. In: Callahan, JC.(Ed) Reproduction, 
Ethics, and the Law: Feminist Perspectives (1995) 343 at 345. 
4 1 Ibid, at 346. 
4 2 Annas, GJ. 'Pregnant Women as Fetal Container' (1986) Hastings Center Report 13. 
18 
consensual caesareans to be the equivalent of 'surgical rape'.4 3 The position is concisely 
stated by Johnsen: 'By creating an adversarial relationship between the woman and her fetus, 
the state provides itself with a powerful means for controlling women's behaviour during 
pregnancy, thereby threatening women's fundamental rights'. 4 4 
The American experience was further complicated by the disproportionate number of women 
from ethnic minorities being challenged by the state. In 1987 Kolder et al reported a national 
survey of the United States: in 21 cases, across 11 states, court orders for compulsory 
caesareans were successfully sought in 86%. In 81% of the successful cases the women were 
non-white and 24% did not speak English as their first language.45 Because of the differences 
between the healthcare systems this form of discrimination may be less likely to occur in the 
U.K. than the U.S. However, as Daniels states: 'Women who differ from their medical or 
legal practitioners in race, ethnicity, religion or class are less likely to be seen as rational 
actors in the healthcare and legal systems'.46 Thus the danger remains that women who do not 
f i t the doctor's view of a culturally acceptable norm may have their competence questioned 
more readily than would white middle-class women. 
The caesarean debate is a difficult moral and legal problem further complicated by the 
potential for discrimination against pregnant women in general and non-white women in 
particular. By adopting a neutral stance and considering the moral and legal dilemma from 
both the woman's and the fetus' situation, I will avoid either undervaluing the fetus or 
subjugating the woman's rights to her reproductive function. Using Collins as a springboard I 
will discuss the current legal position, the legal developments that preceded the case and the 
4 3 Op cit. n.15. 
4 4 Johnsen, DE. 'The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to 
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection' (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 599. 
4 5 Kolder, VEB. Gallagher, J. Parsons, MT. 'Court Ordered Obstetrical Interventions' (1987) 316 
NEJM 1192. 
4 6 Daniels, CR. At Women's Expense (1993) at 136. 
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implications that the case holds for pregnant women. I will consider the legal and moral 
rights of the pregnant woman, in 'both domestic law and under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and how those rights may be affected by third party interests. I will also 
discuss the legal1 and moral status of the fetus. Finally, I will consider whether the current law 
achieves the correct balance of legal protection for the moral rights of the relevant actors and 
whether any possible improvements may be made. The aims of this thesis are thus: to provide 
a balanced, unbiased analysis of the maternal-fetal conflict as it relates to the caesarean 
debate using the judgment in Collins as a starting point; and to analyse whether the law could 
be changed to provide greater protection for the fetus without unacceptably infringing the 
woman's rights. 
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Part One: The Caesarean Cases 
Chapter One: R v ColIins 4 7and the Competent Woman 
Collins was the most recent of a short series of cases concerning the lawfulness of doctors 
overriding a pregnant woman's refusal of consent to a caesarean. Apart from Rochdale,48 in 
which the judge's decision that the women was incompetent was questionable, the only other 
case involving a competent woman was Re S.49 As the first Court of Appeal judgment to 
consider the right of a competent, pregnant woman to refuse treatment as part of the ratio, 
Collins represents the current legal situation. Collins has added significance because the 
caesarean was indicated on both maternal and fetal grounds rather than solely for fetal benefit 
(infra p.25). 
The Facts 
S was a 28 year old veterinary nurse who, at 36 weeks of gestation, sought to register as a 
new patient with a GP. She was diagnosed with pre-eclampsia severe enough to require 
hospital admission and an induction of labour. S was advised as to the potentially life-
threatening risks to her and her baby. It was accepted that she understood the risks but she 
rejected the advice because, as she later documented: ' I have always held very strong views 
with regard to medical and surgical treatments for myself, and particularly wish to allow 
nature to "take its course", without intervention'.5 0 
Op cit. n.32. 
Op cit. n.28. 
OP cit. n.2. 
Op cit. n.32 at 681. 
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She was compulsorily detained for assessment under s.2 Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983 
justified by; a previous diagnosis of moderate depression, her own admission that she was 
probably depressed and her GP's statement that her 'mental state may be compromising her 
ability to make decisions'.51 However, the real concern was for the fetus and S's physical 
health and this was highlighted by the approved social worker: T do not think that a 
psychiatric ward was the best place for this patient, but I felt the gravity of the situation was 
such that she needed some sort of safety containment, assessment and immediate treatment 
when necessary'.52 An ex parte declaration that a non-consensual caesarean would be lawful 
was granted, a caesarean was performed and the baby safely delivered. At no point during her 
detention was S treated for any mental disorder. 
The Court of Appeal's Judgment 
S was held competent and the three principles then considered were: autonomy, the legal 
status of the fetus and the application of the MHA 1983. The Court of Appeal recognised that 
the right of the individual to decide whether to accept or refuse medical treatment was an 
established legal principle. A doctor who treated a patient in the face of their refusal would 
be committing a trespass. It also decided that it was well established that the fetus had no 
independent existence or legal recognition as a person. Combining these two principles the 
court concluded: 'In our judgment while pregnancy increases the personal responsibilities of 
a woman it does not diminish her entitlement to decide whether or not to undergo medical 
treatment. Although human, and protected by the law an unborn child is not a separate 
person from its mother. Its need for medical assistance does not prevail over her rights. She is 
entitled not to be forced to submit to an invasion of her body against her wi l l , whether her 
own life or that of her unborn child depends on it. Her right is not reduced or diminished 
5 l Opcit . n.32at 678. 
5 2 Op cit. n.32 at 679. 
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merely because her decision to exercise it may appear morally repugnant'. Thus, the Court 
of Appeal held that the 'perceived needs of the foetus'5 4 could not justify an infringement of 
the mother's autonomy (Figure 2). 5 5 
Fetus 
es Has 
Decision Is Not 
Competence T-
Legal 




Refusal Consent Protected by 3rd Party 
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Rational Irrational 
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Figure 2: A model of the argument in Collins. 
Discussion 
A competent woman's refusal of a caesarean raises three questions. The first is whether, 
disregarding the fetus, the woman has the right to refuse consent to medical treatment when 
her own health and life are at risk. Such an action creates a moral dilemma between the 
woman's autonomy and society's interest in preserving her well-being and life. It is well 
established in English law that the individual's right of autonomy trumps the state's interest 
in the preservation of l i fe . 5 6 In Bland,51 Lord Keith stated: 'Even when his or her own life 
5 3 Op cit. n.32 at 692. 
5 4 Ibid. 
5 5 The procedural improprieties in this case are not relevant to this thesis. 
5 6 Op cit. n.9 at 796. 
5 7 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 AH ER 821. 
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depends on receiving medical treatment an adult of sound mind is entitled to refuse it. This 
reflects the autonomy of each individual and the right of self-determination'.58 The Court of 
Appeal, in Collins, was correct in restating this principle and in noting that any invasion of 
the woman's body without her consent would amount to a battery.59 
Since the fetus is absolutely dependent upon the pregnant woman, it might be argued that her 
refusal of consent to medical treatment beneficial to the fetus constitutes a 'harm'. According 
to JS Mil l ' s 'Harm Theory', the only justification for overriding an individual's autonomous 
decision is where a third part will be 'harmed'. Thus, the second question is whether the 
presence of a viable fetus affects the woman's right to refuse consent. It is an important 
aspect of this case that this question was considered as part of the ratio. In Re S, although not 
explained, the court's decision appeared to rely on public interest in the fetus,6 0 rather than 
the fetus' rights perse, as justification for overriding a competent woman's refusal. 
The Court of Appeal in Collins stated: 'In the present case there was no conflict between the 
interests of the mother and the foetus; no one was faced with the awful dilemma of deciding 
on one form of treatment which risked one of their lives in order to save the other'. The 
second half of the statement refers to the point I raised earlier; that the caesarean was 
indicated on both fetal and maternal grounds. This is important because, i f indicated solely 
for fetal benefit, a caesarean causes a set-back to the physical well-being of the woman. I f 
performed without her consent then, not only has she suffered an infringement of her 
autonomy and bodily integrity but her welfare interest61 in her health has also been harmed. 
5 8 Ibid, at 860 per Lord Keith. 
5 9 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 at 378 per Goff LJ; See Chapter 3. 
6 0 See p. 13. 
6 1 Feinberg, J. Harm to Others (1984) at 37. Welfare interests include; continuance of life, physical and 
mental health, emotional stability, freedom from interference. 
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Where a non-consensual caesarean is performed on maternal grounds then any infringement 
of autonomy and bodily integrity is offset by the overall beneficial effect that the operation 
has on her welfare interest in her health. Thus a non-consensual caesarean performed on both 
maternal and fetal grounds causes less harm to the woman (Figure 3) than one performed 
solely for the benefit of the fetus (figure 4). This does not mean that the benefit to her health 
outweighs the infringement of her autonomy and bodily integrity. Rather, upholding the 
woman's right to refuse consent despite physical benefits to both her and her fetus is a far 
stronger statement of protection for the right of autonomy than i f it were upheld in the face of 
physical benefit to the fetus but physical detriment to the woman. 
While the second half of their statement was valid and obviously important, the initial point 
made by the Court of Appeal - that 'there was no conflict between the interests of the mother 
and the foetus' - is, with respect, clearly wrong. The fetus has no autonomy and no ulterior 
interests.62 Its only 'interests' are its health and being born alive as these are pre-requisites for 
autonomous life. By denying the fetus the most beneficial mode of delivery the woman 
causes a set-back to those interests. Providing the woman's choice is based on either her 
welfare or ulterior interests, as it was in Collins, then there must be a conflict between the 
woman's and fetus' interests. The Court of Appeal's statement would only be correct i f it 
was taken to mean that there was no conflict between the woman's and fetus' health interests. 
But, by equating 'interests' with 'interests in health' the Court of Appeal makes the same 
mistake as many healthcare professionals: that the effect on the patient's health is the only 
important variable. This ignores many other welfare, and almost all ulterior, interests and 
also implies that the woman's decision was not based on any important 'interest'. However, 
the Court of Appeal in Collins still held that the competent pregnant woman had the right to 
6 2 Op cit. n.61. Ulterior interests include; a successful career and family life and achieving personal 
goals. 
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refuse medical treatment regardless of her own life or that of her fetus, even i f the decision 
'appear[s] morally repugnant'.63 
It is well established in English law that although the fetus has some protected rights it has no 
locus standi to assert those rights until it is born alive.6 4 Thus Collins, in protecting the 
woman's autonomy ahead of the fetus, was correct as far as it went. It failed to consider, 
however, the situation i f the fetus was born alive but damaged - or i f it subsequently died -
because the mother rejected medical advice. In Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 of 1994) 
the House of Lords held that injuring a child in utero could give rise to liability for 
manslaughter i f the child dies subsequent to a live birth. 6 5 Although the case concerned 
unlawful act manslaughter it would be logical that gross negligent manslaughter is similarly 
possible. Could an unreasonable or irrational refusal of a caesarean be considered gross 
negligence? I f yes then, a woman who refuses a caesarean - where the child dies subsequent 
to a live birth - may be guilty of manslaughter. This would be a draconian and undesirable 
way of 'policing pregnancy'.66 By failing to address this question Collins has left open the 
'lacuna' uncovered in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 of1994). 
6 3 Op cit. n.32 at 692. 
6 4 Paton v BP AS [1979] 1 QB 276. 
6 5 Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 WLR 421. 
6 6 Fovargue, S. Miola, J. 'Policing Pregnancy: Implications of the Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 
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Figure 3: The balance between the harms and benefits when a non-consensual caesarean is 
performed on both maternal and fetal grounds. 
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Figure 4: The balance between the harms and benefits when a non-consensual caesarean is 
performed solely on fetal grounds. 
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The third question that should have been addressed is whether any other interests might 
curtail the pregnant woman's right. The most important of these is the public interest. 
Autonomy and consent are not absolute concepts and public policy may vitiate consent where 
serious injury is caused.67 Refusing consent to a procedure that prevents harm is as much a 
cause of harm as giving consent to an act that produces harm. Therefore, public policy must 
be relevant where a refusal of consent may result in such harm. 
In Re S, Sir Stephen Brown P referred to Re AC and Lord Donaldson MR's dictum in Re T 
suggesting that public policy played a major role in his decision. In other caesarean cases 
public policy was side-stepped because the court protected the fetus by finding the woman 
incompetent. Re MB has been specifically criticised for, inter alia, failing to consider policy 
issues.68 The Court of Appeal in Collins similarly failed to consider any of the potentially 
relevant public interests. It did consider the fetus' self-interests, but there is a marked 
distinction between those self-interests and the public interest in preserving the life and 
health of the fetus. Although Collins overrules Re S the question of public interest in the 
fetus remains open. In Re F69 the Court of Appeal decided that, as a legal non-person, the 
fetus of a mentally disturbed , drug abusing pregnant woman could not be made a ward of 
court. Balcombe LJ saw any extension of the law, 'so as to impose control over the mother of 
an unborn child', as a matter for Parliament.70 Since Collins involves a similar infringement 
of the woman's rights i f the fetus is to be protected then it may be that the correct place to 
establish the balance of society's interest is in Parliament. Indeed, Judge LJ, in Collins71 
quoted Balcombe LJ (supra), which suggests it was his reason for avoiding public interest 
R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75. 
6 8 Stauch, M. 'Court-Authorised Caesarians and the Principle of Patient Autonomy' (1997) 6 
Nottingham Law Journal 74. 
6 9 Re F (in utero) [1988] FCR 529. 
7 0 Ibid, at 538 per Balcombe LJ. 
7 1 Op cit. n.l at 689-690. 
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issues. However, it is necessary for these issues to be formally discussed and the status of the 
fetus in the context of the public interest made more certain (see p.91). 
Although the Court of Appeal in Collins delivered a useful judgment regarding the MHA 
1983 and the procedural elements of applying for a declaratory order, their consideration of 
the issue of competence was, like previous cases, inadequate. The tenor of the judgment 
suggests that the Court of Appeal believed S to be obviously competent. It was perhaps 
because of this that Judge LJ only felt it necessary to re-iterate Lord Donaldson MR's view 
of a risk-related standard: 'What matters is whether at that time the patient's capacity was 
reduced below the level needed in the case of a refusal of that importance, for refusals can 
vary in importance. Some may involve a risk to life or of irreparable damage to health. Others 
may not'. 7 2 However, it is clear that the flexibility of this concept allows the court - or the 
doctors - to manipulate the assessment of competence in a way that is easiest on their 
conscience. Perhaps this is what Thorpe LJ had in mind when he warned of the ' . . .obvious 
risk of strained reasoning, increased litigation and stress in interdisciplinary co-
operation'.73 
The Court of Appeal in Collins was wrong to accept the risk-related standard. It requires a 
higher standard of competence when the health risk is great compared to when it is low. 
Since medical treatment is only justified if, on balance, it is beneficial then a refusal of 
treatment creates a greater health risk than does consenting. It follows that a risk-related 
standard allows a doctor to raise the level of competence when a patient rejects their advice. 
Thus, where the risk is high, as in the refusal of caesarean, a risk-related standard makes it 
considerably easier to circumvent an unconscionable decision. 
7 2 Op cit. n.9 at 789 per Lord Donaldson MR. 
7 3 Op cit. n.l at 664. 
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When a woman puts her own life and that of her fetus at risk, doctors and the courts, may feel 
under moral and emotional pressure to move the goal posts and demand an unreachable level 
of competence of the woman in order to protect her fetus: 'By and large doctors (and other 
health professionals) are more likely to be guided in their decision-making by conscience (or 
what seems to them to be the right course) than by any legal constraints'.74 Thorpe LJ, hints 
that the same propensity may be found in the judges of the Family Division. 7 5 A risk-related 
standard effectively means that, where there is a high risk, the only real option open to the 
patient is to consent and thus paternalism sneaks in through the back door. A pregnant 
woman who refuses consent may be deemed incompetent which means her only 'choice' is to 
accept the doctor's advice. Since choice may be defined as the: 'act of choosing between two 
or more possibilities'7 6 then a risk-related standard denies the woman any 'choice' at all. 
Wicclair neatly summarises the error behind a risk-related standard: ' . . .it is important to 
recognise that a stronger reason for making sure that a patient is decisionally capable should 
not be confused with a stronger standard of decision making capacity'.77 The level of 
competence required for a particular decision should be determined by the complexity of that 
decision and not by the risk involved. 
Another way in which Collins has left open an escape route from the primacy of autonomy is 
by accepting, without further comment, that 'fatigue, shock, pain or drugs' affect 
competence.78 Harpwood states: 'difficulties are likely to arise when consent to treatment is 
sought from women in labour, many of whom may temporarily lack the mental capacity to 
give consent, because of pain, fatigue or the effects of analgesia'.79 As Brazier notes: ' A l l are 
Wear, AN. Brahams, D. 'To Treat or not to Treat: the Legal, Ethical and Therapeutic Implications of 
Treatment Refusal'(1991) 17 Journal of Medical Ethics 131 atl32. 
7 5 Op cit. N. 1. at 664. 
76 Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (1990). 
7 7 Wicclair, MR. 'Patient Decision-Making Capacity and Risk' (1991) 5 Bioethics 91. 
7 8 Op cit. n.32 at 693. 
7 9 Harpwood, V. Legal Issues in Obstetrics (1996) at 67. 
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in so many cases an inevitable part of childbirth' but, while competence may be affected, 
their relevance must only exist at the extremes. I f this was not the case then all labouring 
women and emergency patients would be deemed temporarily incompetent. The danger is 
that a subjective analysis of these factors' effects may tip the balance towards finding a 
woman incompetent i f she rejects medical advice. This is what happened in Rochdale%x when 
Johnson J found the woman incompetent because her thought process had been affected by 
the 'throes of labour'. The paternalistic potential of using the woman's state of being in 
labour is exacerbated by the concomitant use of a risk-related standard. Since the guidelines, 
detailed in Collins, effectively allow doctors to determine competence and only approach the 
court when in doubt, they are given almost a carte blanche to treat a labouring woman in the 
way they feel would be in her best interests. Furthermore, the potential for subjectivity is 
increased by the Re C 8 2 test of which the third part - weighing information in the balance to 
arrive at a choice - allows greatest scope. 
The Court of Appeal's restatement of the law relating to autonomy and consent to medical 
treatment, in Collins, was a very strong defence of the individual's right of self-
determination: ' . . .how can a forced invasion of a competent adult's body against her will 
even for the most laudable of motives (the preservation of life) be ordered without 
irremediably damaging the principle of self-determination? When human life is at stake the 
pressure to provide an affirmative answer authorising unwanted medical intervention is very 
powerful. Nevertheless, the autonomy of each individual requires continuing protection even, 
perhaps particularly, when the motive for interfering with it is readily understandable, and 
indeed to many would appear commendable'.83 
0 Brazier, M. 'Hard Cases Make Bad Law?' (1997) 23 (6) Journal of Medical Ethics 341. 
1 Op cit. n.28. 
2 Re C (An Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 2 FCR 151. See p.39. 
3 Op cit. n.l at 688. 
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In re-establishing the primacy of autonomy, the Court of Appeal in Collins has correctly 
stated the current law. 8 4 However, despite being 'legally sound' the judgment failed to 
confront the very real problem of the issue of competence being used as a sword by doctors 
and the courts instead of a shield by the pregnant woman. Hewson is right to describe this 
situation as a catch-22;85 women may only refuse consent i f they are competent but any 
refusal signifies a lack of competence and may be overridden. Whether or not women's rights 
should take precedence over fetal rights, salving the doctor's - or judge's - conscience by 
using a conveniently flexible standard of competence cannot be right. Society must have an 
interest in the protection of both mother and fetus. I f judges are unwilling to confront the 
policy arguments then they need urgent consideration by Parliament. 
8 4 Kahn, M. 'Right to Bodily Integrity' (1998) 3(2) Journal of Civil Liberties 127. 
8 5 Hewson, B. 'Could the High Court Order You to Have an Operation?' (1998) 115 Living Marxism 
24. 
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Chapter Two: Non-consensual Caesareans and the Incompetent Woman 
Three issues spring to mind when considering the treatment (excluding treatment under the 
MHA 1983) of patients whose competence is in question: 
1. competence assessment; 
2. the determination of the appropriate treatment; and 
3. the legal justification for that treatment. 
By considering each of the five caesarean cases - heard in this jurisdiction - in which the 
competence of the woman was questioned by the court I wil l analyse how these issues are 
dealt with in practice. 
Temporary Incapacitating Factors 
Three cases have considered temporary incompetence: one relied on the pain and stress of 
86 87 88 c 
labour, while the other two concerned needle phobias. ' The issue of temporary 
incompetence caused by analgesic drugs was raised in Re L.S9 The leading case is Re MB,90 
which is important for its consideration of competence, its procedural guidelines and its 
obiter on the legal position of a competent woman. 
Re MB 
MB consented to the caesarean but, because of a needle phobia, refused consent to the 
anaesthesia. At first she agreed to inhalational anaesthesia but withdrew that consent when 
she saw the mask. The baby was breech and a vaginal delivery was assessed as posing a 50% 
risk of serious injury to the foetus but little physical risk to the mother. The hospital sought a 
Op cit. n.28. 
Re L (An Adult: Non-consensual Treatment) [1997] 1 FCR 609. 
Op cit. n.31. 
Op cit. n.87. 
Op cit. n.31. 
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declaration that it would be lawful to operate. At first instance, the declaration was granted 
on the basis that the needle phobia rendered MB temporarily incompetent to decide.91 Later 
that evening, the Court of Appeal upheld the declaration.92 






































Figure 5: A model of the legal argument in Re MB. 
The Court held that MB's will had been 'paralysed' by her needle phobia. Although fear may 
be a rational reason to refuse consent, i f - as with MB - that fear is sufficient to 'paralyse the 
wi l l ' then the capacity-to-decide is absent. The Court argued that, while not equivalent to 
incompetence, irrationality may be evidence of it and factors such as shock, pain or drugs 
may cause temporary incapacity where they 'were operating to such a degree that the ability 
9 1 Re MB (Medical Treatment)[1997] Fam Law 542. 
9 2 Opcit . n.31. 
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to decide was absent'. The Court stated, obiter, that there was an 'absolute right' to refuse 
medical treatment: 'A competent woman who has the capacity to decide may, for religious 
reasons, other reasons, rational or irrational reasons or for no reason at all, choose not to have 
medical intervention even though the consequence may be the death or serious handicap of 
the child she bears or her own death'.93 The Court approved the risk-related standard and also 
held: ' A person lacked capacity when some impairment or disturbance of mental functioning 
rendered that person unable to comprehend, retain and use information and weigh it in the 
balance'. Re S and the observation by Lord Donaldson MR in Re Twere disapproved.94 
Discussion 
The Court of Appeal held that the starting point for any assessment of competence is the 
presumption of competence.95 It was correct in restating this principle, as the Law 
Commission96 considered it a 'fundamental concept' and included the principle in their Draft 
B i l l . 9 7 However, it may sometimes be difficult for the doctor or judge to follow this 
requirement when faced with a recalcitrant woman who refuses a caesarean and puts the life 
of her fetus at risk on the basis of an 'irrational' decision. An example of this difficulty is 
seen in Rochdale {infra p.48).9 8 However, the decision itself must be ignored when assessing 
competence objectively otherwise it is difficult to make a genuine presumption of 
competence. 
Op cit. n.31 at 553. 
The court also handed down procedural guidelines not relevant to this thesis. 
Op cit. n.31 at 542. 
Law Commission Report on Mental Incapacity (1995) No. 231. 
Ibid, at para 3.2. 
Op cit. n.28. 
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The Court of Appeal in Re MB did note that an irrational decision was insufficient to 
establish incompetence but may be evidence of it. Thus, an irrational decision, while 
indicating the patient's competence should be questioned, does not equate to incompetence. 
This is the correct approach to irrationality and incompetence and follows Sidaway99 and Re 
T, in which Lord Donaldson MR stated: 'This right of choice... exists notwithstanding that 
the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent'.100 
This principle was included in a green paper on incapacity101 following the Law 
Commission's proposal: 'a person should not be regarded as unable to make a decision by 
reason of mental disability merely because he or she makes a decision which would not be 
made by a person of ordinary prudence'.102 Roth et al noted the "'reasonable' outcome of 
choice' test is 'probably used more often than might be admitted by both physicians and 
courts When life is at stake and a court believes that the patient's decision is 
unreasonable, the court may focus on even the smallest ambiguity in the patient's thinking to 
cast doubt on the patient's competency so that it may issue an order that wil l preserve life or 
health'. 1 0 3 
The "'reasonable' outcome of choice test' is based on the syllogism: i f treatment is beneficial 
it would be unreasonable to refuse it; competent patients do not make unreasonable decisions 
therefore the patient is not competent. This argument is invalid because: firstly, the patient's 
view of what is in his interests may be different to the doctor's view. The doctor is concerned 
with the physical health of the patient but the patient may be more interested in other aspects 
Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 
871. 
1 0 0 Op cit. n.9 at 786 per Lord Donaldson MR. 
1 0 1 Lord Chancellor's department. 'Who decides? Making decisions on behalf of the mentally 
incompetent patients'. (1997) Consultation Paper. 
1 0 2 Op cit. n.96 at para 3.19. 
1 0 3 Roth, LH. Meisel, A. Lidz, CW. 'Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment' (1977) 134 (3) 
American Journal of Psychiatry 279. 
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of their life. Thus, what is reasonable to the doctor may not be reasonable to the patient; 
secondly, competent people do - sometimes - make wrong or unreasonable decisions. I f 
patients possessed ideal rationality then all their decisions would be reasonable. However, 
perfect rationality is unrealistic and all that should be expected is 'minimal rationality'. 1 0 4 
This would require only some of the patient's decisions to accord with their belief-system 
and thus incompetence would not follow from an isolated irrational decision. Roth et al 
conclude: 'The benefits and costs of this test are that social goals and individual health are 
promoted at considerable expense to personal autonomy. The reasonable outcome test is 
useful in alerting physicians and courts to the fact that the patient's decision-making process 
may be, but not necessarily is, awry'. 1 0 5 Other authors have also expressed concern about the 
'reasonable outcome test".106 Likewise, the Mental Health Act Commission stated: 'Outcome, 
in the sense of agreement or disagreement with the doctor is not a valid guide to capacity or 
incapacity'.1 0 7 Fennell comments: 'The main point behind this statement by the commission 
may be to seek to discourage doctors from setting too high a threshold of capacity'.1 0 8 Thus 
the Court of Appeal in Re MB was correct to emphasise the gap between an irrational 
decision and a finding of incompetence. 
Butler-Sloss LJ further protected the competent person by her narrow definition of 
irrationality: '...a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral 
standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided 
could have arrived at i t ' . 1 0 9 However, the Court of Appeal stopped short of fully protecting 
1 0 4 Cherniak C. Minimal Rationality. (1986). 
1 0 5 Op cit. n.103. 
1 0 6 Gostin L. 'Consent to Treatment: the Incapable Person'. In: Dyer, C. (Ed.). Doctors, Patients and 
the Law (1992)72. 
1 0 7 Mental Health Act Commission. Third Biennial Report 1987-9, para. 7.6h. 
1 0 8 Fennell P. 'Inscribing Paternalism in the Law: Consent to Treatment and Mental Disorder' (1990) 
17(1) Journal of Law and Society; 29 at 47. 
1 0 9 Op cit. n.31 at 553. 
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the competent person whose decision seems irrational. The deficiency of the judgment is in 
its failure to discuss that competence should be assessed by analysing the patient's decision-
making ability and not their actual decision. This is essential to avoid equating an irrational 
decision with incompetence for making a decision of comparable complexity. Knowledge of 
the actual decision may taint an assessor's ability to consider the patient's competence 
objectively. As Roberts notes: ' i t may be the case that what the patient decides may subtly or 
overtly influence others' assessment of his capacity'.1 1 0 Objectivity may be ensured only by 
assessing competence before a decision is made or without knowledge of the patient's 
decision. 
The paternalistic reasoning that follows from assessing competence based on the actual 
decision relies on an illogical syllogism: an irrational decision is evidence of lack of 
competence to make that decision; being in labour may affect a woman's competence; i f a 
woman in labour makes an irrational decision then she must lack the competence to make 
that decision. This argument is a non-sequitur,111 while both premises are arguably correct, 
the conclusion does not logically follow from them. This non-sequitur is clearly evident in 
Rochdale"2 
Rochdale was considered in Re MB: 'One may question whether there was evidence before 
the court which enabled the judge to come to a conclusion contrary to the opinion of the 
obstetrician that she was competent. Nonetheless he made the declarations sought'.113 This 
mild criticism by Butler-Sloss LJ does not go far enough. By failing to disapprove the 
1 1 0 Roberts, E. 'Re C and the Boundaries of Autonomy' (1994) 10(3) Professional Negligence 98 at 99. 
1 1 1 Popkin, RH. Stroll, A. Philosophy (1993) at 316. 
1 1 2 Op cit. n.28. See p.48. 
1 1 3 Op cit. n.31 at 551. 
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decision she has effectively sanctioned a finding of incompetence based, almost entirely, on 
the actual decision made by the patient. Furthermore, Butler-Sloss LJ commented that the 
woman changed her mind and consented to the operation. I f she was incompetent to refuse 
consent then surely she was incompetent to give consent. The only difference was that her 
decision altered from 'irrational' to 'rational". Unless the finding of incompetence was based 
on her actual decision, her change-of-mind is irrelevant. By specifically mentioning the 
woman's change-of-mind, Butler-Sloss LJ has emphasised the importance of the actual 
decision when assessing competence. This surely runs counter to the principle in Sidaway 
and Re T that the reasons for a decision may be: ' . . .rational, irrational, unknown or even non-
existent'."'' As de Cruz comments: 'the approach to irrational decisions suggests that there is 
still considerable scope for refusal of consent to be ignored and for paternalism to reign 
supreme as ever justified ' in the best interests of the patient". The legal and ethical debates 
will undoubtedly continue'.1 1 5 
The test of capacity recommended in Re MB was based on the Law Commission's Report on 
mental incapacity"6 and the test accepted by the court in Re C. 1 1 7 The Re C test was: 
1. comprehending and retaining treatment information; 
2. believing it; and 
3. weighing it in the balance to arrive at a choice. 
However, the Law Commission - and Re MB - dropped the second part of the test. By not 
requiring belief the Court of Appeal has removed a highly subjective component of the test. 
Requiring belief in the information denies the right to question or evaluate that 
information." 8 Autonomy does not mean that information cannot be accepted without 
1 1 4 Op cit. n.9 at 786 per Lord Donaldson MR. 
1 1 5 de Cruz, P. 'Caesareans, Consent and the Courts' (1998) 11(1) Practitioners Child Law Bulletin 8. 
1 1 6 Op cit. n.96 at para. 3.2-3.23. 
1 1 7 Op cit. n.82. 
1 1 8 Gordon, R. Barlow, C. 'Competence and the Right to Die' (1993) 143 NU 1719. 
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investigation, however, one should have good reason for accepting the source of the 
information as believable.119 Dropping the need for belief implies that the Law Commission 
and Court of Appeal in Re MB accept that doctors are not infallible and that the patient has 
every right to question the information. 
Another difficulty with 'belief is the tendency to reason abductively from the patient's actual 
decision: i f the patient believes information given by the doctor then, ignoring problems of 
rationality, they will make the 'right' decision. The patient makes the 'wrong' decision and 
therefore cannot have believed the information. It is only a small leap-of-faith to argue that 
because the information was given to them by the doctor and it would have been rational to 
believe it then not believing it indicates the patient must be irrational and ipso facto 
incompetent. Thus, dropping the second part of the Re C test promotes a greater respect for 
the patient's autonomy. 
A significant issue the Court of Appeal has failed to resolve is that the test in Re C is applied 
to the actual decision rather than to the patient's decision-making ability. Applying the test to 
an actual decision facilitates equating an irrational decision with incompetence. This is 
especially true of the third part of the test which is extremely vulnerable to subjective 
analysis and abductive reasoning. As Robbins JA notes in Mallette v Shulman, which 
concerned the right of a Jehovah's witness to refuse - by advance directive - a blood 
transfusion: ' I t is not for the doctor to second guess the reasonableness of the decision or to 
pass judgement on the religious principles which motivated i t ' . 1 2 0 Although abductive 
1 1 9 Benson J. 'Who is the Autonomous Man?' (1983) 58 Philosophy 1983. 
1 2 0 Mallette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4 lh) 321 at 336. 
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reasoning is rational and logically acceptable as evidence it is weaker than deductive or even 
inductive reasoning.121 Again it is a leap-of-faith to argue that i f a patient does not weigh-up 
the actual information then they are incapable of weighing-up information generally and 
hence are incompetent. It is only an indication that the patient's competence should be 
assessed. 
The Court of Appeal in Re MB appears confused by the concepts of an irrational decision and 
weighing information in the balance to reach a decision. I f weighing information in the 
balance is applied to the actual decision then this seems diametrically opposed to the fact that 
the patient's decision is allowed to be based on irrational reasons or even no reasons at all. 
These concepts may only be reconciled i f weighing the information is assessed in the abstract 
rather than applied to the decision in question. As Stauch notes: 'The suspicion is that, 
notwithstanding pronouncements to the contrary which endorse the patient's right to make 
irrational choices, this third element [of the Re C test] functions to filter out precisely these 
kind of choices: an undue attachment on a patient's part to a factor deemed by others of little 
import is readily translated into a conclusion that the patient cannot weigh up information 
and is therefore incompetent'.122 
The Court of Appeal in Re MB, as in Collins, accepted that 'temporary factors such as shock, 
pain or drugs' might affect competence. I have already discussed this issue (supra p.30) so it 
will suffice to point out that these factors allow leeway to find an otherwise competent 
woman incapable of deciding on their medical treatment. The Court of Appeal attempted to 
mitigate the risks associated with a subjective analysis by requiring: 'that such factors were 
operating to such a degree that the ability to decide was absent'. However, unless the judge 
1 2 1 Walton D. Argument structure: a Pragmatic Theory (1996). 
1 2 2 Op cit. n.68 at77. 
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visits the labouring woman at her bedside the court will have to rely on the doctor's opinion 
and the doctors are the very people in conflict with the woman. Harpwood notes: "The wishes 
of these women may well be ascertainable by examining the birth plans which they made 
before going into labour, though these might not take account of the fact that some people 
change their minds after labour commences, particularly in the case of first babies'.123 This 
potential for a change of mind may negate any advance directive.1 2 4 Furthermore, 'In case of 
doubt, that doubt falls to be resolved in favour of the preservation of life for i f the individual 
is to override the public interest, he must do so in clear terms'.1 2 5 
The Law Commission has suggested a statutory presumption in favour of the preservation of 
life: '...in the absence of any indication to the contrary it shall be presumed that an advance 
refusal of treatment does not apply in circumstances where those having the care of the 
person who made it consider that the refusal (a) endangers that person's life or (b) i f that 
person is a woman who is pregnant, the life of the fetus'. 1 2 6 Thus, a woman who makes a 
birth plan refusing consent to a caesarean for an abnormal fetal position may find that refusal 
invalidated i f the indication for caesarean changes to become one of fetal distress. Unless she 
composes an all encompassing advance directive the labouring woman wil l always be subject 
to the doctor's paternalism. Even the support for autonomy gained in Collins is of little help 
because the woman in that case was not in labour and each decision depends on 'the 
particular facts before the court'. 1 2 7Thus, the current position for labouring women is: an 
irrational decision may be considered sufficient evidence that the stressful effects of labour, 
accompanying exhaustion and analgesics have rendered her temporarily incompetent. Any 
advance directive may be ignored i f the circumstances have changed from those predicted. 
1 2 3 Op cit. n.79 at 77. 
1 2 4 Op cit. n.9. 
1 2 5 Ibid, at 796 per Lord Donaldson MR. 
1 2 6 Op cit. n.96 at para. 5.26. 
127 Op cit. n.31. 
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Stauch has further criticised the Court of Appeal's reasoning. Firstly, he claimed that Re MB, 
along with other cases, had 'lost sight of the underlying logic of patient autonomy as it relates 
to refusal of treatment'. 1 2 8 Upholding an irrational decision, he argued, is not necessarily 
respecting the patient's autonomy as it depends exactly how the decision fits in with the 
'general scheme of the patient's life ' . He believes that the test in Re C is too vague and 
allows a subjective analysis of competence. Instead, the courts should amend the test of 
competence to take into account the 'general scheme of the patient's l i fe ' . This approach to 
competence corresponds with Kennedy's view: ' . . . i f the beliefs and values of the patient, 
though incomprehensible to others, are of long standing and have formed the basis for all the 
patient's decisions about his life, there is a strong argument to suggest that the doctor should 
respect and give effect to a patient's decision based on them. That is to say that the doctor 
should regard such a patient as capable of consenting (or refusing). To argue otherwise would 
effectively rob the patient of his right to his own personality which may be far more serious 
and destructive than anything that could follow from the patient's decision as regards a 
particular proposed treatment'.129 This viewpoint may be the appropriate approach when 
dealing with an individual. However, where third parties are affected, irrational beliefs, 
value-sets and decisions are less easily accepted. 
Secondly, while accepting that: 'the court does not have jurisdiction to declare that such 
medical intervention is lawful to protect the interests of the unborn chi ld ' , 1 3 0 Stauch, 
criticises the court for 'assuming that a court will never have jurisdiction to declare treatment 
lawful in such a case, i.e. on other grounds'.131 He points out that this is contrary to other 
recent authorities and 'as a judicial tool, declaratory relief has been developed precisely to 
1 2 8 Op cit. n.68 at 79. 
1 2 9 Kennedy, I. 'Consent to Treatment: the Capable Person'. In: Dyer, C. (Ed). Doctors, Patients and 
the Law (1992) at 56. 
1 3 0 Op cit. n.31 at 561. 
1 3 1 Op cit. n.68 at8t. 
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provide assistance to those, such as doctors, who are faced with urgent ethical dilemmas in 
situations of legal uncertainty'. He suggests that Re S may have been just such a case: 'a case 
where a pregnant woman wil l die without obstetric intervention, also possesses features 
which set it apart from other cases in which life-saving treatment is refused. Most obviously, 
not only the woman but also her foetus, which (whatever its other attributes) is a potent 
symbol of life, stands to die. ' 1 3 2 He concludes: 'given its failure even to begin the task [of 
analysing the issues], the Court of Appeal's decision in Re MB (effectively) to overrule Re S 
must, at the very least, be open to question'.1 3 3 
The actual decision in Re MB concerned the irrational refusal of a caesarean because MB 
suffered from a needle phobia. Whether a fear of needles is sufficient to render a woman 
incompetent to refuse a caesarean must be a matter of degree and this was recognised by the 
Court of Appeal when it held that a patient is rendered incompetent when the fear is 
sufficient to 'paralyse the w i l l ' . 1 3 4 A fear becomes a phobia when it significantly interferes 
with the person's life and quite properly the Court of Appeal recognised that a fear of this 
degree would prevent the woman from making the decision compatible with her autonomous-
self. The evidence was that MB, in theory, consented to the caesarean. However, because of 
her needle phobia she was unable to consent to intravenous anaesthesia. Thus, it is clear that 
MB's needle phobia was preventing her from pursuing her preferred option of a caesarean. 
The Court of Appeal clearly made the correct decision which, while it infringed the woman's 
liberty in restricting her irrational self, in fact promoted her autonomy. 
1 3 2 Op cit. n.68 at 84. 
1 3 3 Ibid, at 84. 
1 3 4 Op cit. n.31 at 542. 
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In conclusion, the Court of Appeal correctly decided that MB's wil l was paralysed by her 
needle phobia. However its treatment of irrationality and competence was confused and 
inconsistent. It is hard to reconcile the Court of Appeal's acceptance that the woman's 
decision may be based on irrational reasons with the application of the modified Re C test to 
the actual decision. This is compounded by its failure to disapprove Rochdale. Acceptance of 
the third part of the Re C test also allows a subjective analysis of the patient's competence 
based largely on the doctor's interpretation of their decision. Furthermore, the Court of 
Appeal's dictum that the 'court did not have the jurisdiction to take the interests of the foetus 
into account'135 is suspect given that it failed to consider all of the relevant issues including, 
most notably, the public interest in the fetus. Thus, as in Collins, the Court of Appeal has 
failed to restrict the leeway, allowed by the flexibility of the tests used to assess competence, 
to override a pregnant woman's refusal of consent. 
Re L 1 3 6 
L had been in labour for 8 hours without cervical dilation and her obstetrician believed the 
baby would die without intervention. L agreed in principle to the caesarean but, because of 
her needle phobia, refused intravenous anaesthesia. She did agree to inhalational anaesthesia 
but the anaesthetist was unwilling to perform a gaseous induction because of the risk of 
gastric inhalation and its potentially fatal outcome. At the time of the hearing, L was felt to 
be confused as a result of using nitrous oxide/oxygen inhalational analgesia. 
1 3 5 Opcit. n.31 at 542. 
1 3 6 Op cit. n.87. 
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The Judgment 
Kirkwood J granted the declaration sought and stated: 'her extreme needle phobia amounted 
to an involuntary compulsion that disabled L from weighing treatment information in the 
balance to make a choice. Indeed it was an affliction of a psychological nature that compelled 
L against medical advice with such force that her own life would be in serious peril. 
Accordingly, I held that L . . . lacked the relevant mental competence to make the treatment 
decision'. 
Discussion 
The legal argument (Figure 6) is similar to that in Re MB except that Kirkwood J did not 
consider the potential effect of the fetus on a competent woman's decision and the Re C test 
was accepted in its entirety. Although Kirkwood J described the effect of the needle phobia 
as 'an involuntary compulsion' rather than a fear that lparalyse[d] the w i l l ' , these phrases are 
essentially different ways of describing the same phenomenon. There are two points worthy 
of mention: 
firstly - although not essential to the judgment - L was held to be confused due to 
inhalational analgesia. As Douglas comments: "The present case... appears to confirm the 
view that pain-relieving treatment given in labour - here gas and air - may itself cause a 
patient to become incapable and thus be used as part of the evidence to justify overriding her 
wishes'. 1 3 71 have already discussed the issue of the effect of temporary factors, such as 
analgesics, on competence (p.30 & 41). However, it is worth noting that 'gas and air' (nitrous 
oxide/oxygen) has a rapid onset and an almost equally rapid offset. Although at it's peak 
effect 'gas and air' probably does affect competence it would only take 2-3 minutes for the 
effects to largely wear off. In many cases, especially where the contractions are more than 
1 3 7 Douglas, G. 'Re L (Patient: Non Consensual Treatment)' [1997] 27 Fam. Law 325. 
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two minutes apart, it should be possible to consent the woman in the absence of any 
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Figure 6: A model of the legal argument in Re L. 
secondly, L was willing to have the caesarean providing anaesthesia was induced using gas 
rather than an injection. Because it presented a greater risk to the woman the anaesthetist was 
not willing to use the inhalational route. The relevance of the risk, however, is surely that it is 
the woman's risk and not the anaesthetist's. For the anaesthetist to deny her that option is 
rank paternalism. The law, however, will not compel a doctor to perform a particular 
treatment.138 In Re L, the conflict between the patient's right to self-determination and the 
doctor's right not to offer a particular treatment was a moot point. Because the court held that 
her needle phobia made her temporarily incompetent, the doctors were justified in treating L 
1 3 8 Re J (Minor: Child in Care, Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 15. 
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in her 'best interests'. However, would the situation be any different i f the woman's fear o f 
needles was not disabling? (See p.86) 
Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v C 1 3 9 
The consultant obstetrician believed that without a caesarean both C and her unborn child 
would die. Mrs C refused consent to a caesarean because o f the backache and scar pain she 
had suffered fo l lowing a previous caesarean. She said that she would rather die than have a 
caesarean again. In the time allowed a psychiatric opinion was unavailable but the 
obstetrician believed C was competent to consent. 
The Judgment 
In granting the declaration that a non-consensual caesarean would be l awfu l Johnson J 
decided, contrary to the obstetrician's opinion, that C was not competent: ' I concluded that a 
patient who could, in those circumstances [the throes o f labour], speak in terms which 
seemed to accept the inevitability o f her own death, was not a patient who was able properly 
to weigh-up the consideration that arose so as to make any valid decision'. 
Discussion 
This decision (Figure 7), although only at first instance, has implications for the autonomy o f 
patients in emergency situations generally and pregnant women in particular. It highlights 
two important points: 
Op cit. n.28. 
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1. temporary incompetence (p.30, 4 1 , 46). It is d i f f icu l t to accept that a judge could make a 
valid decision regarding the competence o f a woman whom he has not seen and who is not 
represented. This is especially true where, as in this instance, the judge overrules the opinion 
o f a consultant obstetrician who has seen the patient. As Hewson notes: 'The issue o f 
competency cannot be analysed satisfactorily given the peremptory way in which it was dealt 
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Figure 7: A model o f the legal argument used in Rochdale. 
2. the problem o f assessing competence based on the actual decision rather than on decision 
making ability (supra p.38). Johnson J based his judgment on the fact that C made an 
' irrational ' decision whilst in the 'throes o f labour'. Since an irrational decision is only 
evidence o f incompetence it cannot be sufficient for such a f inding. While labour may be 
sufficient for a f inding o f incompetence this is not a certainty. Competence must be assessed 
1 4 0 Hewson, B. 'Right to Refuse Medical Intervention; Right to a Fair Hearing'. (1997) 2 Journal of 
Civil Liberties 44 at 48. 
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in person. The only explanation for Johnson J's judgment is that it is a perfect example o f the 
'strained reasoning' highlighted, by Thorpe L J , 1 4 1 as an obvious risk in such an emotionally 
charged situation. 
The Use of Force 
There have been two cases concerning the use o f force to compel a non-consensual 
caesarean. The use o f force is not being considered wi th regard to enforcing the court's 
judgment because a declaratory order merely states the c iv i l court's opinion as to whether the 
activity i n question would be l a w f u l . 1 4 2 It does not state that the woman must undergo a 
caesarean or risk being in contempt o f court but a declaratory order does allow the doctor to 
proceed wi th the sanction o f the c iv i l court. Because the declaratory order does not compel a 
woman to succumb to the doctor's opinion the question remained as to whether the doctors 
could lawful ly use force to compel the woman to do something she was not legally obliged to 
do. This question was considered under the M H A 1983 in Tameside,142 and under common 
law in Norfolk and Norwich.144 
Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v C H 
A 41 year old woman wi th paranoid schizophrenia was admitted under s.3 M H A 1983. It was 
later discovered that she was pregnant. She had a tendency to resist treatment and was 
deemed incapable o f understanding its purpose. Although wanting the baby she harboured the 
delusional belief that the medical advice and treatment were malicious and harmful to her 
fetus. Because o f fetal intra-uterine growth retardation the obstetrician wanted to induce 
1 4 1 Opcit. n.l at 664. 
1 4 2 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 20. 
1 4 3 Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH [1996] 1 FLR 762. 
1 4 4 Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W [1996] 2 FLR 613. 
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labour. As C H was not competent to consent a court order was sought to authorise a 
caesarean and, i f necessary, the use o f force to restrain CH. 
The Judgment (Figure 8) 
Competence 
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Figure 8: A model o f the legal argument used in Thameside. 
Wall J granted the declaratory order that, because C H was incompetent to give or refuse 
consent, a non-consensual caesarean would be lawful as in her best interests. He also decided 
that forcible restraint would be lawful under s.63 M H A 1983 because the caesarean could be 
considered as ancillary treatment to CH's mental disorder. He declined to consider the 
common law position. 
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Discussion 
This case is interesting because o f the Wal l J's justification o f force under s.63 M H A 1983. 
To jus t i fy force under s.63 the treatment must be for a mental illness/disorder as defined by 
the Act. Wal l J reasoned that a caesarean could be considered an ancillary treatment for the 
patient's schizophrenia, because: 
1. i t would prevent a deterioration o f the patient's mental state; 
2. a dead baby might make her schizophrenia less responsive to treatment; 1 4 5 
3. her anti-psychotic medication was interrupted by pregnancy and could not be resumed 
until delivery. 
As Montgomery states: 'this may suggest that compulsory maternity care can be administered 
to all pregnant women who are 'sectioned' under the 1983 Act. However, it should be 
observed that the court heard specific evidence f rom the woman's psychiatrist that this would 
be a danger in her case'. 1 4 6 
S.63 M H A 1983 states: 'The consent o f the patient shall not be required for any medical 
treatment given to h im for the mental disorder f r o m which he is suffering, not being treatment 
fal l ing wi thin ss 57 and 58 above, i f the treatment is given by or under the direction o f the 
responsible medical off icer ' . A n ordinary interpretation o f this provision is that any non-
consensual treatment must have the purpose o f alleviating or preventing the deterioration of 
the patient's mental disorder. Any other treatment must be just i f ied under the doctrine o f 
necessity. However, Wal l J wanted to avoid the common law and he therefore relied on the 
precedents o f B v Croydon HAH1 and Re KB.m 
Based on evidence from the psychiatrist. 
Op cit. n.13 at 406. 
B v Croydon HA [1994] 2 WLR 294. 
Re KB (Adult) (Mental Patient: Medical Treatment) (1994) 19 BMLR 144. 
52 
B v Croydon HA concerned the force feeding o f a psychopathic patient on hunger strike and 
Re KB considered the non-consensual tube feeding o f an anorexic. Their arguments used the 
concept o f ancillary treatment and Hoffman LJ stated: ' . . . in my view this test [the prevention 
or alleviation o f the mental disorder] applies only to the treatment as a whole. Section 145(1) 
gives a wide definition to the term 'medical treatment'. It includes 'nursing, and also includes 
care, habilitation and rehabilitation under medical supervision'. So a range o f acts ancillary 
to the core treatment fal l wi thin the definition. I accept that by virtue o f s 3(2)(b) a patient 
with a psychopathic disorder cannot be detained unless the proposed treatment, taken as a 
whole, is ' l ikely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration o f his condition' It does not 
however fo l low that every act which forms part o f that treatment wi th in the wide definit ion in 
s 145(1) must in itself be l ikely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration o f that disorder. 
Nursing and care concurrent wi th the core treatment or as a necessary prerequisite to such a 
treatment or to prevent the patient f rom causing harm to himself or to alleviate the 
consequences o f the disorder are in my view all capable o f being ancillary to a treatment 
calculated to alleviate or prevent a deterioration o f the psychopathic disorder ' . 1 4 9 
Wall J's argument may be summarised; because anti-psychotic medication had to be 
suspended until after the delivery and because a dead baby might make CH's schizophrenia 
resistant to further treatment, a rapid delivery o f a healthy baby was a 'prerequisite' for the 
effective treatment o f her psychosis. Therefore i f a caesarean was necessary to ensure a 
healthy baby i t could be viewed as ancillary treatment to her mental disorder. This argument 
adopts logic essentially inverse to the doctrine o f double effect: i f treatment aimed at a non-
mental disorder also happens to alleviate or prevent the deterioration o f a mental disorder 
then, for the purposes of s.63 M H A 1983, that treatment w i l l be considered as being 
administered with the ancillary intention o f treating the mental disorder. The doctrine o f 
1 4 9 Op cit. n. 147 at 297 per Hoffman LJ. 
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double effect allows an unintentional bad outcome to be considered a 'side-effect. . . just if ied 
according to the totality o f the circumstances'. 1 5 0 Wal l J's argument, however, is that an 
intentional side-effect (improvement in CH's psychosis) justifies a 'bad' action (the use o f 
force to compel a caesarean). 
Surely a caesarean is intended to improve her (or her fetus') physical condition and should be 
just i f ied under the doctrine o f necessity. It is easier to accept the inclusion o f feeding an 
anorexic as being treatment for her mental condition because the anorexic's refusal to eat is 
symptomatic o f the condition and treating disorders symptomatically is a large part o f 
accepted medical practice. Thus, treatment for a broken arm would rightly include pain relief 
although this has no direct effect on healing the break. Likewise, in B v Croydon HA, self-
harm was a symptom of B's mental disorder and refusing to eat could be seen as a form o f 
self-harm. Therefore, force-feeding could be considered symptomatic treatment. However, i t 
is stretching the point, almost to breaking, to contend that a caesarean is treatment for a 
mental disorder. 1 5 1 
Although the main reason for wanting to induce labour was because the fetus was growth 
retarded the court accepted the argument that anti-psychotic treatment could not be restarted 
until after delivery. However, restarting the anti-psychotic medication would have been a 
more direct means o f treating CH's schizophrenia even i f that treatment had adversely 
affected the fetus. In reality, the doctors and the judge were trying to balance CH's treatment 
to maximise the welfare o f the fetus without a significant deterioration o f her mental state. 
This understandable desire for a 'good' outcome led to more 'strained reasoning'. The only 
saving grace is that Wal l J's judgment relied on specific evidence f r o m the consultant 
Price, DPT. 'Assisted Suicide and Refusing Medical Treatment: Linguistics, Morals and Legal 
Contortions' (1996) 4 Med. Law Rev. 270 at 277. 
1 5 1 Jewell, L 'Treatment Without Consent' [1998] 28 Fam. Law 774 at775. 
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psychiatrist as to the l ikely effect o f a dead baby and thus it could be argued that i t is limited 
to the facts o f the case. 
Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W 1 5 2 
A 32 year old woman was admitted fu l ly dilated and in a state o f arrested labour. She had a 
past history o f psychiatric treatment 'marked by non-co-operation by her wi th those seeking 
to help her'. The psychiatrist opined that she was not suffering f r o m a mental disorder under 
the M H A 1983 and she was capable o f instructing a solicitor. However she had persisted 
throughout the day in denying her pregnancy. On the basis o f the Re C test, 1 5 3 the psychiatrist 
determined that she was unable to weigh treatment information in the balance and hence 
lacked the capacity to consent There were two potential risks i f the delivery o f her baby was 
not assisted: the fetus might be deprived o f oxygen and possibly die in utero; and secondly, 
the scar f rom her previous caesareans might rupture. A declaratory order for a caesarean was 
sought. 
The Judgment (see figure 9) 
Johnson J stated: ' . . .although she was not suffering f r o m a mental disorder within the 
meaning o f the statute, she lacked the competence to make a decision about the treatment that 
was proposed because she was incapable o f weighing up the considerations that were 
involved ' . 1 5 4 He decided that intervention would be in the patient's best interests as it 'would 
end the stress and pain o f her labour, it would avoid the likelihood o f damage to her physical 
health which might have potentially life-threatening consequences and, despite her present 
view about the foetus, would avoid her feeling any feeling o f guilt in the future were she, by 
1 5 2 Op cit. n.144. 
1 5 3 Op cit. n.82. 
1 5 4 Op cit. n.144 at 615-616. 
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her refusal o f consent, to cause the death o f the foetus ' . 1 5 5 He also found that the court had a 
common law power to authorise the use o f reasonable force. This was provided there was a 
'necessity to act... [and] the action taken must be such as a reasonable person would in all 
the circumstances take, acting in the best interests o f the assisted person' . 1 5 6 
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Figure 9: A Model o f the legal argument used in Norfolk and Norwich. 
Discussion 
Johnson J's judgment concerning the use o f force under the common law is undoubtedly 
correct. The doctrine o f necessity, by its very nature, justifies the use o f force provided that it 
is objectively reasonable. The essence o f necessity is that i t makes lawfu l the application o f a 
force which would otherwise be unlawful. Johnson J's judgment is deficient in that it fails to 
even begin to define what might be considered 'reasonable' under the circumstance o f a 
1 5 5 0pci t . n.144 at 616. 
1 5 6 Op cit. n. 142 at 75 per Lord Goff. 
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refusal o f a caesarean. Would the court consider it 'reasonable' to shackle the woman to the 
bed or use manual physical restraint? Furthermore, the court has failed to consider what 
standard w i l l be used to judge the 'reasonableness' o f an action. Would this be another 
instance when the Bolam test 1 5 7 would rear its ugly head? Johnson J has effectively left the 
decision, about how much force is reasonable, in the doctor's hands. 
This is another instance in which the fact that the woman is in labour has been considered 
relevant. Although it was unlikely to have been a major factor in the decision Johnson J did 
consider it worthy of specific mention: 'She was called upon to make that decision at a time 
o f acute emotional stress and physical pain in the ordinary course o f labour made even more 
d i f f icu l t for her because o f her own particular mental h is tory ' . 1 5 8 This statement does not 
carry as much weight as his decision in Rochdale,159 in which the incapacitating effect o f 
labour was a major justification for his judgment. However, when taken in conjunction with 
that decision and the other caesarean cases - such as Collins and Re MB - in which it has been 
accepted (obiter) as a temporary incapacitating factor then it becomes a useful 'get-out-
clause' when a labouring woman makes an 'unacceptable' decision. 
A t the end o f his conclusion, Johnson J stated: 'Throughout the judgment I have referred to 
the 'foetus' because I wish to emphasise that the focus o f my judicial attention was upon the 
interests o f the patient herself and not upon the interests o f the foetus which she bore. 
However, the reality was that the foetus was a fu l ly formed child, capable o f normal l i fe i f 
only it could be delivered f rom the mother ' . 1 6 0 The fact that he fel t i t necessary to explain 
himself suggests that the fetus - or rather the child it was capable o f becoming - was the 
1 5 7 Bolam v Friem Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
1 5 8 Opc i t . n.144 at 616. 
1 5 9 See p.48. 
1 6 0 Op cit. n.144 at 616. 
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focus o f his concern. Although the decision in this case was legally just i f ied under the 
doctrine o f necessity, Johnson J's comment suggests that his interpretation o f the woman's 
'best interests' was tainted by his desire to allow the fetus to realise its potential for 'normal 
l i f e ' . Johnson J phrased this aspect o f the woman's 'best interests' by arguing that a healthy 
baby: 'despite her present view about the foetus, would avoid her feeling any guilt in the 
future were she, by her refusal o f consent, to cause the death o f the foetus ' . 1 6 1 The inclusion 
o f the emotional and psychological effects o f fa i l ing to 'rescue' a ' v i c t im ' who shares a close 
bond (or relationship) wi th the subject does have a legal precedent. Re Y concerned a 
mentally incapacitated woman whose sister needed a bone marrow transplant. 1 6 2 Connell J 
stated: ' . . . i t is to the benefit o f the defendant that she should act as donor to her sister, 
because in this way her positive relationship wi th her mother is most l ikely to be prolonged... 
[ i t ] is l ikely to improve the defendant's relationship wi th her... and also to improve her 
relationship wi th the p la in t i f f who w i l l be eternally grateful to her ' . 1 6 3 Similarly, almost 30 
years previously, the Kentucky Court o f Appeal authorised a kidney transplant f rom an 
incompetent patient to his brother to prevent the 'extremely traumatic effect ' that his 
brother's death would have on h i m . 1 6 4 
Commenting on Re Y, Grubb states: 'the court might well as a rule-of-thumb look for the 
'agreement' (though obviously not the consent) o f the donor as a condition to allowing the 
donation... it is unthinkable that the 'best interests' test could be satisfied i f the donor 
objected to the donation' . 1 6 5 Like the potential organ donor the pregnant woman is expected 
to submit - for the benefit o f another (the fetus) - to an invasive medical procedure which w i l l 
be detrimental to their physical health. Thus, i f i t is 'unthinkable' for an incompetent person 
1 6 1 Op cit. n.144 at 616. 
1 6 2 Re Y (AdultPatient) (Transplant: Bone Marrow) (1996) 35 BMLR 111. 
1 6 3 Ibid, at 114. 
1 6 4 Strunk v Strunk 445 SW 2d 145 (1969). 
1 6 5 Grubb, A. 'Commentary on Re Y ' (1996) 4 Med. Law Rev. 204 at 207. 
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to be expected to donate bone marrow, blood or an organ in the face o f their expressed 
opposition then the same is true for an incompetent woman expected to submit to a caesarean 
solely for the fetus' benefit. Where it is indicated on maternal grounds there is a good case 
for suggesting that it is in her best interests. However, where the indication is fetal then there 
must be a danger that the doctor, or judge, w i l l base his judgement on his own values. This 
risk o f transferring the assessors values and belief on to the patient when determining their 
best interests is also a risk where the benefits to the woman are physical. However, predicting 
the physical effect is more certain than predicting the l ikely psychological and emotional 
consequences. Thus, the 'best interests' test w i l l probably be less reliable when the emotional 
and psychological consequences are considered. 
In Norfolk and Norwich, Johnson J is saved f r o m some o f this criticism because the caesarean 
was indicated for the benefit o f the fetus and the woman. Thus, preventing the woman's scar 
f rom rupturing was a very obvious physical benefit that would satisfy the 'best interests' test 
without the need to recourse to the effect that the death o f the fetus might have at some time 
in the future. However, Johnson J's words create the impression that a major concern was for 
the fetus. As Plomer notes: 'medical decisions which are really intended to benefit the 
unborn foetus could be rationalized with the court's approval as decisions intended to benefit 
the allegedly mentally incompetent or mentally disordered woman instead. I f this were to be 
the case, then the Caesarean cases would have succeeded in effecting a de facto inversion o f 
the relative legal status accorded to women and unborn foetuses, because the interests and 
rights o f women would be de facto subsumed to those o f the unborn foetus. In view o f the 
procedural shortcomings o f these cases, such an outcome would seem di f f icu l t to avo id ' . 1 6 6 
Op cit. n . l l at 254-255. 
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Conclusion to Part 1: The Current Legal Position 
Although Colllins proclaimed the primacy o f autonomy, pregnant women are still at risk o f 
being overridden i f they refuse consent to a caesarean. The importance o f Collins is that it 
confirms the dictum in Re MB that the interests o f the fetus are irrelevant when considering a 
pregnant woman's right to refuse a caesarean. Equally important is its strong defence o f the 
pregnant woman's right to autonomy. However, the woman in Collins was articulate and, 
perhaps more importantly, not in labour. In both Collins and Re MB, the Court o f Appeal 
accepted that labour itself may cause temporary incapacity. This effect o f labour was one o f 
the main justifications for overriding the woman's decision in Rochdale. Likewise, other 
temporarily incapacitating factors that may be utilised to circumvent a patient's decision 
include the effects o f analgesic drugs. 
Temporarily incapacitating factors are not the only judicial tool for circumventing a woman's 
refusal o f consent. In Collins and Re MB, the Court o f Appeal proclaimed that a competent 
woman was entitled to refuse consent even i f her reasons were irrational, or, even non-
existent. However, an irrational refusal would be accepted as evidence that the woman might 
be incompetent. The Court o f Appeal, in Re MB based their test o f competence on the 
recommendations o f the Law Commission that was, in turn, based on the test proposed in Re 
C. In both, the test for incompetence was based on the actual decision rather than an the 
abstract capacity to make a decision o f commensurate complexity. Since this was accepted in 
Re MB, and not disapproved in Collins, i t would seem that the courts currently accept that the 
test should be based on the actual decision. This makes it more l ikely that an irrational 
decision w i l l be equated with incompetence rather than simply considered as an indication 
for assessing competence. I f the law is to pay more than just lip-service to the allowance o f 
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irrational decisions then it must surely require that the test for competence be based on 
abstract capacity rather than on the actual decision. A n even stronger acknowledgement o f 
the competent person's right to make irrational decisions would require that the assessor be 
unaware of that person's actual decision. 
Finally, the acceptance in both Collins and Re MB, o f Lord Donaldson M R ' s risk related 
standard allows yet another way around the woman's right o f self-determination. It requires a 
higher level o f competence for a refusal o f consent than when consent is given. Furthermore, 
the greater the risk involved the higher the level o f competence required. Since it would be 
hard to find a medical situation o f greater risk than where the lives o f both the woman and 
her fetus are threatened a risk-related standard requires pregnant women to be more 
competent than other adults making commensurately complex decisions. 
When the caesarean cases are considered as a whole, it is clear that the court w i l l do 
everything within its power to achieve a 'good outcome' for both mother and baby. The 
courts at first instance have, to some extent, become fetal advocates. While Collins has re-
established the role o f the court as legal arbiter, i t is notable that the fetus had already been 
delivered and was no longer at risk. Thus, despite the Court o f Appeal's powerful defence o f 
the pregnant woman's right o f autonomy, the doctors - and the courts - are sti l l lef t wi th 
sufficient leeway to achieve the outcome they desire. 
61 
Part Two: The Materno-fetal Conflict 
Traditionally, the only means for protecting fetal health was by optimising the pregnant 
woman's health. But, as Daniels notes: 'Technological, social, political, and economic 
developments in the second half o f the twentieth century have challenged the "organic unity" 
o f the pregnant woman and the fe tus ' . 1 6 7 It is now possible to assess, monitor and treat the 
fetus through the use o f techniques including: ultrasound, fetal heart monitoring, blood 
sampling and surgery. Oberman states: 'Visualising the fetus had a profound effect on the 
practice o f obstetrics: i t provided absolute proof that a new l i fe was growing inside the 
patient. Somehow, the impact o f rendering the pregnant woman transparent made i t possible 
to imagine the pregnant woman and the fetus as separate entit ies ' . 1 6 8 The fetus has become a 
second patient and 'some writers conflate fetuses and children, unable to see any morally 
relevant differences between them: they seem oblivious to the fact that fetuses live in 
women's bodies ' . 1 6 9 However: ' In no other situation is the physician faced wi th one patient 
literally inside the body o f another patient. Conceptually, the medical care o f each can be 
approached independently, but practically, neither can be treated without affecting the 
other ' . 1 7 0 
This conceptual independence o f the fetus has engendered the materno-fetal conflict which is 
expressed in two situations: where the pregnant woman's conduct is potentially harmful to 
the fetus; and where the woman refuses consent to medical treatment beneficial to the fetus. 
Materno-fetal conflict implies that the conflict is between the pregnant woman and her fetus 
but it is really between the pregnant woman and doctors (or other 'state representatives' such 
1 6 7 Op cit. n.46 at 1. 
1 6 8 Oberman, M . 'Women, Fetuses, Physicians, and the State: Pregnancy and Medical Ethics in the 21s" 
Century'. In: Monagle, JF. Thomasma, DC. (Ed.) Health Care Ethics: Critical Issues for the 21" 
Century (1998) 67 at 69. 
1 6 9 Purdey, L M . 'Are Pregnant Women Fetal Containers?' (1990) 4 Bioethics 273 at 275. 
1 7 0 Op cit. n. 38. 
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as the court) 1 7 1 who have become fetal advocates. Thus, it is the doctor who identifies the 
conflict when a woman refuses consent to a caesarean. Nelson notes: ' I n such situations, a 
physician may be frustrated or offended by the woman's non-compliance. I f this might result 
in avoidable harm to the fetus and perhaps to the mother, frustration may turn into the pain o f 
a serious moral and professional dilemma: to respect the woman's wishes and permit 
preventable harm or to ignore her wishes to protect the fe tus ' . 1 7 2 However, when a woman 
refuses a caesarean because she believes that operative delivery is forbidden by God then she 
is acting in what she believes to be the best interests o f her child-to-be. To her, the spiritual 
health o f her child-to-be is more important than its physical health and there is no conflict 
between her decision and the fetus' interests. The conflict arises when the doctor is unable to 
see beyond his clinical judgement which: 'displays an arrogance and a lack o f understanding 
o f the woman's l i f e ' . 1 7 3 
In caring for pregnant women, doctors are motivated to achieve the 'best' outcome for both 
mother and baby. This involves a balancing act governed by the principles o f beneficence and 
non-maleficence. From the doctors viewpoint the outcome variables are clinical: a live baby 
and a woman wi th a scar are better than an intact woman and a dead baby. The woman, 
however, w i l l not measure outcome purely in clinical terms but w i l l include the clinical result 
as part o f a much wider social, religious, emotional and economic picture. The principles o f 
beneficence and non-maleficence must be tempered by a respect for the autonomy o f the 
patient. 1 7 4 Thus the materno-fetal conflict is comprised o f two sub-conflicts: respect for the 
woman's autonomy against beneficence towards the fetus; and beneficence towards the fetus 
1 7 1 The courts at fust instance have, arguably, become fetal advocates by using 'strained reasoning' to 
protect the fetus. Collins has re-established the role of the court as arbiter. 
1 7 2 Nelson, LJ. 'Legal Dimensions of Maternal-fetal Conflict' (1992) 35(4) Clinical Obstetrics and 
Gynecology 738. 
1 7 3 Mair, J. 'Maternal/Foetal Conflict: Defined or Defused?' In: McLean, SAM.(Ed.) Contemporary 
Issues in Law, Medicine and Ethics (1996) 79 at 94. 
1 7 4 See Mahowald, MB. 'Matenal-fetal Conflict: Positions and Principles' (1992) 35(4) Clinical 
Obstetrics and Gynecology 729. 
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against non-maleficence towards the woman. The main actors are the woman and the doctor 
with the fetus sitting uneasily between them. I f the conflict cannot be resolved then the 
judiciary w i l l become involved to decide whose rights prevail. In court the rights and 
interests to be considered are those of: the woman (Figure 10); the fetus (figure 11) and the 
state or public (figure 12). Included within the state interest are the rights and interests o f the 
doctor (figure 13). 
Persons, other than the woman, the doctor and the state, have interests in the well-being o f 
mother, fetus or both. This wider conflict involves the woman's dependant family and the 
father o f the fetus (figure 14). The narrow conflict can be divided into three sub-conflicts 
which focus on the internal conflicts that determine the events that occur whenever a 
caesarean is advised on fetal grounds. They are best represented by figures 15 to 17.1 w i l l 
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Chapter Three: The Pregnant Woman's Right to Autonomy 
The competent, pregnant woman enjoys the same rights as any other competent adult and, 
regarding medical treatment, the important rights are those o f autonomy and bodily integrity. 
Legally these rights are protected by trespass against the person, battery, and the rules o f 
consent. 'The fundamental principle, plain and incontestable, is that every person's body is 
inviolate. It has long been established that any touching o f another person, however slight, 
might amount to a battery' . 1 7 5 This principle is not absolute and a number o f exceptions have 
been recognised. Consent, for example, provides the just if icat ion for medical treatment. 
Thus: 'Every human being o f adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall 
be done wi th his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's 
consent, commits an assault... ' . 1 7 6 
Just as a competent woman has the right to give consent so she has the right to refuse it . In 
Bland, Lord Kei th stated: ' . . . i t is unlawful so as to constitute both a tort and a crime o f 
battery, to administer medical treatment to an adult, who is conscious and o f sound mind, 
without his consent. Such a person is completely at liberty to decline to undergo treatment, 
even i f the result o f his doing so w i l l be that he w i l l d i e ' . 1 7 7 Lord G o f f explained: 'To this 
extent, the principle o f the sanctity o f human l i fe must yield to the principle o f self-
determination, and, for present purposes perhaps more important, the doctor's duty to act in 
the interests o f his patient must likewise be qua l i f i ed ' . 1 7 8 This right to refuse consent exists 
regardless o f the rationality o f the decision. 1 7 9 
Op cit. n.59. 
Schloendorff v New York Hospital (1914) 105 N E 92. 
Op cit. n.57 at 860. 
Ibid, at 866. 
Op cit. n.9 at 786. 
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Whether the legal protection o f self-determination goes further than the moral right to 
autonomy demands depends on how autonomy is defined. Clouser and Gert note: 'One side 
may favour overruling a patient's refusal on the ground that the refusal is irrational, claiming 
that therefore the choice is not autonomous, whereas the other side may favour going along 
wi th the patient's explicitly stated refusal on the ground that, though the refusal is irrational, 
the patient is competent and therefore the refusal is an autonomous choice ' . 1 8 0 Their first 
argument demands that an autonomous action be based on rational thought; their second 
argument allows any action to be autonomous providing the actor is capable o f rational 
thought. 
Gi l lon defines autonomy as: ' . . .the capacity to think, decide, and act on the basis o f such 
thought and decision freely and independently... In the sphere o f action it is important to 
distinguish between... simply doing what one wants to do and, on the other hand, acting 
autonomously, which may also be doing what one wants to do but on the basis o f thought or 
reasoning'. 1 8 1 Gerald Dworkin believes: 'Autonomy is a second order capacity to reflect 
critically upon one's first order preferences and desires, and the ability either to identify wi th 
these or to change them in light o f higher order preferences and values' . 1 8 2 Alternatively, 
autonomy is: ' . . .freely and actively making one's own evaluative (requires true beliefs and 
rationality) choices about how one's l ife should go ' . 1 8 3 These definitions all require both the 
capacity for reasoning/self-reflective thought and the practice o f basing one's actions on 
such reasoning/self-reflection. 
1 8 0 Clouser, K D . Gert, B . 'Morality vs. Principalism'. In: Gillon, R. Lloyd, A. (Ed.) Principles of 
Health Care Ethics (1994) 250 at 254. 
1 8 1 Gillon, R. Philosophical Medical Ethics (1985) at 60. 
1 8 2 Dworkin, G. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988).. 
1 8 3 Savulescu, J . Momeyer, W. 'Should Informed Consent be Based on Rational Beliefs?' (1997) 23 
Journal of Medical Ethics 282. 
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Both Gil lon and Dworkin recognise the difference between deciding what is right and acting 
in accordance wi th that decision. There is also an important difference between an act by an 
autonomous actor and an autonomous act: to be autonomous an act must further the 
autonomy o f the actor and be based on autonomous judgement but an act by an autonomous 
actor only requires that the actor be capable o f autonomous judgement. The principle o f 
autonomy requires respect for autonomy. However, does this mean that the law must respect 
any act o f an autonomous person or only those acts which are themselves autonomous? 
Beauchamp and Childress argue that an autonomous action has 3 components: a) an 
intentional act; which is b) based on an understanding o f the circumstances; and c) is 
without controlling influences. 1 8 4 Both understanding and controlling influences are variable 
and establish a broad spectrum across which an action may be more or less autonomous. The 
line drawn between what is considered an autonomous act and what is not, is - to some extent 
- arbitrary. However: 'No theory o f autonomy is acceptable i f i t presents an ideal beyond the 
reach o f normal choosers'. 1 8 5 Equally, autonomy is meaningless i f there is no requirement for 
rational thought or freedom f rom controlling influences. Thus, no rationality is too weak and 
ideal rationality is unobtainable. Beauchamp and Childress 1 8 6 would ' . . .require a substantial 
degree o f understanding and freedom from constraint' but, Cherniak suggests only a minimal 
level o f rationality is required. 1 8 7 
Culver and Gert argue that an act qualifies as irrational i f the harm potentially caused by the 
act is greater than the harm potentially prevented (or good potentially generated) by the 
184 Beauchamp, T L . Childress, JF. 'Respect for Autonomy'. In: Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1994) 
120. 
1 8 5 Ibid. 
186 




act. 1 8 8 Also: 'Judging the adequacy o f a reason always involves a balancing o f evils versus 
evils (or evils versus goods) ' . 1 8 9 However, this begs the question as to who act as judge: 
should it be judged subjectively or objectively? Culver and Gert would give the job to 
'rational persons'. The danger here is that goods and evils depend to some extent on the 
individual's circumstances, l ife values and belief-set. Persons wi th different belief-sets may 
rationally rank goods and evils in different hierarchies: to some, loss o f l i fe is the greatest 
harm while to others pain and disability would rank higher. Respect for autonomy, in the face 
o f different belief-sets, demands moral pluralism and tolerance. 1 9 0 Brown suggests: 'a 
rational agent is one whose fundamental beliefs are based on an appropriate body o f 
evidence; where sufficient rules for decision making are lacking a rational agent w i l l exercise 
judgement and that judgement should be evaluated against the judgements o f a community o f 
those who share the relevant expertise for evaluation against their own judgements' . 1 9 1 The 
one restriction on a belief-set is that i t is acceptable to society as a whole and, providing that 
is the case, an individual's action should be judged in the context o f their belief set. 
I have argued that the rationality o f an act should be judged objectively, by 'rational persons', 
based on the subjective belief-set o f the actor. This would be best done by persons sharing 
the same belief-set. When a woman refuses consent to a caesarean the assessment w i l l be 
made, at least init ial ly, by the doctor who w i l l probably have different beliefs and values to 
the woman. He is also unlikely to be aware o f all the personal circumstances involved in the 
woman's decision. The danger o f an action being judged by someone wi th a different belief-
set is that they w i l l apply their own beliefs to the decision. This risks confusing 
incomprehensibility with irrationality with the subsequently unjustified conclusion that an 
1 8 8 Culver, C M . Gert, B. Philosophy in Medicine (1982) 26. Harms include: death; pain; disability; and 
the loss of freedom; opportunity or pleasure. 
1 8 9 Ibid, at 31. 
1 9 0 Raz, J. 'Autonomy, Toleration and the Harm Principle'. In: Gavison, R. (Ed.) Issues in 
Contemporary Legal Philosophy (1989) 313. 
1 9 1 Brown HI. Rationality. (1988). 
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irrational decision is an indication o f lack o f decision-making capacity. As Clouser and Gert 
note: 'Neglecting the fact that there are different rational rankings is one o f the primary 
causes o f unjustified paternalism'. 1 9 2 
One possible solution is that the woman's decision and subsequent refusal o f consent be 
judged by 'rational' representatives o f a community with similar beliefs to the woman. This 
' j u ry ' could then decide whether the decision was autonomous and furthered the woman's 
interests. However, overruling even a non-autonomous decision would still be a restriction o f 
the woman's moral liberty. Moral liberty is the freedom to do what one wants without the 
interference f rom others. It has less moral force than autonomy because it does not require 
reflective thought and consideration o f long term goals. 1 9 3 However, liberty is still a moral 
good and: ' A n y restraint on liberty to do what one likes is seen as something requiring 
jus t i f i ca t ion ' . 1 9 4 This fol lows because: 'Any interference... wi th a voluntary action... is an 
invasion o f a person's interest in liberty, and is thus h a r m f u l ' . 1 9 5 
J.S. M i l l ' s harm principle requires that legal coercion is only jus t i f ied when used to prevent 
harm to others. 1 9 6 Raz extends this to include self-harm. 1 9 7 To be just i f ied, a restriction o f 
liberty must cause less harm than it prevents. Harm may result i f an actor performs a non-
autonomous act as it may affect the actor's long term autonomous goals. A respect for 
autonomy demands, not only that we do not restrict a person's autonomy but, that we 
positively enhance it . Thus there may be occasions when a restriction o f liberty is just if ied in 
that, although it obstructs the actor's short term first order desires, i t prevents a detrimental 
, y 2 O p c i t . n.181 at 253. 
1 9 3 Op cit. n.183. 
1 9 4 Harris, JW. Legal Philosophies (1980) 115. 
1 9 5 Feinberg, J. 'Harm and Self-interest'. In: Hacker, PMS. Raz, J . (Ed.) Law, Morality and Society 
(1979) 285 at 299. 
1 9 6 Mill, JS. On Liberty (1982) 68. 
1 9 7 Op cit. n.191. 
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effect on the actor's long term goals and hence promotes the actor's autonomy. Gerald 
Dworkin uses Odysseus as illustration: 'Not wanting to be lured onto the rocks o f the sirens, 
he commands his men to tie him to the mast and to refuse all later orders he w i l l give to be 
set free.. . Although his behaviour at the time he hears the sirens may not be voluntary... 
there is another dimension to his conduct that must be understood. He has... a desire not to 
have or act upon various desires. He views the desire to move his ship closer to the sirens as 
something that is no part o f him, but alien to him. In l imit ing his liberty, in accordance with 
his wishes, we promote, not hinder, his efforts to define the contours o f his l i f e ' . 1 9 8 There is, 
however, a difference between abiding by an actor's advance directive - such as the decision 
made by Odysseus to be tied to the mast - and restricting the liberty o f an actor based on a 
paternalistic interpretation o f that actor's best interests. Stauch argues: 'However, suppose 
that, having expressed no prior wish, he were not tied to the mast and, on hearing the sirens, 
began to steer the ship towards the rocks. The sailors who laid hands on h im and bound him 
at this point would be acting paternalistically in Odysseus's best interests; nevertheless, on 
the facts, they would also be promoting his autonomy. This is because it can be assumed that 
long-term survival is part o f Odysseus's l i fe plan and is what he, i n his collected state, would 
The important thing to note, in Stauch's amendment, is that Odysseus is not acting 
autonomously since he temporarily lacks competence. The sailors were not only just if ied but 
would have failed in their duty i f they had not secured Odysseus to the mast. Respect for 
autonomy demands that when a person temporarily lacks the capacity to be autonomous we 
should act to promote that person's recovery o f capacity and to protect their 'welfare 
interests' essential for achieving their autonomous 'ulterior interests'. 2 0 0 Where the woman 
Op cit. n.183 at 14. 
Op cit. n.68 at 79. 
Op cit. n.196 at 285. 
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lacks decision-making capacity, providing i t is necessary and in her best interests, the law 
allows doctors to treat her under the doctrine o f necessity. 2 0 1 Dworkin ' s and Stauch's 
arguments simply provide moral justification for, respectively, the acceptance o f advance 
directives and the treatment o f incompetent patients. The question remains; can it be morally 
just if ied to override an irrational decision made by a competent autonomous actor? 
There are occasions when self-harm is consistent wi th autonomous goals such as when the 
woman believes that the caesarean is against God's w i l l and to act against God w i l l result in 
eternal damnation. Thus, i f a woman's choice is made autonomously, based on her acceptable 
belief set, then society has no right to interfere wi th her refusal o f treatment even i f that 
choice might result in her death. I f her compelling 'ulterior interest' is to live according to 
God's w i l l and hence go to heaven when she dies then dying accordingly furthers her 
'ulterior interests'. Thus preventing her death, in a manner which she believes to be against 
God's w i l l , is a devastating and irreversible infringement o f her autonomy that makes her 
worse o f f than i f she had died. Simply because we cannot understand her beliefs does not 
mean that her choice is irrational and should not be respected. I f , however, given the 
woman's belief set, her decision would not further her 'ulterior interests' then it is irrational 
and there may be a moral duty to prevent her f rom acting on i t . 
I f the woman's decision is not detrimental to her 'ulterior interests' then there is no 
justification to interfere with her decision simply because it does not promote them. 
According to Culver and Gert's definition (supra) the woman's decision would not, in any 
case, be irrational since it has not caused self-harm. However, their definit ion is narrow and a 
more commonly held view is that expressed by the Oxford English Dictionary: 'Contrary to 
or not in accordance with reason, unreasonable, utterly il logical, absurd'. Reason is: 'That 
1 Re F (Mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 A C 1. 
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intellectual power or faculty.. . which is ordinarily employed in adapting thought or action to 
some end; the guiding principle in the human mind in the process o f thinking' ; or ' A ground 
or cause of, or for, something'. Using this definition it is possible for the woman's decision to 
be irrational without causing self-harm. There would be no justif ication to override an 
irrational decision that is harmless. However, what i f her decision risks self-harm? 
We would certainly be just i f ied in temporarily restricting the woman's liberty in order to 
explain the danger to her. But consider i f , on hearing all the facts, she still insists on 
fo l lowing her decision because she believes the risk worth taking in order to live by her 
values. Even though we may not understand her value hierarchy, the risk incurred by 
fol lowing her values would be consistent wi th her 'ulterior interests' and we have no 
justification for interfering with her decision. I f this were not the case we would be obliged to 
prevent any dangerous activity. The di f f icul ty here is at what level o f risk to draw the line 
and interfere wi th a person's liberty: there may be good argument to ban boxing but should 
we also ban climbing, parachuting, driving or even walking under ladders? Should society 
value health and l i fe over the right o f autonomous persons to make their own decisions? 
This may appear a simple choice between paternalism and autonomy but: both good health 
and l i fe are pre-requisites for f u l l autonomy; and not all decisions/actions made by 
autonomous persons w i l l themselves be autonomous. When an irrational decision made by an 
autonomous person risks their health to such a degree that their future autonomy is 
jeopardised then acting paternally to override the decision is consistent wi th the principle o f 
respect for autonomy. As Raz states: ' I t is not surprising, however, that the principle o f 
autonomy... yields duties which go far beyond the negative duties o f non-interference, which 
are the only ones recognised by some defenders o f autonomy' . 2 0 2 Preventing an irrational 
Opcit. n.191 at 324. 
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action is an interference wi th liberty and not autonomy, however, i t must sti l l be just if ied. 
Diff icul t ies in justification include: 
1) distinguishing an irrational decision f r o m an incomprehensible one. To make this 
distinction requires an understanding o f both the actor's belief-set and l i fe circumstances. 
Doctors are not the best group to make this assessment because their propensity towards a 
somatic perspective risks ignoring other relevant influences such as social and spiritual 
factors. As Robbins JA stated in Malette: ' I t is not for the doctor to... to pass judgement 
on the religious principles which motivated i t ' ; 2 0 3 
2) assessment o f risks. Medical decisions are often a question o f balancing one probability 
against another. The weighting o f probabilities is based on population studies but then 
applied to an individual. How appropriately the doctor applies those statistics to the 
individual depends on how closely the individual matches the general characteristic o f the 
population studied. The combination o f statistics and assumptions made by the doctor 
means that the final opinion is just that - an opinion. While some opinions can be given 
wi th relative certainty, or wi th little risk o f harm, others are less certain and more risky. 
This uncertainty is highlighted by Jefferson™ in which the woman was diagnosed as 
having a complete placenta praevia (an abnormally sited placenta obstructing the opening 
o f the birth canal). Doctors estimated the woman's risk o f death to be 50%, and that o f her 
fetus 99%, i f delivered vaginally. An order for a compulsory caesarean was granted but a 
subsequent ultrasound demonstrated that the placenta had shifted and the baby was 
delivered vaginally without complication. 2 0 5The less certain an opinion then the less 
weight should be attached to it and the more weight given to the other factors important to 
the patient. Consideration must also be given to the disempowering effect, on the patient 
and their relatives, o f an infringement o f liberty. A harrowing example o f this was the 
2 0 3 Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 D L R 321. 
2 0 4 Op cit. n.3. 
2 0 5 Gallagher, J. 'Collective Bad Faith: 'Protecting' the Fetus'. In: Callahan, J C . (Ed.) Reproduction, 
Ethics, and the Law: Feminist Perspectives (1995) 343. 
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Nigerian man who committed suicide after his wife was forcibly restrained with leather 
straps to enable a court ordered caesarean.2 0 6 Alternatively, restricting the woman's liberty 
may empower the woman's dependants as was the case in Re S in which the interests o f 
S's two children were advanced by overriding S's refusal o f consent. 2 0 7 The final 
balancing o f the factors is a matter o f judgement and the patient is the person best able to 
make the judgement; 
3) consistency. A n argument that i t is justifiable to infringe a person's liberty to protect their 
welfare interests must be applied throughout society and not just the realm o f healthcare. 
Thus priests would be justif ied in refusing to marry 'unsuitable' couples since marriage 
can certainly affect a person's future autonomy. Furthermore, all potentially harmful 
activities, which satisfied only first order desires rather than promoting 'ulterior interests', 
would have to be banned. While society has taken this view wi th some harmful activities, 
such as using controlled drugs, i t does not do this consistently. Thus we are allowed to 
smoke, eat an unhealthy diet, drink too much alcohol and have unprotected sex wi th as 
many partners as we choose. 
English law avoids these difficulties by avoiding the issue and allows that the competent 
adult's right to self-determination, wi th regard to medical treatment, is protected by law. This 
right has been aff irmed on many occasions using phrases such as: 'completely at l ibe r ty ' ; 2 0 8 
'his choice must be obeyed' ; 2 0 9 'absolute right to choose'; 2 1 0 'entitled to refuse ' ; 2 " and 'a 
basic human right protected by the common l a w ' . 2 1 2 In this way the law does not need to 
Kolder, V E B . 'Woman's Health Law: a Feminist Perspective' (1985) Unpublished manuscript 
discussed in: Gallagher, J . Op cit. n.205. 
2 0 7 Op cit. n.2. 
2 0 8 Op cit. n.57 at 860 per Lord Keith . 
2 0 9 Op cit. n.57 at 889 per Lord Mustill . 
2 1 0 Op cit. n.9 at 786 per Lord Donaldson MR. 
2 1 1 Malette v Shulman (1988) 47 D L R 18 at 44 per Donnelly J. 
2 1 2 Op cit. n.99 at 882 per Lord Scarman. 
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determine whether an actual decision is irrational and its only concern is that the person 
possesses decision-making capacity. 
This reluctance to interfere with irrational decisions may be because the law recognises the 
d i f f icu l ty in filtering out the incomprehensible f r o m the irrational. I t also protects against the 
risk o f a doctor taking the moral high ground and overriding a decision simply because he 
morally disagrees wi th it. A morally pluralist society demands a degree o f tolerance and, 
therefore, the law w i l l respect any decision made by a person competent to decide regardless 
o f whether the decision is based on irrational or even non-existent reasons. 2 1 3 In this respect, 
the law protects the right to self-determination to a greater extent than is required by the 
principle o f respect for autonomy. While this protects the autonomous decisions o f an 
autonomous person it also protects their non-autonomous decisions which may paradoxically 
harm that person's future autonomy. Thus, in trying to avoid determining which decisions are 
autonomous and which are not, the law may conflict wi th the principle o f respect for 
autonomy. I f the law's primary motivation was respecting the principle o f autonomy then i t 
would be just i f ied in overriding any decision, including autonomous ones, that may 
reasonably be expected to restrict the actor's future autonomy. As Raz states: ' A moral 
theory which values autonomy highly can jus t i fy restricting the autonomy o f one person for 
the sake o f the greater autonomy o f others or even o f himself in the fu tu re ' . 2 1 4 In not 
respecting autonomy per se the law focuses on the person rather than the principle and by 
respecting any decision o f an autonomous person allows that individual to take responsibility 
for their l i fe . 
2 , 3 Op cit. n.9 at 786 as per Lord Donaldson MR. 
2 1 4 0 p c i t . n.191 at 331. 
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Chapter Four: The Liberty-limiting Role of Countervailing Interests 
The right to self-determination is not absolute. Professor Beaudoin noted two limitations: 
'First the corresponding rights o f others. Accordingly, an individual may not use his body in 
a manner which may have the effect o f putting in jeopardy the l i fe or health o f others. 
Second, public order (policy). The law sometimes imposes limits on the right to freely do 
what one wishes with one's body. Accordingly, it does not allow a person to dispose inter 
vivos o f a part o f his body which is not capable o f regeneration or, a vital organ ' . 2 1 5 
Third Party Interests 
The third party most obviously affected is the fetus. This was recognised by Lord Donaldson 
M R whose dictum in Re J 2 1 6 was relied on in Re S. The decision in Re S although contrary to 
the earlier Court o f Appeal judgment in Re F (in utero) - and the established legal position 
that the fetus is not a legal person - has received support f rom Thorpe LJ: 'Obviously, the 
jurisdictional foundation for that [the decision in Re S] may, as a matter o f rationality, be 
d i f f i cu l t to tease out. The autonomy o f the patient is a clear rule. . . But o f course to recognise 
the autonomy o f the patient seemed to put an end not only to her l i fe but to the l i fe o f the 
child she was about to bear. Can we not all understand the pressure on the judge to make the 
order that has the prospect o f saving human l i f e ? ' 2 1 7 
The decision in Re S has now been disapproved by the Court o f Appeal in Re MB (obiter) and 
R v Collins. These decisions confirm that the fetus has no legal existence unti l i t is born alive. 
Legally, the fetus cannot be considered a relevant third party whose rights conflict wi th the 
autonomous woman when she refuses consent to a caesarean and the doctrine o f necessity 
2 1 5 Beaudoin, J-L. 'Le Droit de Refuser d'etre Traite (The Right to Refuse to be Treated)': Translation 
quoted in: Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR 385. 
2 1 6 Op cit. n.9. 
2 1 7 Thorpe LJ. 'The Courts and Medical Treatment' [1996] 26 Fam Law 728. 
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cannot jus t i fy overriding her decision for the fetus' sake (see p. 112). Nor can the contingent 
rights o f the child-to-be jus t i fy a caesarean against the woman's w i l l . Legally, there is no 
matemo-fetal conflict. 
Another third party affected by the woman's refusal is the doctor. It may be argued that, 
because the doctor's main interest is to ensure his patient's health, a refusal o f treatment that 
jeopardises the fetus and/or the woman harms the doctor. However, the doctor has no duty to 
treat the competent patient against their wishes and, under the Declaration o f Lisbon (infra), 
has a duty not to treat. Thus, the doctor's duty to act in the patient's best interest must be 
qualified by the patient's right to self-determination. 2 1 8 The risk to the fetus, however, 
complicates this scenario. Legally, since the fetus is not a person, the doctor has no 
justif ication for overriding the woman's decision, regardless o f how morally compromised he 
feels in respect o f the fetus. I w i l l consider the doctor's position in more detail later. 
The fetus' father may be able to act as a fetal advocate but, it is unlikely that he would have 
legal standing to compel a woman to consent to treatment for the fetus' benefit. This follows 
f rom Paton,219 in which a request for an injunction to prevent the woman f r o m aborting their 
fetus was denied. This decision was upheld by the European Commission o f Human Rights, 
in Paton v UK,220 because protection o f the woman's rights just i f ied l imi t ing the father's 
putative rights under Article 8. 2 2 1 Following this, there is no legal just if icat ion for allowing 
the father an injunction to prevent the woman f rom refusing consent to treatment. 
2 1 8 Op cit. n.57 at 866 per Lord Goff . 
2 1 9 Op cit. n.64. 
2 2 0 Paton v UK (1980) 3 EHRR 408. 
2 2 1 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights allows 'the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence'. 
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Public Policy 
In Robb, Thorpe J, noted 4 state interests that may affect the individual 's right to decide 
(See figure 12): 
1) the preservation o f l ife; 
2) the prevention o f suicide; 
3) maintaining the integrity o f the medical profession; 
4) the protection o f innocent third parties. 2 2 4 
He stated: 'The principle o f the sanctity o f human l i fe in this jurisdiction is seen to yield to 
the principle o f self-determination'. 2 2 5 This view follows the House o f Lords opinion in 
Bland}26 Further support comes f r o m Re MB and in Collins, Judge L J stated: 'Even when his 
or her own l i fe depends on receiving medical treatment, an adult o f sound mind is entitled to 
refuse i t ' . 2 2 7 
The state interest in preventing suicide is not relevant in the context o f refusing medical 
treatment. 2 2 8 Where the caesarean is indicated for fetal reasons refusing consent cannot be 
taken to indicate suicidal intent. Even where the operation is required on maternal grounds a 
suicidal intent cannot be implied. This is because, in most instances the patient desires to 
live, not at all expense, but only in accordance wi th her belief-set. Death is an unwanted side 
effect and, under the doctrine o f double effect, is not morally wrong. Furthermore, refusing a 
caesarean is by no means a certain way o f ensuring death. However, even i f death were 
certain, the courts would be unlikely to consider it suicide. As Price notes: 'The courts 
typically adopt a narrow construction o f intention in this context, equating it wi th desire' . 2 2 9 
2 2 2 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb [1995] 2 WLR 722. 
2 2 3 based on Thor v Superior Court (1993) 855 P.2d 375. 
224 , Op cit. n.222 at 727. 
' ] 
2 2 6 Op cit. n.57 at 866 per Lord Goff . 
2 2 7 Op cit. n.32 at 685. 
2 2 8 Op cit. n.57. 
2 2 9 Op cit. n. 150 at 276. 
2 2 5 Ibid. 
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Thus, in Nancy B, a ventilator-dependent patient insisting on being disconnected f rom the 
ventilator was not suicide but simply 'nature taking its course' . 2 3 0 Even where the person has 
plainly indicated a desire to die the courts w i l l deny that a refusal o f treatment is suicide. 2 3 1 
Thus, in Bouvia, Beach J argued: ' . . . i t is clear she has now merely resigned herself to accept 
an earlier death, i f necessary, rather than live by feedings forced upon her by means o f 
nasogastric tube. Her decision to allow nature to take its course is not equivalent to an 
election to commit suicide. . . ' . 2 3 2 The courts appear to be making an arguably unjustified, but 
crucial, distinction between acts and omissions in this context. 2 3 3 
The integrity o f the medical profession is maintained i f the doctors are allowed to practice 
according to established ethical principles. The Wor ld Medical Association ( W M A ) , in the 
Declaration o f Geneva, state: 'The health o f my patient w i l l be my first consideration'. 2 3 4 The 
Declaration o f Lisbon, adopted by the W M A in 1981, states: 'a physician should always act 
according to his/her conscience and always in the best interest o f the patient' . 2 3 5 These 
statements suggest the doctor is obliged to act paternalistically to ensure his patient's health. 
However, the Declaration o f Lisbon later states: 'The patient has the right to accept or to 
refuse treatment after receiving adequate information' . Likewise, the Brit ish Medical 
Association states: 'Doctors offer advice but it is the patient who decides whether or not to 
accept the advice ' . 2 3 6 Thus, a refusal o f treatment does not threaten the doctor's integrity 
since he is only ethically obliged to act in the patient's best interests i f consented to by the 
patient. 
2 3 0 Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR 385. 
2 3 1 Price, DPT. 'Assisted Suicide and Refusing Medical Treatment: Linguistics, Morals and Legal 
Contortions' (1996) 4 Med. Law Rev. 270 
2 3 2 Bouvia v Superior Court 179 Cal App 3d 1127 (1986). 
2 3 3 See: Price, DPT. Op cit. n.231. 
2 3 4 The Declaration of Geneva (as amended) (1983) Reproduced in: The British Medical Association. 
The Handbook of Medical Ethics (1984) 70. 
2 3 5 The Declaration of Lisbon (1981) Reproduced in: The British Medical Association. The Handbook 
of Medical Ethics (1984) 72. 
2 3 6 The British Medical Association. The Handbook of Medical Ethics (1984) 19 para 2.15. 
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The fetus, although not a legal-person, can still be a patient and this creates an ethical 
dilemma: because the fetus lacks autonomy the doctor is ethically obliged to act in its best 
interests which may be contrary to the competent woman's decision. This dilemma comprises 
a balance between the respect for the woman's autonomy and beneficence towards the fetus 
and the woman. A non-consensual caesarean harms the woman's right to self-determination, 
bodily integrity and potentially her right to l i fe . Not performing the caesarean risks harming 
the fetus' right to l i fe . Legally, the doctor is not just i f ied in placing beneficence above the 
right to self-determination. Moral ly, however, there are arguments that support either the 
woman or the fetus. 2 3 7 Thus, a doctor who believes that he is morally just i f ied in overriding 
the woman's decision w i l l be able to claim support from within society. However, he w i l l not 
have the support o f society as a whole. 
Upholding that doctor's ethical integrity would result in an unsatisfactory conclusion for two 
reasons: since not all doctors agree on the correct ethical approach, women would be 
subjected to different treatment on a geographical basis; and more importantly, infr inging the 
doctor's ethical integrity is a lesser harm than infr inging the woman's right to self-
determination and her bodily integrity. Guidelines issued by the Royal College o f 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists state: 'Obstetricians must respect the woman's legal liberty 
to ignore or reject professional advice, even to her own detriment and that o f her foetus ' . 2 3 8 
Thus, the ethical integrity o f the doctors is not sufficient to establish a public interest in 
overriding a competent woman's refusal o f treatment. 
One potential d i f f icul ty is that while the patient has the right to refuse treatment she has no 
right to demand an alternative against the doctor's advice. As Kennedy and Grubb state: 'The 
2 3 ' O p cit. n.175. 
2 3 8 Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, A Consideration of the Law and Ethics in 
Relation to Court-Authorised Obstetric Interventions (1994). 
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right to refuse treatment has limitations... It is a negative r ight . . . Consequently, a doctor 
cannot be required to provide treatment which in his clinical judgement he does not believe 
to be in a patient's best interests'. 2 3 9 This view is supported by Re J 2 4 0 in which, Lord 
Donaldson M R , as part o f the ratio, repeated his dictum f rom Re R:241 'No doctor can be 
required to treat a child whether by the court in the exercise o f its wardship jurisdiction, by 
the parents, by the child or anyone else. The decision whether to treat is dependent upon an 
exercise o f his own professional judgment... \ 2 4 2 Re C concerned a disagreement between the 
doctors and the parents o f a 16 month old girl suffering f r o m spinal muscular atrophy. Both 
parties agreed the gir l should be taken o f f ventilation but the parents wanted ventilation 
restarted i f necessary. Sir Stephen Brown P refused to instruct the doctors to comply wi th the 
parent's wishes, as: "That would o f course be tantamount to requiring the doctors to 
undertake a course o f treatment which they are unwil l ing to do. The court could not consider 
making an order which would require them so to d o ' . 2 4 3 
Since the patient has the right to refuse treatment and the doctors cannot be compelled to use 
a treatment against their better judgement, the scene is set for a potential impasse. In Re L244 
because o f a needle phobia, L refused consent to intravenous anaesthesia. She was wi l l ing to 
have anaesthesia induced by gas inhalation but the anaesthetist refused this method because 
of the risk o f gastric regurgitation and aspiration pneumonitis. The court circumvented the 
deadlock by f inding that, because o f her needle phobia, L was not competent to refuse 
consent. However, the anaesthetist's refusal to perform a gaseous induction o f anaesthesia 
was simply his personal opinion. In Re MB the woman also suffered from a needle phobia but 
2 3 9 Kennedy, I . Grubb, A. 'Treatment Without Consent: Adult' (1993) 1 Med. Law Rev. 83 at 85. 
2 4 0 Op cit. n.l38at27. 
2 4 1 Re R (a Minor: Wardship Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11. 
2 4 2 Ibid, at 26 per Lord Donaldson MR. 
2 4 3 Re C (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1998] Lloyd's Law Reports Medical, 1 at 5. 
2 4 4 Op cit. n.87. 
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here the anaesthetist was wi l l ing to perform a gaseous induction. How would the court 
have dealt wi th the issue i f L had simply been frightened o f needles rather than suffering 
f rom a true phobia? 
Given that, since Collins, a competent woman's refusal must be respected, w i l l doctors be 
compelled to perform a treatment against their better judgement? In Re C the situation was 
slightly different: the choice was between ventilating or not ventilating. In the caesarean 
cases, the choice w i l l generally be between a caesarean or vaginal delivery. It may be thought 
that for a doctor to refuse to assist a vaginal delivery simply because he disagrees wi th the 
woman's rejection o f his professional advice would be unthinkable. However, Chervenak and 
McCullough consider that refusal is just if ied. In arguing that certain conditions, e.g. a 
complete placenta praevia, are grounds for coercive intervention, they state: 
1. 'No physician is just i f ied in accepting such a refusal because doing so would be based on 
unreliable clinical judgement; and 
2. the physician is just i f ied in resisting a patient's exercise o f a positive right [to choose a 
treatment] when f u l f i l l i n g their positive right contradicts the most highly reliable clinical 
judgement, dooms the beneficence-based interests o f the fetus, and virtually dooms the 
beneficence-based interests o f the pregnant woman ' . 2 4 6 
They also believe that allowing a woman the right to refuse obstetric intervention endorses 'a 
policy that altogether ignores the integrity o f medicine as worthy o f serious consideration or 
even protection' . 2 4 7 This follows f rom their argument that the fetus is a second patient wi th 
ethical significance arising f rom its l ink wi th the 'chi ld it can become'. However, medical 
2 4 5 In the event, MB panicked when she saw the mask and withdrew her consent. She was subsequently 
deemed incompetent and the caesarean was performed using an intravenous induction. 
2 4 6 Chervenak, FA. McCullough, LB. 'Justified Limits on Refusing Intervention' (1991) 21 Hastings 
Centre Report 12. 
2 4 7 Chervenak, FA. McCullough, LB. 'Legal Intervention During Pregnancy' (1991) 265(15) JAMA 
1953. 
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integrity is infringed by allowing the woman to refuse intervention only i f i t is the doctor who 
assesses the reasonableness o f the risk. I f the woman makes the assessment then the 
beneficence-based obligations o f the doctor are rightly restricted to those interventions that 
the woman is wi l l ing to risk. Surely, since it is the woman who takes the risk she should be 
allowed to decide i f the risk is reasonable. The doctor's role is to counsel the woman about 
the risks and benefits o f an intervention. It is not his role to make the decision for her; to do 
so would be a paternalism that fails to respect the woman's autonomy. 
Furthermore, when a woman refuses a caesarean she is not making a positive demand for an 
alternative intervention. Vaginal delivery is the default mode o f birth and it would be strained 
reasoning to argue that rejecting a caesarean in favour o f vaginal delivery is an exertion o f a 
positive right. Effectively, their argument rests on whether the doctor's moral obligations to 
the fetus outweigh his obligations to the pregnant woman. While it might be argued that the 
woman has a moral obligation to the fetus she is not under any obligation to take major risks 
for its benefit. Since a caesarean is a significant invasion o f bodily integrity, wi th risks o f 
both morbidity and mortality, she cannot be obliged to agree to a caesarean for her fetus' 
sake. Consenting to a caesarean may be morally commendable but refusing consent is not 
morally reprehensible. 
Just as the integrity o f medicine is not infringed by a potential organ donor refusing consent 
which w i l l result in the potential recipient's certain death neither is i t infringed by the refusal 
o f a caesarean. To argue differently would demand that doctors act as moral arbiters and 
would place them in conflict wi th their patients and the law. This would create too large a 
burden for the doctor and runs a much greater risk o f infr inging their moral integrity than 
does demanding that they respect their patient's decisions. Demanding respect for patient's 
decisions adds a definite boundary to the doctor-patient relationship that frees the doctor 
88 
f rom moral responsibility for that decision and allows him to concentrate on the role for 
which he was trained: providing medical care. 
I f the doctor believes that the caesarean is the right treatment would he be legally just if ied in 
refusing to assist the woman deliver vaginally? The answer is no. Firstly, the woman, by 
refusing the caesarean effectively reduces the treatment options to assisting, or not assisting, 
her vaginal delivery. The caesarean is no longer part o f the equation and the doctor must 
therefore decide whether assisting her or not is in her best interests. I f the doctor still owes 
her a duty o f care then there is really little choice but to assist her delivery. Secondly, the 
woman w i l l still be under the care o f the hospital and the doctor's contractual obligations to 
the hospital would probably require that he assists the delivery. Thirdly, although he might be 
able to argue that the woman's refusal o f his advice negates his personal duty o f care he 
would still remain under an obligation to refer her to a colleague who would be wi l l ing to 
assist. Finally, i f a doctor chooses not to assist the woman without making alternative 
arrangements then, should the woman or the fetus suffer harm because o f the lack o f 
assistance, the doctor may be liable for negligence. Thus, although the doctor cannot be 
compelled to fo l low a particular course o f action he must act in his patient's best interests 
wi thin the confines o f the options left open by her treatment decision. I f the doctor chooses to 
do nothing then he may be liable for negligence i f his inaction results in harm. Hopefully, no 
doctor would be churlish enough to refuse to help a woman simply because she rejected his 
professional advice. 
The final state interest is the protection o f innocent third parties. These include; the fetus, the 
woman's dependants, and others emotionally dependent on the woman. The persons 
emotionally dependent on the woman may be harmed i f she dies or is seriously injured. 
However, this type o f harm is emotional rather than physical and does not infringe their 
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rights, moral or legal. Where the harm is unintentional and not associated wi th the breach o f 
a recognised right or duty then the state does not owe its citizens a right not to be emotionally 
hurt. In criminal law: 'the phrase 'actual bodily harm' is capable o f including psychiatric 
injury. But it does not include mere emotions such as fear or distress or panic nor does it 
include, as such, states o f mind that are not themselves evidence o f some identifiable clinical 
condi t ion ' . 2 4 8 Likewise, tort law w i l l not allow an action for emotional harm unless that harm 
is either associated wi th 'some other type o f actionable in jury ' or where the harm is severe 
enough to cause a 'medically recognised psychiatric i l lness". 2 4 9 Furthermore, unintentionally 
causing a psychiatric injury would not incur l iabil i ty unless it was caused negligently. 2 5 0 
Since a refusal o f medical treatment may be based on irrational reasons it seems unlikely that 
a pregnant woman could be negligent when she refuses a caesarean. It would be morally good 
for the woman to consider the feelings o f others when she makes her decision but the State 
has no right to interfere wi th that decision. The massive interference that would be required 
by the State, i f i t was to try and prevent emotional harm, would be impossible to achieve on a 
practical level. 
Essentially, the woman's dependants are her children. The State does restrict her autonomy 
for her children's benefit to ensure that they are provided wi th essentials such as food, shelter 
and medical care. However, child neglect laws do not require that she refrains from 
dangerous activity such as mountaineering or even smoking, nor do they require her to put 
herself at risk for her children. While she may be required to 'rescue' her child i f there was 
no risk she would not be expected to enter a burning house to do so. Nor would she be legally 
required to donate an organ or even just a pint o f blood. In McFall,251 the court held that a 
cousin could not be compelled to donate bone marrow even though his refusal 'appears to be 
2 4 8 Chan-Fook [1994] 2 Al l ER 552 at 559. 
2 4 9 Cane, P. The Anatomy of Tort Law (1997) at 68. 
2 5 0 Rogers, WVH. Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (1994) at 119. 
2 5 1 McFall v Shrimp 10 Pa D&C 2d 90 (1978). 
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revolting in the moral sense'. From the State's perspective, the harm to the woman, in 
overriding her refusal, would be much greater than the harm suffered by the children. Thus 
the State cannot compel a woman to undergo an operation against her wishes simply because 
they suffer an emotional harm and may become a financial burden to the state. 
The ultimate third party, that may require protection under the umbrella o f public interest, is 
the fetus. Although the fetus has no independent legal personality the State may still have a 
legitimate interest in its protection. This follows because any in utero harm may affect its 
ability to become an autonomously useful member o f society. This could later place a burden 
on society and thus its prevention must be within the public interest. However, i f a parent 
cannot be compelled to undergo even minor procedures for their child's sake then they 
cannot be compelled to do so for the sake o f their fetus. In the U.S., one judge refused to 
override a woman's refusal and order a caesarean because he recognised there was no 
jurisdiction to force her to donate an organ to one o f her children, even i f i t would die 
without i t . 2 5 2 As Nelson and Mi l l i ken observe: ' . . .our society refuses to force the donation o f 
organs or tissues f rom cadavers to benefit or save the lives o f the thousands in need o f them. 
We see no good reason why pregnant women should be treated wi th less respect than 
corpses'. 2 5 3 
Current public policy as evinced by Statute Law emphasises the primacy o f the mother over 
her unborn child. Thus, the Abortion Act 1967 puts the woman's health ahead o f the fetus, 
even at f u l l term. Likewise, the Congenital Disabilities (Civ i l Liabi l i ty) Act 1976 makes all 
liability to the fetus derivative to a tort committed against the parent (usually the mother) and 
it denies any maternal l iabili ty for ante-natal harm except for that caused by dangerous 
2 5 2 Unpublished opinion, No. 84-7-50006-D (Super Ct Benton Cty Wash, April 20, 1984) discussed in: 
Nelson, LJ. Milliken, N. Op cit. n.38. 
2 5 3 Op cit. n. 38. 
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driving. This suggests that the legislature places maternal liberty above the prevention o f fetal 
harm and shifts the balance o f decision making power away f rom the doctors and midwives 
and towards the woman. As Eekelaar and Dingwall state: 'The Congenital Disabilities (Civi l 
Liabi l i ty) Act 1976 only recognises a separate duty to the child after the moment o f birth, 
defined as the point when the child has a l i fe "separate from its mother". Before that, the 
attendant's first duty appears to be the care o f the mother in which, clearly, deference to her 
wishes w i l l be a significant feature. I f in deferring to her and giving her correct professional 
attention, the child is injured, the law appears to hold that this is just too bad. On the other 
hand, i f the attendant overrides the mothers wishes in attending to the child, he would seem at 
risk o f l i t iga t ion ' . 2 5 4 
More recent government reports ' also add weight to the woman's position. The Expert 
Maternity Group stated: 'The woman must be the focus o f maternity care. She should be able 
to feel that she is in control o f what is happening to her and able to make decisions about her 
care, based on her needs, having f u l l y discussed matters f u l l y wi th the professionals 
invo lved ' . 2 5 7 A n earlier Department o f Health Memorandum states: 'Women should as far as 
practicable, be able to choose and have access to the type o f care which they feel is best 
suited to their needs'. 2 5 8 Similarly, the Health Committee focused on the woman's needs and 
recommended that: ' . . .a hospital delivery unit should: ensure the feasibility o f the woman 
being ' i n control ' o f her labour ' . 2 5 9 
A l l these considerations suggest that public policy does not require a woman to submit to a 
non-consensual operation for the fetus' benefit. As Hewson notes: 'There is no clear 'public 
Eekelaar, JM. Dingwall, RWJ. 'Some Legal Issues in Obstetric Practice' [1984] Journal of Social 
Welfare Law 258 at 267. 
2 5 5 House of Commons Health Committee. Maternity Services (1992). 
2 5 6 Department of Health Expert Maternity Group. Changing Childbirth (1993). 
2 5 7 Ibid, at 9. 
2 5 8 Quoted in: House of Commons Health Committee. Maternity Services (1992) xv. 
2 5 9 Ibid, at xcviii. 
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policy' argument to jus t i fy hospitals imposing unwanted services on unwil l ing consumers, 
especially by fo rce ' . 2 6 0 Currently, the public interest in ensuring that the rights o f the adult 
woman are protected is perceived to be stronger than the public interest in protecting the 
fetus. This position should only be changed by Parliament and not the courts. 2 6 1 As Thorpe 
LJ states: 'The issue lies across the fields o f jurisprudence, morality, medical ethics and 
constitutional rights. The debate is more in the political than the legal arena. It is for society 
to resolve the debate through its democratic and legislative processes'. 2 6 2 
Hewson, B. 'Women's Rights and Legal Wrongs' (1996) 146 NLf 1385. 
Re F (In utero) [1988] Fam 122 at 144 per Balcombe LJ. 
Op cit. n.l at 664. 
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Chapter Five: The Woman's Rights Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) 
The woman's position receives further support under the E C H R . 2 6 3 A non-consensual 
operation may violate Articles 3, 5 and 8. I f the woman's refusal o f consent is for religious 
reasons it may also breach Article 9. Article 3 states: 'No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'. To violate these provisions the treatment 
must exceed a threshold level which ' . . .depends on all the circumstances o f the case, such as 
the duration o f treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and 
state o f health o f the victim, etc ' . 2 6 4 Thus, for an emotionally and physically vulnerable 
pregnant woman, especially one in labour, the threshold level would be lower than for a 
healthy adult prisoner. The obligation o f the State to comply wi th Article 3 is not relieved by 
the patient being obstructive or uncooperative. 2 6 5 Furthermore, the fact that medical treatment 
is not intended to cause suffering is irrelevant: 'inhuman treatment need not be intended to 
cause suffering. . . the crucial distinction lies in the degree o f suffering caused'. 2 6 6 
In Herczegfalvy,267 the Commission stated: 'Compulsory medical treatment does not violate 
Article 3 i f it is necessary f rom the medical point o f view and carried out in conformity with 
standards accepted by medical science'. 2 6 8 The Court stated that: 'a measure which is a 
therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman or degrading. The Court must 
2 6 3 See Hewson, B. 'Right to Refuse Treatment; Right to a Fair Hearing' (1997) 2 Journal of Civil 
Liberties 44. 
2 6 4 Ireland v UK A 25 (1978) para 162. 
2 6 5 Herczegfalvy v Austria A 244 (1992) at 45. 
2 6 6 Harris, DJ. O'Boyle, M . Warbrick, C. Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (1995) 
61. 
2 6 7 Herczegfalvy v Austria A 244 (1992). 
2 6 8 Ibid, at 45. 
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nevertheless satisfy itself that the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist'. 
However, Herczegfalvy concerned a mentally incompetent patient under compulsory 
detention who was force fed while on hunger strike. Harris et al argue that the effect o f 
Article 3 on compulsory medical treatment o f detainees is not clear: ' A t the least, it is likely 
that Article 3 permits the compulsory treatment by the state in accordance with the 'standards 
accepted by medical science' o f all persons in its custody where this is necessary to save 
them f rom death or serious in jury . . . Such treatment would not be inhuman or degrading just 
because o f the lack o f consent or the manner o f its administration' , 2 7 0 Under Article 2 a State 
has a positive obligation, ' . . . to take appropriate steps to safeguard l i f e ' . 2 7 1 The Commission 
has held that, at least in respect to a person in the state's custody, this positive obligation 
supersedes issues under Article 3 . 2 7 2 
When the court authorised a caesarean in Collins, the woman was detained in the State's 
custody under s.3 M H A 1983. Irrespective o f whether the detention itself was lawful this 
would still jus t i fy non-consensual treatment to safeguard her l i fe and would take that 
treatment outside o f Article 3. It may also be argued that, although not compulsorily detained, 
patients in NHS hospitals are in the State's care and that the State's obligations to persons in 
its care are the same as to those in its custody. I f this argument is accepted then non-
consensual treatment would not breach Article 3. However, the position taken by the 
Commission in Xv FRG,27i that the obligation under Article 2 'should in certain 
circumstances call for positive action on the part o f the contracting parties, in particular an 
active measure to save lives when the authorities have taken the person in question into their 
Op cit.n.267 at 26. 
0 Op cit. n.266 at 72. 
1 Opinion of the Commission in McCann and others v UK (1996) 21 EHRR 97 at 138, para 187. 
2 X v FRG (1985) 7 EHRR 152. 
3 Ibid, at 153. 
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custody', has been criticised. An alternative view is that the duty is to make treatment 
available but there is no duty to enforce treatment against the w i l l o f a competent woman. 
Article 5 states: 'Everyone has the right to liberty and security o f person'. In Xv Austria, the 
Commission held : ' . . . that enforcing a blood test on a person is a deprivation o f l iber ty ' . 2 7 5 I f 
this is the case then a non-consensual caesarean must also qualify as a violation o f Article 5. 
Article 8 states: 
' 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family l i fe , his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority wi th the exercise o f this right except 
in accordance wi th the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests o f 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being o f the country, for the 
prevention o f disorder or crime, for the protection o f health or morals, or for the 
protection o f the rights and freedom o f others'. 
In Herczegfalvy, the Court held: 'the right to respect for a person's private l i fe includes his 
right to decide himself whether he wishes undergo a certain medical treatment'. 2 7 6 In 
Laskey,171 the Commission considered whether overriding a person's consent to sado-
masochistic acts that inflicted actual bodily harm was 'necessary in a democratic society', 
under Article 8, ' fo r the protection o f health or morals'. The Commission stated: 'any 
interference under Article 8 had to correspond to a pressing social need and be proportionate 
to the aim pursued, taking into account the State's margin o f appreciation [ in relation to 
Op cit. n.266 at 40. 
X v Austria No. 8278/78 18 DR 154 at 156 (1979). 
Op cit. n.267 at 49. 
Colin Laskey, Roland Jaggard, and Anthony Brown v UK [1996] EHRLR 194. 
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moral i ty] ' . The Commission held, that even though Article 8 covered sexual relationships, 
the derogation ' fo r the protection of health and morals' was just if ied. 
It might be argued that where a fetus is likely to be born alive then there is a 'pressing social 
need' to ensure that it is born healthy. I f it is the only safe way to deliver the baby then a non-
consensual caesarean might be considered proportionate. Likewise, given the 'margin o f 
appreciation' in relation to moral issues, i f a state felt morally obliged to protect the l i fe o f 
the fetus a non-consensual caesarean would not necessarily be a violation o f Article 8. 
However, in Bouchelkia, the Commission emphasised the need to ensure that: ' . . .a fair 
balance has been struck between the legitimate aim pursued and the seriousness o f the 
interference wi th the applicant's r i gh t ' . 2 7 9 This view was endorsed by the Court. Thus, even i f 
protecting the health o f the fetus is a legitimate aim it would still have to be offset against the 
woman's rights. In Cossey, the Court stated: 'the fair balance that has to be struck [is] 
between the general interest o f the community and the interests o f the ind iv idua l ' . 2 8 0 Thus the 
Court would have to be convinced that protection o f the fetus outweighed the woman's right 
to self-determination and bodily integrity. Following earlier decisions, 2 8 1 and given that a 
non-consensual caesarean is a major infringement o f the woman's bodily integrity and 
liberty, it seems unlikely that the public interest in the fetus would trump the woman's rights. 
Similar arguments pertain to 'the protection o f the rights and freedoms o f others': i t is 
doubtful i f the fetus would be considered as an 'other' under the Convention and even i f i t 
was the rights o f the woman would trump any limited rights given to the fetus. It may be that 
the father-to-be o f the fetus could be a vict im under this section and this would certainly be 
so i f the father-to-be could make a claim under the Convention as a vic t im o f the woman's 
2 7 8 Opcit. n.277 at 195. 
2 7 9 Bouchelkia v France (1997) 25 EHRR 686 at 702, para 47. 
2 8 0 Cossey v UK A 184 para 37 (1990). 
2 8 1 Opcit. n.221. 
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decision regarding her pregnancy. In Bowman, the Commission stated: ' i n order to be a 
vict im o f an interference with a right an applicant must be 'directly affected' by the measure 
complained o f . 2 8 2 Indirect victims may also be allowed providing they are closely affected 
and not simply acting as advocates. 'Broadly speaking the concept o f indirect victims 
encompasses those who are also prejudiced by the violation as well as those who may have a 
valid personal interest in having the violation established'. 2 8 3 In Paton, a prospective father 
was held to be so closely affected, by the decision o f the woman to terminate her pregnancy, 
that he was considered a vict im. However, the rights o f the woman under Article 8 trumped 
both the rights o f the fetus under Article 2 and any rights the father might have had under 
Articles 8 and 12. 2 8 4 This would also be the case for refusal o f medical treatment and thus a 
non-consensual caesarean could not be just if ied as 'protection o f the rights and freedoms o f 
others'. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in arguing that State interests override the woman's rights, 
any interference o f those rights must be ' i n accordance with the l a w ' . 2 8 5 Overriding a 
competent woman's consent would not be in accordance with the current law in England as 
stated in Collins and Re MB. Any proposed change in the law would have to take into 
account the need for certainty. 2 8 6 Prior to Re S, the law regarding a refusal o f a caesarean was 
uncertain. Lord Donaldson MR's dictum about the presence o f a viable fetus being a possible 
exception to the right to self-determination was possibly one o f the justifications for 
overriding S's refusal o f consent. However, since the fetus is not a person under English law, 
Lord Donaldson MR' s dictum did not make it foreseeable that it would be lawful to perform 
a non-consensual caesarean on a competent woman. Given the serious nature o f the 
2 8 2 Bowman and the SPUC v UK (1996) 21 EHRR CD 79. 
2 8 3 Op cit. n.266 at 637. 
2 8 4 Article 12 states: 'Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right'. 
2 8 5 S.2 Article 8. 
2 8 6 Malone v UK A 82 para 87 (1984). 
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infringement o f the woman's rights and the lack o f foreseeability o f the decision, 2 8 7 Re S was 
probably not in accordance with the law for the purposes o f a derogation under Article 8. 
Article 9(1) states: 'Everyone has the right to freedom o f thought, conscience and religion: 
this right includes freedom... to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice 
and observance'. Article 9 protects both religious and non-religious beliefs. Non-religious 
beliefs are fair ly generously interpreted and, in Arrowsmith, pacifism satisfied the 
requirements because it was a 'philosophy' . 2 8 8 The beliefs held by S, in Collins, that nature 
should not be interfered with and therefore her pregnancy should be left to take its course, 
would probably fal l under Article 9. In Re S, S and her husband were 'described as 'bom 
again Christians' and are clearly quite sincere in their be l ie fs ' . 2 8 9 Their refusal o f a caesarean 
for religious reasons would be protected by Article 9 providing they could show that such a 
refusal was consistent wi th or required by their bel iefs . 2 9 0 Under Article 9(2) the State may 
interfere with the manifestation o f religion or belief in 'the interests o f public safety, for the 
protection o f public order, health or morals, or for the protection o f the rights and freedoms 
o f others'. Ignoring the need for foreseeability, the Court may accept that a violation is 
just i f ied under the grounds o f protecting the woman's (and/or the viable fetus') health. In X v 
UK it was held that the requirement that a Sikh prisoner clean his cell's f loor, although 
contrary to accepted Sikh practice, was just i f ied for the protection o f health. 2 9 1 Similarly the 
potential risk to the health/life o f the mother or her child-to-be may jus t i fy a violation o f 
Article 9. 
Silver v UK A 61 paras 91, 93-95 (1983). The law must be certain and foreseeable and the 
knowledge of those factors must have been available to or accessible by the victim. 
2 8 8 Arrowsmith v UK No. 7050/75, 19 DR 5 (1978) Com Rep paras 69-71; CM Res DH (79) 4. 
2 8 9 Op cit. n.2 per Sir Stephen Brown P. 
2 9 0 Op cit. n.266 at 358. 
2 9 1 X v UK No. 8231/78, 28 DR 5 at 38 (1982). 
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In summary, a non-consensual caesarean w i l l violate the rights o f a competent woman under 
Articles 3, 5 and 8. I f her refusal is on religious or conscientious grounds then Article 9 w i l l 
also be breached. Furthermore, i f the woman dies fo l lowing the caesarean then her rights 
under Article 2 w i l l have been infringed. I f the caesarean is indicated on maternal grounds 
then Art icle 3 may not have been breached because o f the State's positive obligations under 
Article 2. This may also be the case i f the Court allows the viable fetus a limited right to l i fe . 
While the violation o f Article 9 may be just if ied under the protection o f health or the rights 
o f others it is unlikely that the same can be argued for the breach o f the woman's rights under 
Article 8. Certainly that would be the case where the caesarean was indicated solely on fetal 
grounds because the gross invasion o f the woman's rights, under Article 8, would outweigh 
any State interest in the potential l i fe o f the fetus. Therefore, a non-consensual caesarean 
would be a violation o f a competent woman's rights under the ECHR. 
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Chapter Six: The Legal Status of the Fetus 
In Collins?92 the Court o f Appeal considered the full- term fetus: 'Whatever else it may be, a 
36-week foetus is not nothing; i f viable, i t is not lifeless and i t is certainly human'. It argued: 
' . . .the interests o f the foetus cannot be disregarded on the basis that in refusing treatment 
which would benefit the foetus, a mother is simply refusing treatment for herself . However, 
Judge LJ found that, both in c r imina l 2 9 3 and c iv i l l aw , 2 9 4 legally protected interests o f the 
fetus are not realised until i t is born alive. The Court o f Appeal concluded: 'Although human, 
and protected by the law in a number o f different ways .. .an unborn child is not a separate 
person f r o m its mother'. This was also the conclusion in Re MB.295 The Court o f Appeal was 
undoubtedly correct, on the basis o f current law, to deny that the fetus has legally protected 
interests that may override the competent woman's right to self-determination. The law is 
strongly weighted in favour o f the competent woman's autonomy but the first-instance 
decisions suggest there is a significant amount o f judicial sympathy wi th the fetus. It is 
therefore important to consider the legal and moral status o f the fetus in order to determine 
whether the legal balance is weighted appropriately. 
Legal Protection of the Fetus as Fetus 
It is certain that, under English law, the fetus is not a legal person. In Attorney General's 
Reference (No.3 o f 1994), Lord Must i l l stated: ' I t is sufficient to say that it is established 
beyond doubt for the criminal law, as for the c iv i l law. . . that the child en ventre sa mere does 
not have a distinct human personality whose extinguishment gives rise to any penalties or 
liabilities at common l a w ' . 2 9 6 Thus, a stillborn child cannot give rise to l iabil i ty for homicide 
2 9 2 Op cit. n.32. 
2 9 3 Op cit. n.65. 
2 9 4 Op cit. n.69. 
295 
296 
Op cit. n.31 at 561. 
Op. cit. n.65 at 434. 
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and in Tail, a threat to k i l l a pregnant woman's fetus is not a threat to k i l l a 'legal person". 
As Sir George Baker said, in Paton: 'The foetus cannot, in English law, in my view, have a 
right o f its own at least until i t is born and has a separate existence f r o m its mother ' . 2 9 8 
Likewise, in Re F an attempt to make a fetus a ward o f court f a i l ed . 2 9 9 As Balcombe LJ 
explained: ' . . .an unborn child has, ex hypothesi, no existence independent o f its mother ' . 3 0 0 
However, the fetus is not bereft o f legal protection. 
Three criminal law statutes provide limited protection for the fetus: the Infant L i f e 
(Preservation) Act 1929; the Offences Against The Person Act (OAPA) 1861 and the 
Abortion Act 1967. The 1861 Act makes it an offence to 'unlawful ly administer .. .any 
poison or other noxious thing, or [shall] unlawful ly use any instrument or other means 
whatsoever' wi th 'intent to procure' a 'miscarriage'. 3 0 1 Under the 1929 Act, any intentional 
destruction o f 'the l i fe o f a child capable o f being born alive' is an offence unless it is done in 
'good faith for the purpose only o f preserving the l i fe o f the mother ' . 3 0 2 Because i t requires a 
' w i l f u l act', intentional omissions escape the ambit o f the 1929 Act which means that 
refusing medical treatment could never be an offence under this Act even i f i t was virtually 
certain 3 0 3 the child would die before achieving an independent existence. Likewise, recklessly 
or negligently causing fetal death is not an offence under the 1929 Act - or the OAPA 1861 -
and so recklessly or negligently refusing medical treatment, not caring whether the fetus dies, 
would not create a liabili ty. Similarly, the Abortion Act 1967 gives little protection to the 
fetus. Up to 24 weeks gestation, it may be aborted on 'social ' grounds. 3 0 4 Af ter 24 weeks, 
2 9 7 RvTa i t [1990] 1 QB 290. 
2 9 8 Op cit. n.64 at 279. 
2 9 9 Op cit. n.69. 
3 0 0 Ibid, at 538. 
3 0 1 OAPA 1861, s.58. 
3 0 2 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, s.l. 
3 0 3 R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025. 
3 0 4 s.l(2) allows the woman's 'actual or reasonably foreseeable environment' to be taken into account. 
In: Health Care Law (1997) at 365, Montgomery, J. notes: 'While this ground clearly refers to health 
matters, it has been described as a 'social' ground... This means that the inconvenience of having a 
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although termination o f the fetus requires stronger justification, its ' r ight-to-l ife ' is still 
subservient to the woman's right to preserve her l i fe or avoid 'grave permanent in jury ' to her 
health. 3 0 5 Thus, the criminal law, does not require a pregnant woman to place the interests o f 
the fetus qua fetus before her own well-being 
The fetus fares even worse in the c iv i l law which provides no protection against in utero 
death. Both under common l a w 3 0 6 and under the Congenital Disabilities (Civ i l Liabi l i ty) Act 
1976 the child must first be born alive before it acquires any standing. 3 0 7 Similarly, a parent 
cannot claim for bereavement loss, under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, when a child is 
s t i l lborn. 3 0 8 The argument is succinctly stated by Whi t f ie ld : 'There can be no actionable 
breach o f duty to those born dead: before they are born they are not 'persons' and after they 
are born they have no legal r ights ' . 3 0 9 
The ECHR provides for the right-to-life which is ' . . .the most basic human right o f a l l ' . 3 1 0 
Article 2 states: 'Everyone's right-to-life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived 
o f his l i fe intentionally save in the execution o f a sentence o f a court fo l lowing his conviction 
o f a crime for which the penalty is provided by law' . This article 'establishes a positive 
obligation for states to make adequate provision in their law for the protection o f human l i f e ' , 
but whether 'everyone' includes the fetus has not yet been f u l l y resolved. 3" 
child may provide a basis for an abortion'. He also notes that in 1993, of the 157,846 abortions in 
England and Wales, 96% were on 'social grounds'. 
3 0 5 Abortion Act 1967, s.l(l)(b), (c). 
3 0 6 B v Islington Health Authority [1991] 1 QB 638. 
3 0 7 Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 
s. 1,2. In some circumstances, such as under the laws of inheritance, the civil law has engineered the 
fiction that a child can be deemed 'born legally' before its physical birth. Thus, in The George and 
Richard (1871) LR3A and E.466, a child born after the death of its father was a dependent for the 
purposes of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846. 
3 0 8 Bagley v North Herts Health Authority (1986) 136 NLJ 1014. 
3 0 9 Whitfield, A. 'Common Law Duties to Unborn Children' [1993] 1 Med. Law Rev. 28. 
3 1 0 Op cit. n.266 at 37. 
3 1 1 Op cit. n.266 at 41. 
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In Paton v UK the Commission noted that although not defined: 'both the general usage o f 
the term 'everyone' in the Convention and the context in which this term is employed in 
Article 2 tend to support the view that it does not include the unborn ' . 3 1 3 Later the 
Commission argued that the fetus does not have an absolute right-to-life because: 'The ' l i f e ' 
o f the foetus is intimately connected with , and it cannot be regarded in isolation of, the l i fe o f 
the pregnant woman. I f Article 2 were held to cover the foetus and its protection under this 
Article were, in the absence o f any express limitation, seen as an absolute, an abortion would 
have to be considered as prohibited even where the continuance o f the pregnancy would 
involve a serious risk to the l i fe o f the pregnant woman. This would mean that the 'unborn 
l i f e ' o f the foetus would be regarded as being o f a higher value than the l i fe o f the pregnant 
woman ' . 3 1 4 However, because the case involved the abortion o f a fetus during the first hal f o f 
gestation, the Commission declined to consider whether the fetus had a l imited right-to-life or 
no right at all under the Convention. 
After Paton i t is still possible that the fetus may have a limited right-to-life under Article 2 . 3 1 5 
Implied limitations to this right would reasonably include protection o f the woman's health 
and l i fe but it is not clear whether their application would be uniform throughout gestation. 
However, the fragile right-to-life o f the pre-viable fetus received another blow in H v 
Norway^6 which involved the abortion o f a 14 week fetus on the statutory ground that 
continuation o f the pregnancy 'may place the woman in a d i f f i cu l t situation o f l i f e ' . The 
Commission held that this was not contrary to Article 2 thus allowing the woman's lifestyle 
to further l imi t the pre-viable fetus' right-to-life. This decision means that the pre-viable fetus 
has no real right-to-life at all . 
3 1 2 Paton v UK No. 8416/79 19 DR 244 (1980). 
3 1 3 Ibid, at 250. 
3 1 4 Op cit. n.313at 252. 
3 1 5 Op cit. n.266 at 42. 
3 1 6 H v Norway No. 17004/90 (1992) unreported. 
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The refusal of a caesarean concerns a viable fetus rather than the pre-viable fetus considered 
in the abortion cases. After H v Norway i t is unlikely that the pre-viable fetus has a right-to-
l i fe protected by the Convention, but it is still possible that the viable fetus has a limited 
right-to-life. In Bruggerman317 the Commission stated that 'pregnancy cannot be said to 
pertain uniquely to the sphere o f private l i fe . Whenever a woman is pregnant, her private l i fe 
becomes closely connected with the developing foetus'. Also, in H v Norway, despite 
allowing social abortions, the Commission would not exclude the possibility o f 
circumstances (not defined) in which Article 2 may offer protection to the fetus. As Douglas 
notes: ' I t [the Commission] seems to be unsure about the position o f the foetus, and has yet to 
make up its m i n d ' . 3 1 8 
Re MB319 is the only caesarean case in which the court considered (obiter) the rights o f the 
fetus under the Convention. The Court o f Appeal concluded that none o f the Commission's 
opinions were helpful in deciding the issue. Thus, until the Commission considers the status 
o f the ful l- term fetus - or at least the viable fetus - the courts must rely on current English law 
which allows the fetus only very limited protection. The implication is that the interests o f 
the fetus qua fetus cannot be heeded when considering the right o f a pregnant woman to 
refuse consent. 
The United Nations Convention On The Rights O f The Child, adopted in 1989, may be 
interpreted to afford the fetus greater protection. The preamble, by stating 'the chi ld . . . 
.. .before as well as after b i r th ' , implies that the fetus has as much 'inherent right-to-life ' as 
the child after b i r t h . 3 2 0 Since a human being is not defined, the definit ion o f a child may 
3 1 7 Bruggerman and Scheuten v Federal Republic of Germany [1977] 3 EHRR 244. (10 DR 100). 
3 1 8 Douglas, G. Law, Fertility and Reproduction (1991) at 37. 
3 1 9 Op cit. n.31. 
3 2 0 Article 6 demands that: 1) States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right-to-life; and 
2) States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child. 
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arguably include the fetus. However, 'The definition was indeed left deliberately vague to 
permit individual states to give it their own meaning' . 3 2 1 Also, 'appropriate legal protection' 
could be interpreted differently for the child post- as opposed to pre-birth. Furthermore, the 
Convention is only politically persuasive not legally binding. 
Legal Protection of the Fetus as a Child-to-be 
Despite the lack of protection afforded the fetus ki l led in utero the law recognises that the 
child born alive is affected by pre-birth events. In Re D, a wardship case, Lord G o f f stated: 
'They [magistrates] have, o f course to consider the question whether the relevant (factual) 
continuum exists, at the date when they are asked to make their order, wi th reference to a 
l iv ing child. But in looking for evidence whether such continuum exists, there is no reason 
why they should not look at events which occurred while the child was still unborn ' . 3 2 2 
Glazebrooke notes: ' . . . i t has long been clear that, i f the baby had died o f ante-natal injuries 
deliberately or recklessly inflicted, the person causing them would be guilty o f 
manslaughter'. 3 2 3 The authority for this was Senior: a male midwife , who negligently crushed 
a baby's skull causing it to die immediately after birth, was found guilty o f manslaughter. 3 2 4 
In Kwok Chak Ming the defendant was convicted o f manslaughter for stabbing a pregnant 
woman causing her baby's death 3 days post-partum. 3 2 5 The decision was based on the 
doctrine o f transferred malice which: 'applies we think with equal force even where [the third 
party] was only an embryo or foetus at the time when the malice was manifested and the 
injury inflicted but is subsequently born alive and dies o f the i n j u r y ' . 3 2 6 
3 2 1 Opcit. n.318 at 39. 
3 2 2 Re D (A minor) [1987] 1 FLR 422 at 438 per Lord Goff. 
3 2 3 Glazebrook, PR. 'What Care Must be Taken of an Unborn Baby?'(1993) 52(1) Cambridge Law 
Review 20. 
3 2 4 R v Senior (1832) 1 Mood 346. 
3 2 5 Kwok Chak Ming v The Queen [1963] HKLR 349. 
3 2 6 Ibid, at 354. 
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The doctrine o f transferred malice was again applied by the Court o f Appeal in Attorney-
General's Reference (No.3 of 1994).m The decision was criticised because: the argument 
that the fetus should be treated as part o f the mother would negate transferred malice which 
applies between persons and not between parts o f the same person, and: ' I f i t is not possible 
to have the mens rea for murder in relation to a foetus, on the basis that the foetus is not a 
person in being, surely it cannot be possible to transfer the mens rea to a person not in 
be ing ' . 3 2 8 When the case came before the House o f Lords it held that transferred malice was 
not applicable and: 'That a foetus was neither a distinct person separate f r o m its mother nor 
merely an adjunct o f the mother, but was a unique organism to which existing principles 
could not necessarily be appl ied ' . 3 2 9 However, as the defendant had stabbed a woman in the 
abdomen knowing she was pregnant, there was sufficient mens rea for manslaughter. 
Pre-natal injury to a fetus may also support a charge o f murder. In Attorney-General's 
Reference (No.3 of 1994). Lord Hope stated: 'For the foetus, l i fe lies in the future, not the 
past. It is not sensible to say that i t can never be harmed, or that nothing can be done to it 
which can ever be dangerous. Once it is born i t . . . may also carry wi th it the effects o f things 
done to it before birth which, after birth, may prove harmful. It would not seem unreasonable 
therefore, on public policy grounds, to regard the child in this case, when she became a l iv ing 
person, as wi thin the scope o f the mens rea which B had when he stabbed her mother before 
she was bo rn ' . 3 3 0 Lord Must i l l considered, obiter, that an act o f murder could be initiated 
ante-natally providing: ' i t is possible to interpret the situation as one where the mental 
element is directed, not to the foetus but to the human being when and i f i t comes into 
existence'. 3 3 1 
7 Attorney-General's Reference (no.3 of 1994) [1996] 2 WLR 412. 
8 Seneviratine, M . 'Pre-natal Injury and Transferred Malice: the Invented Other' (1996) 59 MLR 884. 
9 Op cit. n.65. 
° O p cit. n.65.at 443. 
1 Ibid, at 434. 
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The decision o f the House o f Lords in the Attorney-General's Reference (No.3 of 1994) has 
implications for the materno-fetal conf l ic t . 3 3 2 By adopting the principle o f 'transferred malice 
to establish the necessary mens rea and their assertion that qua foetus the child-to-be is an 
integral part o f the mother, the Court o f Appeal appeared to rule out any possibility o f 
maternal criminal l i a b i l i t y ' . 3 3 3 However, by overruling the Court o f Appeal, the House o f 
Lords have established that maternal l iabil i ty for homicide is possible for a pre-natal act. 
Unlawfu l act manslaughter is not relevant to the caesarean section debate because refusing 
medical treatment is l awfu l . However, might gross negligent manslaughter, or even 
murder, 3 3 4 arise when a pregnant woman rejects or ignores medical advice? 
Refusing medical treatment is an omission rather than an act. 3 3 5 Both gross negligent 
manslaughter 3 3 6 and murder 3 3 7 may be committed by omission but only where a there was a 
duty-to-act. A duty-to-act arises where there is a special relationship between the defendant 
and vict im. Such a relationship exists between parent and c h i l d 3 3 8 but does it exist between 
the woman and her fetus? The provisions o f the Abortion Act 1967 make it d i f f i cu l t to 
establish a duty-of-care to the fetus before it reaches 24 weeks o f gestation. It would be 
nonsensical to argue that a woman has both a duty-of-care and a l ibe r ty 3 3 9 to abort on 
minimal grounds. 3 4 0 However, i f the woman elects to carry the fetus to term does the 
rejection o f a termination establish a duty-of-care? 
Fovargue, S. Miola, J. 'Policing Pregnancy: Implications of the Attorney-General's Reference (No.3 
of 1994)' (1998)6Merf. Law Rev. 265. 
3 3 3 Brazier, M . 'Parental Responsibilities, Foetal Welfare and Children's Health'. In: Bridge, C.(Ed.) 
Family Law Towards The Millennium: Essays For P.M. Bromley (1997) 263 at 284. 
3 3 4 This might arise in the unlikely event that, in rejecting medical treatment, an intent (satisfied by the 
virtual certainty of the consequences: R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025) to k i l l or cause grievous bodily 
harm is directed, by the pregnant woman, at the child-to-be rather than the fetus. 
3 3 5 Op cit. n.57. 
3 3 6 Rvlnstan [1893] 1 QB 450. 
3 3 7 R v Gibbons & Procter (1918) 13 Cr. App. R. 134. 
3 3 8 Ibid. 
3 3 9 As healthcare workers are not obliged to assist in an abortion the woman merely has a liberty and not 
a right. 
3 4 0 See n.304. 
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Morally, it may be argued that once a woman elects to continue wi th a pregnancy and to carry 
a fetus to term then she owes a duty-of-care to the child. As Draper suggests: ' . . .having 
decided that the child is going to be born, the woman bearing h im has an obligation not to 
injure him irrespective o f whether or not she intends to mother h im personally' . 3 4 1 Legally, 
for births prior to the Congenital Disabilities (Civi l Liabi l i ty) Act 1976, the common law 
allowed that a child has a cause o f action in negligence for injuries sustained while in utero. 
The duty is contingent ante-natally but crystallises when the child is born a l ive . 3 4 2 
This common law duty would be sufficient to establish maternal l iabil i ty for those offences 
that may be committed by omission. Thus, a woman who refuses medical treatment resulting 
in the post-natal death o f her child may be guilty of, inter alia, murder or gross negligent 
manslaughter. As Whi t f ie ld notes: ' . . .wholly unreasonable refusal to go into hospital despite 
clear medical advice that home delivery would present a danger to the unborn child would 
seem to be a dereliction o f duty which is d i f f icu l t to distinguish f rom an unreasonable refusal 
to take a l iving child to hospital ' . 3 4 3 
Criminal l iabil i ty for negligence is o f a different nature to c iv i l l iabil i ty. C iv i l l iabil i ty is 
black-and-white and once negligence is established the degree o f negligence is irrelevant. ' In 
a criminal court, on the contrary, the amount and degree o f negligence are the determining 
question', per Lord Hewart L C J . 3 4 4 He considered that the accused's negligence must show: 
'such disregard for the l i fe and safety o f others, as to amount to a crime against the State and 
conduct deserving punishment', hi Andrews v DPP, Lord Atk in believed, ' . . .a very high 
degree o f negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established'. 3 4 5 In 
3 4 1 Draper, H. 'Women, Forced Caesareans and Antenatal Responsibilities' (1996) 22 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 327 at 329. 
3 4 2 Op cit. n.306 at 648 per Potts J; upheld by the Court of Appeal [1992] 3 A l l ER 833. 
3 4 3 Op cit. n.309. 
3 4 4 R v Bateman (1925) 94 LJKB 791 at 793. 
3 4 5 Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 5776, [1937] 2 A l l ER 552. 
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Adomoko, the House o f Lords overruled its previous decision in Seymour347 and confirmed 
that the standard o f care for gross negligence manslaughter is objective and determined by 
the jury . 
Even i f the pregnant woman's refusal o f treatment breaches her duty-of-care towards the 
child-to-be and that child dies as a result it is highly improbable that she would reach the 
level o f negligence required for manslaughter. Eekelaar and Dingwall note: 'Grossly 
negligent procedures resulting in the child's death after birth may amount to manslaughter, 
although it seems that this covers only acts, not omissions' . 3 4 8 Thus in Knights349 and hod350 
women who failed to summon assistance or arranged to be unattended during labour were not 
guilty o f manslaughter. However, these cases occurred before the common law first 
recognised a duty to the child-to-be and also before advances in medicine allowed the fetus to 
be treated as a patient. 
The strongest argument against criminal l iabili ty o f pregnant women for treatment arises 
f rom the requirement that the law should be coherent and consistent. Consistency demands 
that i f an individual's right to refuse treatment is absolute under c iv i l law then it should not 
incur a l iabil i ty under criminal law. Although Collins331 and Re MB352 did not specifically 
consider the possibility o f the child dying post-natally, they both strongly aff irmed the 
pregnant woman's right to refuse treatment, ' . . .whether her own l i fe or that o f her unborn 
child depends on i t ' . 3 5 3 This statement might mean the unborn child regardless o f whether it 
3 4 6 R v Adomoko [1994] 3 Al l ER 79. 
3 4 7 R v Seymour [1983] 2 Al l ER 1058, [1983] 2 AC 493. 
3 4 8 Op cit. n.254 at 263. 
3 4 9 R v Knights (1860) 2 F & F 46. 
3 5 0 R v Izod (1904) 20 Cox CC 690. 
3 5 1 Op cit. n.32. 
3 5 2 Op cit. n.31 at 533 a competent woman may refuse consent 'even though the consequence may be 
the death or serious handicap of the child... ' . It is unclear whether this refers to the death of the child 
in-utero (stillborn) or ex-utero, having been delivered alive. 
3 5 3 Op cit. n.32 at 692 per Judge LJ. 
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dies in utero or after birth. I f this is accepted then the c iv i l right to refuse treatment regardless 
o f the consequences would negate any liabili ty for gross negligence manslaughter. 
Alternatively, the statement might only apply where the child is stillborn and the pregnant 
woman may, theoretically, still be liable where the chid dies fo l lowing a live birth. However, 
it would be incoherent for there to be no criminal l iabili ty at all i f the fetus dies in utero but 
l iabil i ty for manslaughter i f i t dies after birth. Although criminal law already differentiates 
between the intentional death o f a fetus and that o f a child, under such circumstances, the 
unlawful k i l l ing o f a fetus, although not a homicide, is still a criminal offence under The 
Infant L i f e (Preservation) Ac t 1929. 
Even i f a theoretical l iabil i ty for gross negligence manslaughter exists i t would be extremely 
unlikely that the crown prosecution service would prosecute. And, i f such a case actually 
reached court, i t is improbable that a jury would f ind a refusal o f treatment grossly negligent, 
especially i f the woman had a reasonable justification for her behaviour. Reasonable 
justification may include religious reasons and poor maternal health that increased the risk o f 
treatment significantly beyond that o f non-treatment. A n irrational decision may receive less 
sympathy, however, because maternal mortality associated wi th caesareans is greater than the 
rate associated wi th vaginal delivery, the mother's decision may st i l l be considered 
reasonable. 3 5 4 
Likewise, since refusing medical treatment is l ikely to be considered a lawful justif ication a 
pregnant woman who refuses a caesarean section w i l l not be liable under s.18 3 5 5 or s.20 3 5 6 
OAPA 1861. 
Between 1991-993, of 140 maternal deaths, 98 were directly or indirectly connected to caesarean 
sections. From: Report on Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths in the United Kingdom 1991-
1993. 
3 5 5 s. 18 OAPA 1861 states: 'Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever 
wound or cause any grievous bodily harm to any person ... with intent... to do some ... grievous 
bodily harm to any person ... shall be guilty of an offence'. 
I l l 
Maternal liability for criminal offences might allow reasonable force to be used to prevent 
the woman f rom injuring her child. Brazier states: ' i t could be argued that i f gross maternal 
neglect could constitute manslaughter when a child is bom alive but dies o f its injuries, s.3 o f 
the Criminal Law Act 1967 justifies anyone intervening to prevent a crime. Section 3 grants 
to every citizen the right to use 'such force as is reasonable [ in the circumstances] in the 
prevention o f a crime'. Could doctors invoke that right to use reasonable force to prevent a 
crime to detain the drug-abusing mother-to-be or to administer a blood transfusion forcibly to 
the Jehovah's witness ' . 3 5 7 This argument also applies to a woman refusing a caesarean. 
However, Collins, because it allows the woman a c iv i l right to refuse treatment regardless o f 
the consequences, negates the possibility o f a woman committing a criminal offence by 
refusing treatment. 
The common law allows reasonable force to be used in the defence o f self or another. As 
intent for murder can be against the child-to-be there seems no reason why the child-to-be 
cannot be considered as 'another' and defended against harm. However, common law self-
defence may only be invoked against unlawful force or unlawful i n j u r y . 3 5 8 Thus, after 
Collins, injury to the fetus - resulting f rom a refusal o f treatment - would not be unlawful and 
a doctor could not jus t i fy a caesarean as common law self-defence. 
The only other possibility that may allow the doctor to override a refusal o f consent is the 
doctrine o f necessity. Necessity provides justification for medical treatment o f patients where 
a valid consent is unavailable. 3 5 9 , 3 6 0 Despite a chequered history, 3 6 1 its continued existence 
3 5 6 Section 20 OAPA 1861 states: 'Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any 
grievous bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be 
guilty of an offence. 
357 Op cit. n.333 at 290. 
3 5 8 Smith, J. Hogan, B. Criminal Law (1996) 314. 
359 
360 
Williams, G. 'Necessity' [1978] Crim LR 128 at 132. 
Op cit. n.201. 
3 6 1 Gardner, S. 'Necessity's Newest Inventions' (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 125. 
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has been supported by a number o f cases. Thus necessity has jus t i f ied the possession o f a 
f i rearm, 3 6 3 growing cannabis for medical purposes, 3 6 4 reckless d r i v i n g 3 6 5 and driving while 
disqual if ied. 3 6 6 In the situation o f a woman refusing a caesarean, the necessity to operate, 
since it cannot override the known objection o f a competent woman, could only be just i f ied 
in the best interest o f the fetus or the child-to-be. Although not discussed in either Collins or 
Re MB, the availability o f this defence should be considered. 
Lord G o f f described 3 types o f necessity: 
1. public necessity - destroying houses to make a fire block to prevent fire spreading; 
2. private necessity - an action taken to save the actor's own person or property f rom 
damage; 
3. where an ' . . .action taken as a matter o f necessity to assist another person without his 
consent'. 3 6 7 
Three conditions must be met: 
1. an external pressure to act (the actor's own suicidal tendencies are intrinsic and thus do 
not jus t i fy action) 3 6 8 ; 
2. the act caused less harm than it averted; 3 6 9 
3. there was no other way o f preventing the harm. 3 7 0 
The risk to the l i fe o f the fetus would, as the doctor has both a moral and legal duty to the 
fetus, certainly satisfy the external pressure to act. Whether or not an alternative means o f 
3 6 2 In R v Rodger and Rose [1998] 1 CR App R 143, the Court of Appeal accepted that a defence of 
necessity or duress of circumstances was available in appropriate cases. 
3 6 3 R v Pommell Times Law Reports, 22 May, 1995; (1996) 60 JCL 173. 
3 6 4 Watson, M . 'Cannabis and the Defence of Necessity' [1998] 148 NU 1260. 
3 6 5 R v Conway [1989] QB 290. 
3 6 6 R v Martin [1989] 1 Al l ER 652. 
367 Op cit. n.201 at 74. 
3 6 8 Op cit. n.362. 
3 6 9 Slapper, G. 'Public Policy under Duress' [1995] 145 NU 1063. Watson (n.364) considered that the 
two harms need only be comparable. 
3 7 0 Op cit. n.364 at 1262. 
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preventing the harm was available would most likely be determined using the Bolam 
principle. However, there w i l l be occasions when a caesarean is the only means of preventing 
harm to the child-to-be. 
Overriding a competent woman's refusal o f consent to a caesarean harms the woman but 
averts harm to the fetus and, arguably, the child-to-be. Since the fetus is not a legal person it 
cannot be the beneficiary o f an act o f necessity under Lord G o f f s 2 n d or 3 r d head. However, i t 
may be considered as a beneficiary o f public necessity. That the state has an interest in the 
viable fetus was clearly stated in the U.S. case Roe v Wade.m However, the state also has an 
interest in the l i fe and wellbeing o f the woman and i t permeates throughout Anglo-American 
reproductive law that the health o f the woman takes precedence over the l i fe o f the fetus. 3 7 3 
Since a caesarean carries a higher mortality rate than vaginal delivery overriding the 
woman's refusal o f consent would risk her l i fe . This runs counter to currently accepted public 
policy and thus necessity could not be just if ied. 
It may be argued that, where a caesarean is indicated on both maternal and fetal grounds, 
there is no conflict between the woman's l i fe and that o f the fetus. In these cases the harm 
prevented is greater (the deaths o f woman and fetus) and the harm caused is less (violation o f 
the woman's bodily integrity and autonomy). However, both Collins and Re MB considered 
the woman's right to self-determination to be the overriding factor regardless o f the outcome. 
Although they did not consider the public's interest in the l i fe and wellbeing o f the fetus, the 
Court o f Appeal ' s judgment represents the current law unless and unti l i t is overruled by the 
House o f Lords or by legislation. Given Balcombe LJ's opinion, in Re F , m and the major 
3 7 1 Op cit. n.157. 
3 7 2 Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
3 7 3 The Abortion Act 1967 allows a termination of pregnancy at any stage of the gestation to prevent 
gTave injury to the physical or mental health of the woman (s. l ( l ) (b)) or to obviate a risk to her life 
(s.l(l)(c)). This was also the only caveat to the states interest in the fetus in Roe v Wade. 
3 7 4 Op cit. n.69 at 538. See p.28. 
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human rights implications involved the House o f Lords would be unlikely to make a 
judgment in favour o f the fetus. Thus it would be up to Parliament to determine the public 
interest in the wellbeing o f the fetus and to legislate accordingly. 
I f mens rea can be projected onto the child after it is born a l ive 3 7 5 surely the justification for 
necessity could also be projected onto the child-to-be? One may interpret the decision in Re 
•S"376 as jus t i f ied by the doctrine o f necessity, 3 7 7 but despite disapproving Re S, neither Re MB 
or Collins considered the doctrine o f necessity. 3 7 8 In Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 
J994) Lord Hope clearly stated that public policy formed the grounds for including the child-
to-be wi th in the scope o f the mens rea o f an act during pregnancy. The Court o f Appeal, in 
both Re MB and Collins, avoided public policy issues but in Re F i t held that Parliament was 
the correct place to determine whether public policy could jus t i fy protecting the fetus/child-
to-be at the expense o f the woman's rights. 
Given the Judges' reluctance to make policy decisions on the maternal-fetal conflict, and 
fol lowing Collins, i t is unlikely that a court would declare it l awful to perform a caesarean 
against the w i l l o f a competent woman for the sake o f the fetus. However, i f a doctor 
proceeded anyway a criminal court would have to determine whether necessity just i f ied the 
act. Judges have a history o f protecting the doctor who acts in good faith and it is possible 
that they may decide that necessity did jus t i fy the act. Gardner suggests that a ' . . .rule could 
be taken as impliedly saying 'do X , unless it is better to do Y ' " . 3 7 9 Regarding the maternal-
fetal conflict this would be 'respect the woman's consent unless it is better not to". This begs 
the question: when is i t better to override the woman's decision? 
3 7 5 Op cit.n.65 at 434, 443. 
3 7 6 Op cit n.2. 
3 7 7 Op cit. n.358 at 307. 
3 7 8 Re MB did consider necessity from the perspective of treating an incompetent pregnant women but 
failed to consider whether it had any relevance to the fetus or child-to-be. 
3 7 9 Op cit. n.361 at 133. 
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Padfield notes: 'The greatest problem with the defence o f necessity is its relationship with 
fundamental r ights ' . 3 8 0 A rights-based theory o f necessity means that the rights protected 
must be hierarchically superior to the rights invaded. Under the ECHR the woman's rights 
are superior to those of the fetus. 3 8 1 The rights o f the child-to-be, however, are conceptually 
different to the rights o f the fetus even though the fetus and child-to-be are the same physical 
entity. The concept o f the child-to-be recognises that events during gestation can affect the 
child once it is born alive. English law recognises this and provides the child-to-be wi th 
contingent rights. However, i f the fetus has no right-to-life then the child has no right to be 
born alive and the doctor cannot claim that necessity justifies infr inging the woman's rights. 
The child-to-be, i f born alive, might have the right to be bom undamaged but this would 
require balancing the child-to-be's right o f bodily integrity against the woman's bodily 
integrity and her autonomy. Thus, as the doctor's act would infringe two o f her actual rights 
as opposed to only one o f the child-to-be's contingent rights, i t would not satisfy necessity's 
requirement that the harm prevented is greater than the harm caused. 
I have shown that necessity would not jus t i fy a doctor overriding a competent woman's 
refusal o f a caesarean for the fetus' sake. As Wil l iams noted: 'the abortion cases raise the 
problem o f the relation between necessity and fundamental rights, like the right-to-life and 
the right to self-determination. We should not regard wi th equanimity the proposition that a 
surgeon can k i l l a patient to get two kidneys to save the lives o f two others, or that he could 
operate to save the l ife o f a sane protesting adul t ' . 3 8 2 Likewise, necessity cannot jus t i fy 
infr inging the woman's rights o f bodily integrity and autonomy to protect the child's limited 
right to be born alive. Only legislative change could alter the balance o f these rights in favour 
o f the fetus. 
3 8 0 Padfield, N M . 'Duress, Necessity and the Law Commission' [1992] Criminal Law Review 778 at 
785. 
3 8 1 See Chapter 5. 
3 8 2 Op cit. n.359 at 135. 
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The current position is that the criminal law is unlikely to punish a woman for refusing a 
caesarean. Collins, by allowing the woman the c iv i l right to refuse treatment regardless o f the 
consequences means that it would be inconsistent and incoherent o f the criminal law to 
punish the woman for exercising this right. Also, the doctor who uses force to override the 
woman's refusal is unlikely to succeed in claiming necessity, self-defence or statutory 
prevention o f a crime against a charge o f battery. 
Tort law also provides some protection for the fetus providing it is born alive. The common 
law approach was similar to the way criminal law currently deals wi th ante-natal harm. The 
ante-natal events that caused the harms are seen as ' l inks in the chain o f causation' resulting 
in the damage suffered at birth when the child inherits the damaged body. 3 8 3 However, the 
common law only applies to children born before the Congenital Disabilities (Civ i l l iabil i ty) 
Act 1976. 
For children born after the 1976 Act the common law is no longer applicable. 3 8 4 The Act still 
requires the child to be born alive before any cause o f action arises but shifts the focus o f the 
tort-feasor's l iabil i ty f rom child to parent. The Act creates a derivative l iabi l i ty such that: 'a 
person ...is answerable to the child i f he was liable in tort to the parent ' . 3 8 5 The dubious value 
o f derivative l iabil i ty, that maternal l iabil i ty is almost completely excluded, 3 8 6 was based on 
the Law Commission's recommendation that: ' legislation should specifically exclude any 
right o f action by a child against its own mother for pre-natal i n j u r y ' . 3 8 7 Except for negligent 
3 8 3 de Martell v Merton and Sutton H.A. [1992] 3 A l l ER 820 at 832 per Philips J. See also: Watt v 
Rama [1972] VR 353; and, Montreal Tramways v Leveille (1933) 4 DLR 337. 
3 8 4 S.4(5) Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976. 
3 8 5 S.l(3) Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976. 45 Halsbury's Statutes (4 t h Ed.) (1994) 
871. 
3 8 6 Op cit. n.333. 
3 8 7 The Law Commission Report on Injuries to Unborn Children. (1974) Law Com. No.60, p25 para 
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driving, the Act excludes almost all the pre-existing ante-natal responsibility o f the mother 
to her child. Under common law a mother may have been liable for negligently rejecting 
medical advice or treatment but fo l lowing the introduction o f the 1976 Act she cannot be 
liable for any such injuries. Thus the child born disabled as a result o f maternal refusal o f 
treatment, even i f the refusal is wholly irrational, has no recourse under either c iv i l or 
criminal law. 
Just as the law provides the child wi th no jus t ice 3 8 9 for injurious ante-natal maternal 
behaviour so there is no legal mechanism for preventing the damage in the first place. 
Although the ante-natal period may be considered when warding a c h i l d , 3 9 0 and an unborn 
child may be placed on the child protection register, 3 9 1 the Court o f Appeal, in Re F,392 held 
that, because it has 'no existence independent o f its mother' the court had no jurisdiction to 
ward the unborn ch i l d . 3 9 3 
I have shown that the civi l law provides very limited protection for the fetus as an unborn 
child. Third party liabili ty to the child for ante-natal injuries is derivative and requires that a 
tort has been committed against one o f the parents. Maternal l iabi l i ty is l imited to negligent 
driving and the courts have no mechanism for prospectively l imi t ing ante-natal injury. A 
competent woman may, on a whim, refuse medical treatment resulting in the birth of a 
disabled child and the child has no cause o f action for compensation. Since it is only by 
determining the fetus' value that it is possible to decide i f and how i t should be protected, I 
3 8 8S.2 Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976. This inconsistent provision is justified as loss-
spreading since compulsory insurance means that the insurer, rather than the mother, wil l have to pay 
the damages. 
3 8 9 Except for negligent driving. 
3 9 0 Re D (A minor) [1986] 3 WLR 1080. In Caller v Caller [1966] 2 A l l ER 754, the court held that an 
unborn child could be a child of the family under s.16 Matrimonial Proceedings Magistrate's Court Act 
1960. 
3 9 1 Barker, RW. 'Unborn Children and Child Protection - Legal Policy and Practice Issues' [1997] XIX 
The Liverpool Law Review 219. 
3 9 2 Op cit. n.69. 
3 9 3 Ibid, at 538 per Balcombe LJ. 
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w i l l discuss whether the current law provides the fetus wi th adequate protection after I have 
considered' its moral worth. 
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Chapter Seven: The Moral Status of the Fetus 
English law ascribes personhood only to those who have been born alive. As Glazebrook 
notes: ' I t is astonishing what a difference being born makes in English l a w ' . 3 9 4 Reid and 
Gillet argue: 'B i r th , in particular makes an important difference to the value o f the fetus, 
because o f what occurs in our interactions wi th the fetus. Bi r th also allows a fetus/child's 
interests to be considered separately f rom those o f the mother' , 3 9 5 In determining whether a 
human being does or does not have moral personhood the only difference between a full-term 
fetus and a new born baby is one o f geography. 3 9 6 However, moral personhood and moral 
value are not synonymous and something that is not a moral person can still be worthy o f 
respect. Douglas identifies three approaches to defining the status o f the fetus: 
1. can the fetus ever be considered a person with all the associated rights; 
2. as a potential person does the fetus deserve the same rights as an actual person; 
3. it is more important to determine how a fetus/embryo should be treated rather than 
whether it can be labelled as a person. 3 9 7 
A 4 t h approach is to consider that all human l i fe is worthy o f protection. The sanctity- of- l i fe 
doctrine 'means that all bodily human l i fe , irrespective o f its quality or kind, is equally 
valuable and invio lable ' . 3 9 8 The doctrine prohibits 'the intentional termination o f innocent 
human l i f e ' . 3 9 9 The modern approach views the doctrine as relative such that, ' . . .the principle 
that l i fe is sacred operates only up to . . . [the] point where l i fe is perceived as not worth 
J 9 4 Op cit. n.323 at 20. 
3 9 5 Reid, MC. Gillet, G. 'The Case of Medea - a View of Fetal-maternal Conflict' (1997) 23 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 19. 
3 9 6 Barrow, R. Injustice, Inequality and Ethics (1982) at 100. 
3 9 7 Op cit. n.318at 29. 
3 9 8 Kuhse, H. The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine (1987) 4. 
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l iv ing ' . However, even under the modified doctrine, human l i fe assumes a certain moral 
value and determining when human l i fe begins is o f moral significance. 
The personhood argument denies that it is being human per se that is intrinsically valuable. 
Rather there are certain characteristics, using the adult human as a model, that constitute 
personhood. As Fortin notes: 'There seems to be little agreement over which properties are 
essential', 4 0 1 but they include: 4 0 2 
1. consciousness (o f objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in 
particular the capacity to feel pain; 
2. reasoning; 
3. self-motivated activity (relatively independent o f either genetic or direct external control); 
4. the capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages o f an indefinite variety o f 
type, that is, not just wi th an indefinite number o f possible contents, but on indefinitely 
many possible topics; 
5. the presence o f self-concepts and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both . 4 0 3 
Because the fetus lacks these characteristics the personhood argument does not support a 
right-to-life equal to that o f a fully-fledged moral person. Even the newborn baby lacks these 
characteristics which means that it deserves no more protection than the fetus. This has led 
some authors to claim that 'infanticide is not morally objectionable' . 4 0 4 
One way around this problem is to define a 'minimal personhood' required to afford the 
right-to-life. Some philosophers argue that 'consciousness' is the truly valuable aspect o f 
4 0 0 Wilson, W. 'Is Life Sacred?' (1995) 17(2) The Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 131. 
4 0 1 Fortin, JES. 'Legal Protection for the Unborn Child' (1988) 51 MLR 57. 
4 0 2 A moral person is not required to possess all of these characteristics, but a being that possesses none 
of them would certainly not qualify. 
4 0 3 Warren, MA. 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion'. In: Gruen, L. Panichas, GE. (Ed.) Sex, 
Morality and the l a w (1997) at 302. 
4 0 4 Op cit. n.401. 
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human l i fe . The first signs o f consciousness equate to when the fetus first experiences 
sensation and thus a sentient fetus has 'minimal personhood' and a r ight - to- l i fe . 4 0 7 
Consciousness requires a functioning neo-cortex which: 'completes its inclusion into the 
neuraxis after mid-gestation'. 4 0 8 This places 'minimal personhood' at 19-22 weeks gestation 
although, on the basis o f Electroencephalographic recordings, it arguably arises later at 30-35 
weeks. 4 0 9 However, the main problem wi th equating sentience wi th personhood is that many 
animal species would have an equally strong right-to-life as a human. The claim that a mouse 
has the same right-to-life as a human person seems intuitively wrong . 4 1 0 However, because 
sentient creatures appreciate pain, sentience justifies minimal rights such as the right not to 
be treated cruelly. A basic right-to-life might also be appropriate but i t would be easier to 
jus t i fy overriding this right than the adult human's right-to-life. Thus, a fetus may not be 
destroyed on a wh im but might be kil led when its continued existence threatens the mother's 
well-being. The newborn baby need not have any greater right-to-life than the sentient fetus 
but, because it is no longer in utero it 's right-to-life is less l ikely to confl ict wi th the mother's 
rights. 
A n alternative view is that personhood merely requires the membership o f a species: ' typif ied 
by rationality or self-consciousness or b o t h ' . 4 " This places embryos on a moral par wi th 
adult humans which means that abortion would not be morally permissible even where the 
mother's l i fe was at risk. Harris dismisses this position because: ' I t would be like arguing that 
4 0 5 Gillet, G. 'Consciousness, the Brain and What Matters' (1990) 4 Bioethics 181. 
4 0 6 Burgess, JA. Tawia, SA. 'When Did You First Begin to Feel It? - Locating the Beginning of Human 
Consciousness' (1996) 10 Bioethics, 1. 
4 0 7 Sumner, LW. Abortion and Moral Theory (1981). 
4 0 8 Flower, MJ. 'Neuromaturation of the Human Fetus' (1985) 10 The Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 248. 
4 0 9 Op cit., n.406 at 23. When the EEG recordings could plausibly be regarded as ancestors of adult 
waking states'. 
4 1 0 Strong, C. 'The Moral Status of Preembryos, Embryos, Fetuses, and Infants' (1997) 22 The Journal 
of Medicine and Philosophy 457 at 462. 
4 1 1 Teichman, J. 'The Definition of Person' (1985) 60 Philosophy 175 at 181. 
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Fred who is tone deaf and musically illiterate, but who comes from a family o f musical 
prodigies, whose parents are famous virtuosi and whose siblings are all concert musicians, 
should be valued as a musician for the musical ability possess by the typical members o f his 
family but not by h i m ' . 4 1 2 
Some ethicists avoid the personhood argument by claiming that human l i fe is intrinsically 
valuable. 4 1 3 The problem is then to determine when human l i fe begins. The Roman Catholic 
Church believes that l i fe begins at conception. 4 1 4 The d i f f icu l ty here is that there is no 
particular reason why conception should be chosen over other points in the human l i fe cycle. 
Davies equates the moment o f conception wi th the creation o f a genetically human 
individual. However, a fertilised egg may develop into a cancerous teratoma, conjoined 
twins, a fetus-in-feto or an anencephalic fetus. As Beller and Zlatnik note: 'individualisation 
apparently depends, in practice, on the presence o f a brain. I f not, resection o f the brainless 
part o f a conjoined twin would constitute murder ' . 4 1 5 Admittedly, the fertilised egg has the 
potential to develop into a human individual but 2/3rds o f all pre-embryos are lost before 
implantation. 4 1 6 The sperm and the unfertilised egg also have potential to develop into a 
human individual 4 1 7 Why should l i fe not be considered to start there? Furthermore, as human 
cloning becomes a reality, any human cell may have the potential to become a human 
individual. Does every cell in our bodies have the right-to-life? 
4 1 2 Harris, J. 'Not Al l Babies Should be Kept Alive as Long as Possible'. In: Gillon, R. Lloyd, A. (Ed.) 
Principles of Health Care Ethics (1994) 643 at 651. 
4 1 3 Davies, A. ' A l l Babies Should be Kept Alive as Far as Possible'. In: Gillon, R. Lloyd, A. (Ed.) 
Principles of Health Care Ethics (1994) 629. 
4 1 4 Soane, B. 'Roman Catholic Casuistry and the Moral Standing of the Human Embryo'. In: Dunstan, 
GR. Seller, MJ. (Ed.) The Status of the Human Embryo (1990) 74. 
4 1 5 Beller, FK. Zlatnik, GP. 'The Beginning of Human Life: Medical Observations and Ethical 
Reflections' (1992) 35(4) Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology 720. 
4 1 6 Ibid. 
4 1 7 Admittedly this potential is less than that of the fertilised egg and only exists while there remains the 
possibility that the two will meet. 
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Other authors have argued for different starting points o f human l i fe . However, human l i fe is 
a continuum - f rom gamete to adult to gamete - interrupted only by the death o f an individual 
who has not reproduced. Essentially, these authors are attempting to determine when a human 
l i fe attains sufficient moral significance 4 1 8 to allow a right-to-life equivalent to that o f the 
paradigm moral person. Points at which this may occur are: 
1. conception; 
2. implantation (6-7 days post-conception); 
3. unity and uniqueness (coinciding with development o f the primitive streak at about day 
14); 
4. when the fetus outwardly resembles the human form ( f rom 6 weeks post-conception); 
5. the first detectable electrical impulses in the brain (about 8 weeks); 
6. Quickening (about 16 weeks); 
7. viabili ty; 
8. the development o f sentience (the earliest possible time for this is 19-22 weeks); 
9. birth; 
10. the ability to experience, to remember the past and envisage the future, to communicate 
etc. 4 1 9 
The last two o f these milestones are not relevant to the fetus and all o f the others may be 
criticised as insufficiently important to jus t i fy conferring a f u l l right-to-life. I have already 
considered conception and using implantation as the point at which a new human being 
comes into existence raises similar objections; cancerous change may still occur and part o f 
the blastocyst that reaches the uterine endometrium w i l l develop into the fetal part o f the 
4 1 8 1 use 'moral significance' to mean that point at which the entity's moral value demands a right-to-life 
equivalent to the paradigm moral person. 
4 1 9 Bok, S. 'Ethical Problems of Abortion'. In: Shannon, TA. (Ed.) Bioethics (1987) 19 at 22; Schenker, 
JG. 'The Rights of the Pre-embryo and Fetus to In-vitro and In-vivo Therapy'. In: Bromham, DR. et al 
(Ed.) Ethics in Reproductive Medicine (1992) 33. 
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placenta. The true significance o f implantation is that it is the beginning o f pregnancy rather 
than the beginning o f a new human being. 4 2 0 
Although development o f the primitive streak is the point at which a unique individual comes 
into existence - the formation o f identical twins or a chimera is no longer possible - that new 
human being is far f rom f u l l y formed. The creation o f a new human being is morally 
important, but a human being's moral value is considerably less than that o f a fully-fledged 
moral person. Its right-to-life is minimal and may be overridden wi th little justification. 
The point at which an embryo begins to resemble a person is anachronistic and probably 
religious in origin. From a secular viewpoint, resemblance to man may jus t i fy a conferred 
moral worth but is o f no intrinsic moral value. 
The beginning o f brain activity has been proposed as the start o f morally significant l i fe 
because this would introduce a symmetrical definition o f l i fe : since brainstem death is the 
criterion for death, so brainstem l ife should be the criterion for l i f e . 4 2 1 The argument for 
brainstem l ife can be criticised because: 
1. a pre-brainstem embryo does not require a brainstem to be a f u l l y functioning individual 
whereas an adult human does; 4 2 2 
2. a pre-brainstem embryo has the potential to develop a brainstem whereas the adult wi th 
brainstem death has no such potential. 
The development o f brain activity is o f moral importance only because it is another step on 
the ladder to moral personhood. 
0 Op cit. n.415. 
1 Ibid.; Kushner, T. 'Having a Life Versus Being Alive' (1984) 1 Journal of Medical Ethics 5. 
2 Downie, J. 'Brain Death and Brain Life: Rethinking the Connection' (1990) 4 Bioethics 216. 
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Quickening marks the point at which the mother first becomes aware o f fetal movement. This 
is relevant only because it may increase social interaction between the fetus, its mother-to-be 
and other persons allowed to 'feel the baby kicking' . Fetal movement is used as an indicator 
o f fetal well-being and the mother-to-be may relate periods o f activity to the fetus 'being 
awake'. Quickening may therefore be a reasonable point at which to allow the fetus a greater 
moral value than the embryo at implantation or at the point o f f irst brain activity but it does 
not equate to personhood. 
Viabi l i ty arises when the fetus is capable o f surviving outside the womb. The U.S. Supreme 
Court accepted viability as jus t i fy ing a 'compelling' state interest in the fetus, 'because the 
fetus then presumably has the capability o f meaningful l i fe outside the mother's w o m b ' . 4 2 3 
Although - based on this judgment - the District o f Columbia Superior Court allowed a 26 
week fetus' right-to-life to override its competent mother's refusal o f a caesarean section, the 
decision was reversed on appeal. 4 2 4 Furthermore, in Roe v Wade the Supreme Court held that 
the right to preserve the mother-to-be's health and l i fe overrides the right-to-life o f even a 
viable fetus. Having sufficient surfactant in its lungs and access to more advanced medical 
facilities does not increase the intrinsic moral value o f the viable fetus. The moral 
significance o f viabili ty arises because the act o f terminating a pregnancy can potentially be 
achieved without k i l l ing the fetus. 
The final milestone relevant to the fetus is sentience. I have already discussed its significance 
as affording a minimal personhood and arguing that sentience is the beginning o f morally 
significant l i fe is essentially no different. Thus none o f the milestones proposed allow the 
fetus a right-to-life equivalent to the paradigm moral person. 
4 2 3 Op cit. n.372. 
4 2 4 Op cit. n.6; re AC, 533 A.2d 611 (App. D.C. 1987), reh'g granted, judgement vacated, 539 A.2d 
203 (App. D.C. 1988). 
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Some philosophers suggest the fetus has moral value as a potential person. The usual 
argument against potential is; destroying an acorn is not the same as destroying an oak tree. 
Harris states: 'The argument f rom potentiality involves the idea that we are not valuable for 
what we are but for what we w i l l become'. 4 2 5 His view is wrong and the true argument for 
valuing potentiality is; we are not only valuable for what we are but are also valuable for 
what we w i l l become. Thus, an entity's value comes mostly from its present state and its 
potential to become something more valuable merely adds to that entity's inherent value. As 
Gil lon notes: 'There seems little doubt that i f something has the potential to be valuable then 
there is good prima facie reason to value it however the value o f the ini t ial entity is not 
generally as great as the value o f the entity it has the potential to become'. 4 2 6 
The main difficulties with potentiality come when it is used to afford the same value to the 
potential entity and the entity itself. This was noted by Poplawski and Gillett: 
1. giving an embryo rights that it may have at a later stage only makes sense if its potential is 
an intrinsic property that confers those rights. An entity should be valued on the basis of 
what it is not what it might be; 
2. the potentiality of an embryo may never be achieved, i.e. it may never become a fully-
fledged moral person; 
3. how far back in a human life cycle should those rights be extended? 4 2 7 
Their solution is to deny the fetus intrinsic moral worth because of its potential but allow a 
conferred moral value because it will be justified at some potential point in that individual's 
life span. However, potentiality is an intrinsic characteristic with a moral value of its own. 
There is no need to argue for conferred moral value except to try and justify an equal right-to-
life for the fetus and moral person alike. It makes little sense to argue that the full value of an 
4 2 5 Op cit. n.412at 652. 
4 2 6 Gillon, R. 'Human Embryos and the Argument from Potential' (1991) 17 Journal of Medical Ethics 
59. 
4 2 7 Poplawski, N. Gillett, G. 'Ethics and Embryos' (1991) 11 Journal of Medical Ethics 62. 
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oak tree should be conferred on an acorn simply because one stage of its life-cycle is to be an 
oak tree. 
Because of potentiality's intrinsic value, the greater the potential an entity has to become 
something of moral value the greater it should be valued. A neonate has a greater potential to 
become a moral person than does a fetus at term because it has survived an event (birth) that 
might have destroyed that potential and is nearer to achieving its potential. Likewise a ful l-
term fetus, which has survived the gestation period, has a greater moral value than a fetus at 
an earlier stage of pregnancy. This gradual increase in potential,4 2 8 and hence moral value, is 
neither completely smooth nor stepped but is a combination of the two. Each day the fetus 
survives is a day nearer moral personhood but equally there are certain events that increase 
its potential significantly beyond the gradual, day-to-day, change. These events include; 
conception, implantation, development of the primitive streak, development of brain activity, 
viability, development of sentience and birth. However, it is important to note that the fetus 
has intrinsic value because of both its actual characteristics and its potential characteristics. 
Also, although full moral personhood confers full moral rights and responsibilities, that does 
not mean some moral rights cannot exist before full personhood is achieved. 
The right-to-life is a fundamental moral right and without its protection ful l moral 
personhood may never be achieved. Because of this life must be protected before moral 
personhood is reached. A limited right-to-life begins at conception, but at this stage it is a 
very weak right and can be overridden simply because a new life would be 'inconvenient' to 
the responsible moral person. As the embryo/fetus develops, so its right-to-life becomes 
stronger. Up until birth the fetus' continued existence may be detrimental to the pregnant 
woman's health or life and thus conflict with her rights. At this stage her rights outweigh 
Op cit. n.395. 
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those of the child and i f there is no alternative she has the moral right to terminate the 
pregnancy even i f it kills the fetus. However, after birth, the child, although not yet a full 
moral person, has a right-to-life that cannot be so overridden. This is not because its moral 
right-to-life is greater than that of the full term fetus, but simply because there will be ways 
of resolving any conflict of rights without needing to kill the child. Thus, it is only where 
there is no alternative to destroying the fetus that the pregnant woman, when her health is 
threatened, has the moral right to destroy a late gestation fetus. 
Some authors have suggested that the fetus has moral worth because that value is conferred 
on to it by fully-fledged moral persons.429 Strong argues that conferring moral value on non-
persons, like fetuses, engenders 'good' qualities such as 'sympathy and care for human 
l i f e ' . 4 3 0 Unlike other authors who emphasise the social role of entities, Strong argues that: 
' . . .focusing on social role is too narrow an approach. Rather, it is the overall degree of 
similarity that an individual has to the paradigm of human persons - to self-conscious human 
beings - that matters in the consequentialist argument'.431 Social interactions begin well 
before birth and are encouraged by ultrasound pictures of the fetus, amplified fetal 
heartbeats, fetal movement, the ability of doctors to treat the fetus as a patient in its own right 
and the encouragement of mothers to begin their child's educational experiences while it is 
still in utero. These social interactions, along with the similarities of the fetus to the paradigm 
moral person, justify the conferring of moral worth on the fetus. However, allowing a 
conferred moral value 'that is close to, although not quite as strong as, that of persons in the 
strict sense... [does not mean] .. .that fetuses near term should have legal rights equal to 
those of women'. 4 3 2 
4 2 9 Op cit. n.410. 
4 3 0 Strong, C. Anderson, GD. 'An Ethical Framework for Issues During Pregnancy'. In: Gillon, R. 
Lloyd, A. (Ed.) Principles of Health Care Ethics (1994) 587 at 589. 
4 3 1 Op cit. n.410at 466. 
4 3 2 Op cit. n.430 at 590. 
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It remains only to consider whether the approach taken by the Warnock committee is 
justifiable. They stated: 'Although the questions of when life or personhood begin to appear 
to be questions of fact susceptible of straight forward answers, we hold that the answers to 
such questions in fact are complex amalgams of factual and moral judgements. Instead of 
trying to answer these questions directly we have therefore gone straight to the question of 
how it is right to treat the human embryo'.433 However, when they considered the question of 
the time limit on research on human embryos they referred to the formation of the primitive 
streak as marking 'the beginning of individual development of the embryo'. 4 3 4 This can only 
be because they regarded that point as being when the moral value of the embryo outweighed 
the benefit to society of any research carried out on it. Thus, although it is not necessary to 
determine whether the fetus should ever be considered a moral person it is not possible to 
consider how the fetus should be treated without at least determining its moral worth. 
I do not believe the fetus could ever justifiably be considered a fully-fledged moral person. 
However, it is not necessary to prove that it is a person in order to allow the fetus moral value 
and associated rights. The right-to-life is one such right that does not depend on personhood. 
However, rights are rarely absolute and, in a conflict, the right-to-life of a moral person 
outweighs that of a non-person. The fetus gains its moral value from three sources: 
intrinsically from its actual characteristics; intrinsically from its potentiality; and extrinsically 
from moral value conferred by fully-fledged moral persons. The combined moral worth of the 
fetus gradually increases with superimposed steps due to significant events in its 
development. As the fetus develops so the three sources of its moral value combine to give 
the fetus an increasingly strong right-to-life. I f the right-to-life of the full-term fetus is to be 
overridden then there must be good justification. Thus, the refusal of medical treatment that 
Warnock, M. (Chairperson) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (1984) 60. 
4 3 4 Ibid, at 66. 
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would benefit the fetus is justified only i f that treatment would significantly harm the mother, 
either physically or psychologically. 
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Part Three: Conclusions 
The English experience of the caesarean section debate highlights two areas of concern. 
Firstly, despite emphasising the primacy of autonomy over the sanctity of life, the Court of 
Appeal in both Collins and Re MB has left a number of loopholes that allow doctors - or the 
court - to circumvent the pregnant woman's refusal of consent. These 'get-out' clauses 
include the flexibility of competence assessment and the largely undefined effect of 
temporary incapacitating factors such as pain, stress or drugs. The fact that labour itself is 
included as such a factor emphasises the scope for subjective analysis of a pregnant woman's 
competence. The problem is exacerbated because the Court of Appeal, while accepting that a 
competent woman may make an irrational decision, has allowed that competence be tested 
against the actual decision rather than against the person's capacity to make such a decision. 
However, since this thesis is aimed at the caesarean conflict rather than the problems 
associated with competence I will not discuss these problems any further. 
The second area of concern relates to the one-sided way in which the law weights the 
balancing of rights in favour of the woman. That the scale may be tipped too far in favour of 
the woman is exemplified by the 'strained reasoning' that the courts-at-first-instance have 
resorted to in trying to protect the fetus. There is obviously a reasonable body of opinion, 
certainly amongst the Family Division judges, that believes the fetus worthy of stronger legal 
protection than it currently receives. The fetus - especially at full term - although not a ful l -
fledged moral person cannot be dismissed as having no moral worth or right-to-life. Thus, its 
rights to-life and bodily integrity still deserve legal protection. The question that remains is 
whether there is a point at which it is morally justified to override a competent woman's 
decision, and whether that moral justification warrants a change in the law, to protect the 
fetus. 
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Mair notes: 'Morally, a society may consider that a pregnant woman is responsible for the 
well-being and development of her foetus'. 4 3 5 Thus, some authors contend that, by planning 
pregnancy or by rejecting the option of termination, a woman voluntarily assumes a duty-of-
care to her fetus.4 3 6 Although this view may be criticised,4 3 7 it is uncontentious to suggest that 
it would be morally good for a pregnant woman to act in the 'best interests' of her fetus. 
However, this does not mean that it would be morally bad to act against those 'best interests': 
firstly, there may be disagreement as to what constitutes the fetus' 'best interests'. Thus, the 
woman may be acting in the way that she feels is in the fetus' 'best interests' but her 
viewpoint may conflict with the doctor's opinion; secondly, although morally good, it is not 
morally required for the woman to act as a good Samaritan, especially where it harms the 
woman. Few would condemn a parent who fails to rescue a child from a burning house and a 
caesarean certainly causes significant trauma and even risks the woman's life. As Weinrib 
notes: 'Respect for another's physical security does not entail foregoing one's own' . 4 3 8 
The moral pressure on the woman is further lessened by the lack of reliability of clinical 
judgement in obstetrics.439 One study demonstrated that in 30% of cases at least 4 of the 5 
assessors disagreed with the decision to perform an immediate caesarean where the indication 
was 'fetal distress'. Further, they found that unanimity only occurred in 28% of cases.440 The 
problem may be compounded by the doctor's desire to avoid the worse possible outcome 
regardless of how rarely that outcome will actually be realised.441 This means that a non-
consensual caesarean is equivalent to demanding a parent enters a burning house in case their 
child requires rescuing. 
4 i > Opci t . n.173 at 87. 
4 3 6 Op cit. n.341 at 329; See p. 109. 
4 3 7 Op cit n.42 at 14. 
4 3 8 Weinrib, EJ. 'The Case for a Duty to Rescue' (1980) 90 The Yale Law Journal 247 at 289. 
4 3 9 Op cit. n. 11 at 268. Also see n.4 at 2011. 
4 4 0 Barrett, JFR. Jarvis, GJ. Macdonald, HN. Buchan, PC. Tyrrell, SN. Lilford, RJ. 'Inconsistencies in 
Clinical Decisions in Obstetrics' (1990) 337 Lancet 549. 
4 4 1 Op cit. n.4 at 2017. 
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Although it is not morally bad for a person to refuse to 'rescue' someone when there is a 
reasonable risk of harm, the situation is different where there is no risk to the 'rescuer'. 
Weinrib argues: 'Because his claim to that freedom [to pursue his projects as a moral right] 
implies a right to the physical integrity that is necessary to its exercise, he must concede to 
others the right to physical integrity that he implicitly and inevitably claims for himself . 4 4 2 A 
caesarean indicated on both maternal and fetal grounds confers a direct physical benefit on 
the woman. Thus, 'rescuing' the fetus can be achieved without the woman risking harm. 
Since the woman can 'rescue' her fetus without harming herself there is a greater moral 
pressure on her to be a good Samaritan. However, even though it may be morally good to 
consent to a caesarean this does not mean that she should be required to do so by legal 
coercion. 
Given the divergent views in the materno-fetal conflict, it is unlikely that moral debate will 
solve the issue. Honore notes: 'to ensure, or try to ensure, justice between moral communities 
which are seriously at variance with one another is something that only a political entity can 
do. I f the State does not intervene, justice is not well served... Law here acts as a determinant 
of justice. 
Given that justice provides the motive for political intervention, laws do not usually rule on 
moral conflicts directly... What they are ruling on is whether to permit certain 
behaviour... \ 4 4 3 In order to determine the behaviour acceptable to society as a whole the 
legislature must consider the moral conflict in light of practical considerations such as the 
likely consequences of judicial intervention, the cost of intervention and the ability of the 
state to police the behaviour. It is perhaps these practical issues that provide the strongest 
argument against overriding the competent pregnant woman's decision. 
4 4 2 Op cit. n.438 at 288. 
4 4 3 Honore, T. "The Dependence of Morality on Law' (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 at 
16. 
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Plomer states: 'The moral ideal of respect for human life cannot justify the use of legally 
sanctioned forcible invasions of women's bodies... the concern is that judicial legitimation of 
medically coerced Caesareans could gradually lead to a brutalization of medical care with a 
resulting and inevitable erosion of fundamental civil liberties'. 4 4 4 Examples of this 
brutalization are aptly demonstrated by the U.S. experience: viewing the fetus as worthy of 
protection at the expense of the woman has resulted in some frightening scenarios such as 
that involving Pamela Monson who was arrested for, inter alia, disobeying her doctor's 
instructions and having sexual intercourse with her husband.445 In another case, a Nigerian 
woman was forcibly restrained in leather straps to enforce a court ordered caesarean. Other 
women have gone into hiding or had the police sent out to transport them back to hospital.4 4 6 
Oberman concludes that state intervention: 'threatens the medical and ethical integrity of the 
doctor-patient relationship'.4 4 7 She argues that mandatory care may cause patients to avoid 
the health care system and notes that in South Carolina: 'rates of women delivering babies in 
abandoned buildings and bus stations soared following the implementation of a mandatory 
prenatal drug-screening policy, accompanied by criminal sanctions for those women who 
used drugs'.4 4 8This point is interesting because protecting the ethical integrity of the doctors 
was one of the state interests in Robb449 that may justify overriding a person's autonomy. 
Oberman's argument suggests that, far from protecting it, not respecting a patient's 
autonomy may destroy that doctor's ethical integrity. 
Oberman further claims that another reason for avoiding state intervention is: 'From 
bloodletting to thalidomide, the history of pregnancy-related medical innovations is rife with 
Op cit. n. l l at 271. 
Op cit. n42 at 13. 
Op cit. n.4 at 2004. 
Op cit. n.l68at72. 
Ibid, at 75. 
Op cit. n.222. 
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treatments that ultimately have proven ineffective and even harmful to pregnant women and 
developing fetuses'.450 Related to this is the acknowledged lack of certainty in the 
obstetrician's clinical opinion. I have already argued that this uncertainty reduces the moral 
pressure on the woman to follow the advice and, similarly, it weakens any justification for 
legal coercion. Thus, Annas states: 'In three of the first five [U.S.] cases in which court-
ordered caesarean sections were sought, the woman ultimately delivered vaginally and 
uneventfully. In the face of such uncertainty - uncertainty compounded by decades of 
changing and conflicting expert opinion on the management of pregnancy and childbirth - the 
moral and legal primacy of the competent, informed pregnant woman in decision making is 
overwhelming'.4 5 1 Furthermore, Nelson and Milliken state that: 'Incompleteness of medical 
knowledge and the unavoidable uncertainty of medical diagnostic and therapeutic techniques 
make it impossible to define a clear, precise, and accurate model on which society could base 
a fair and uniformly applied legal policy that would sanction the use of force against pregnant 
women'. 4 5 2 
Compounding these issues is the reality that, since most women wil l accept their doctor's 
advice, these cases are uncommon. Even though individual cases are tragic, to change the law 
to protect those few fetuses at risk would require the devaluing of all pregnant women to the 
point where they are treated as 'fetal containers'.453 As Nelson and Milliken note: 'situations 
in which fetuses may die or be born damaged as a direct result of maternal behaviour are 
likely to be rare. This being so, the price of intervention to woman's liberty and privacy 
, . , , 454 
seems too high . 
4 5 0 Opcit. n. 168 at 72. 
4 5 1 Annas, GJ. 'Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients' (1987) 316 NEJM 1213. 
4 5 2 Op cit. n.38atl065. 
4 5 3 Opcit. n.42 at 13. 
4 5 4 Op cit. n.38at 1065. 
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I have argued that to legally coerce pregnant women into submitting to non-consensual 
treatment would be unjust and cause more harm than it prevents. Such a change in the law 
would not be justified on utilitarian grounds. Likewise, Kantian principles also run counter to 
overriding the pregnant woman's autonomy. To treat the woman as a 'fetal container' is to 
treat her as a means to an end rather than an end in herself. Since the woman is a fully-
fledged member of the moral community, while the fetus is not, her rights must be 
hierarchically superior. In conflict the woman's right's must trump those of the fetus. 
However, seeing the caesarean section debate as a conflict between the woman and her fetus 
is misleading and potentially damaging. As Mair notes: 'The conflict model stifles 
communication. In the presentation of the conflict the loudest voice, and sometimes the only 
voice, is that of the doctor. The foetus cannot speak and the woman is often not heard'.4 5 5 
Since the fetus - unlike the child - is totally dependant on its mother, every action of the 
pregnant woman potentially affects the fetus. Likewise, all the risks of childbearing are borne 
by the pregnant woman and any treatment of the fetus must infringe both the woman's liberty 
and her bodily integrity. For these reasons, and because - in most cases - the woman is highly 
motivated to act in the fetus' best interests, the law should allow her to decide what is in both 
their best interests. The law should not favour one member of society over another, let alone 
favour a potential member over a current one, and thus, the state should not protect the fetus 
at the expense of the pregnant woman. The situation following birth is different: when a court 
overrides a parental treatment decision they are restricting the parent's power, not their right, 
to decide on their child's medical care. The parent's own rights of self-determination and 
bodily integrity are not infringed. In this case, treatment of the fetus is also treatment of the 
pregnant woman. As the only autonomous partner in this unique relationship she must be 
allowed to make the decisions about their care. There is, however, one instance where it may 
Op cit. n.173 at 95. 
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be justifiable for the law to intervene and that is where the competent pregnant woman 
refuses consent for a wholly irrational reason. 
A decision based entirely on irrational reasons (a whim) does not further the woman's 
autonomy. The only valid interest served by protecting the woman's right to whimsy is her 
liberty. In some circumstances, and the need for a caesarean may be one of them, overriding a 
whimsical decision wil l further the woman's autonomy.456 It may be argued that autonomy is 
the valuable component of liberty and that the law should, i f necessary, protect autonomy 
even at the expense of liberty. However, restriction of liberty is itself a harm and must be 
justified. Where the person making the decision is capable of autonomy our legal system 
holds that self-harm is not sufficient to justify restricting liberty. Further justification, such as 
the corruption of morals, is required.457 One such justification is to prevent harm to others.458 
Although the fetus is not a legal person it still has a limited right-to-life that warrants a 
degree of legal protection. Thus, i f the law could protect the fetus without harming the 
woman - except by restricting her liberty to make irrational decisions - it would be justified in 
so doing. However, a woman should not be compelled to undergo a non-consensual caesarean 
because: firstly, there is often significant uncertainty that the fetus will be harmed by the 
woman's refusal of consent. Her decision may increase the risk to the fetus but 'risk cannot 
be regarded as harm in its own right'; 4 5 9 secondly, overriding her refusal infringes, not only 
the woman's liberty but also, her right to bodily integrity, and risks her right-to-life. Thus, it 
potentially limits her future autonomy. For example, a caesarean increases the likelihood that 
her future children will also have to be delivered via caesareans and thus her choice of 
4 5 6 See p.74. 
4 5 7 R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75. 
4 5 8 Feinberg, J. Harm to Others (1984). 
4 5 9 Perry SR. 'Risk, Harm and Responsibility'. In: Owen, DG. (Ed.) Philosophical Foundations of Tort 
Law (1995) 321 at 339. 
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delivery may be limited, not only in this case but also, in all of her future pregnancies. The 
price of restricting her liberty may be much more than 'just' a single operation. 
Therefore, even where the woman's decision is wholly irrational, the law should never 
authorise a caesarean in the face of a competent woman's refusal. However, this does not 
mean that she should not be legally responsible for her decision. Criminal sanctions would be 
a draconian way of protecting the fetus that might disrupt the doctor-patient relationship, 
enflame any adversarial conflict between woman and fetus and 'brutalize' medical care. 
Furthermore, criminal sanctions would, arguably, act to indirectly coerce women to submit to 
a non-consensual caesarean. Possibly the only justifiable way of making the woman legally 
responsible would be in liability in tort. 
Liability would be for any harm caused to the child as a result of a 'negligent' decision. 
Liability should not be strict because this would penalise women, whose decisions were 
reasonably based on beliefs (e.g. religious beliefs) acceptable to society, for following their 
beliefs. This would be contrary to religious tolerance and the freedom of religion protected 
by the ECHR. Liability for negligence allows the woman to refuse the advice where her 
decision is 'reasonable'. However, where it is unreasonable she should be responsible for her 
choice. This would be just and fair to the child who would be able to claim monetary 
recompense for any harms caused by the woman's decision while still allowing the woman to 
make the decision without the risk of state intervention or the stigma of criminal liability. As 
Honore states: 'The argument for holding people responsible to others for harmful outcomes 
is that it is fair to make the person to whom the advantages wil l flow from an uncertain 
situation over which [s]he has some control (or which [s]he has chosen to enter into) bear the 
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losses that may likewise flow from that situation'. It may be that, in most cases, simply the 
fact that a caesarean carries a greater maternal risk than a vaginal delivery is sufficient reason 
to negate the woman's liability. However, this does not mean that the woman should not be 
responsible where this is not the case. 
One argument against holding the woman responsible for her decision is that of the slippery-
slope. I f a woman should be responsible for her medical decisions then she should also be 
responsible for her other behaviour during pregnancy. Thus she should be liable for drug-
taking and i f she should be liable for the effects of her drug taking then the same holds for 
smoking, drinking alcohol, a poor diet etc. Likewise, i f she is responsible to her child for 
ante-natal behaviour then why not for her pre-conception behaviour? Furthermore, i f the 
woman should be responsible for the post-natal effects of her ante-natal behaviour then so 
should her partner and indeed anyone, including the state, whose actions cause harm to the 
child. 
Perhaps the strongest argument against liability in tort is: the only way for the woman to 
ensure that she avoids tortious liability would be for her to submit to the caesarean. This 
means that to avoid liability she would have to allow her bodily integrity to be infringed. 
There is no other area in tort law, or in law generally, that requires one person to submit to an 
infringement of bodily integrity for the sake of another. Although tort law liability may often 
only be avoided by inconvenience or monetary expense these are far smaller burdens than the 
infringement of bodily integrity required of the woman. It may be argued that the physical 
harm to the fetus is far greater i f the refusal is upheld than the physical harm to the woman i f 
the refusal is overridden. This may be defeated on two points. Firstly, a caesarean wil l always 
put the woman's life at risk. Thus it is by no means certain that the harm to the fetus will be 
4 6 0 Honore, T. 'The Morality of Tort Law - Questions and Answers'. In: Owen, DG. (Ed.) 
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (1995) 73 at 83. 
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greater. Secondly, there are no other instances in English law where an 'innocent' party is 
expected to allow themselves to be harmed for the sake of another even where the overall 
harm is reduced. For these reasons tort liability is not justified, even where the woman's 
decision is wholly irrational. 
In conclusion, where the woman is competent, a non-consensual caesarean should never be 
authorised even i f her decision is wholly irrational. Although the right to liberty in decision 
making carries with it responsibility for ones actions, criminal sanctions would be too 
draconian. Likewise, tortious liability would be unjustifiable. This is because the state has no 
right to expect one 'innocent' individual to submit to physical harm for the sake of another. 
Nelson and Milliken argue that the woman has an ethical obligation to the fetus but agree that 
'legal enforcement would create more harm than it could prevent'.461 The current law rightly 
emphasises the primacy of autonomy but, by allowing too great a scope for finding the 
woman incompetent, is still deficient in its protection of autonomy. The risk-related standard, 
adoption of overly vague temporarily incapacitating factors and the subjective nature of the 
Re C test all need addressing in order to tighten the loopholes. Only when these problems 
have been solved wil l the pregnant woman be properly respected as an autonomous person 
who, simply through her role as child-bearer, already sacrifices her liberty to a significant 
extent for the sake of her fetus. Protecting the fetus is best served through education and 
engendering a good doctor-patient relationship which allows the woman to trust the advice 
she is given. Conflict and adversarial relationships are generally destructive and risk 
exacerbating the very harm the doctors are trying to prevent by driving the women away from 
the healthcare system. 
'Op cit. n.38at 1066. 
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